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This study investigated peacekeeping in West Africa, with particular focus on
Nigeria’s roles (diplomatic, political, cultural, socioeconomic, peacekeeping and peace
enforcement) in the West Africa region, from 1990 to 2005. This time frame is
particularly important, because in the 1 990s, the West African region experienced an
outbreak of inter/intra state conflicts. These conflicts have been studied extensively by
social scientists, political analysts and other scholars. In many of these studies, the
analysts have focused mostly on the intervening roles of groups and organizations, such
as the United Nations (UN), and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). What this study found missing, however, is an in-depth analysis of the
role/s of individual member states, such as Nigeria. The inter-agency framework for
conflict analysis in transition and the contemporary history approaches were utilized to
further understand the dynamics of peacekeeping in West Africa and the extent of
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Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The conclusion drawn from
the findings suggest that Nigeria plays pivotal peacekeeping roles in the West African
region. These roles though necessitated by the limited role of the international
community in Africa since the end of the Cold War, and by the need for regional political
stability and security, have placed added burden on Nigeria as evidenced by the case
studies of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises of the 1990s.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The interest in peacekeeping has been the subject of several studies and continues
to dominate the minds of many on the international scene. Fundamentally, peacekeeping
relates to the preservation of peace, especially the supervision by international forces of a
truce between hostile nations) It has been a subject of vast academic and professional
inquiry, primarily because of its importance as a strategy for maintaining and preserving
peace, stability, and order in conflict-ridden parts of the world. Worldwide, old and new
conflicts, emanating largely from people’s quest for political, economic, territorial, and
even cultural independence and power, provide ample justification for peacekeeping
initiatives and efforts at the international and regional levels.
Enormous resources and efforts are invested continuously in peacekeeping by
international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), by world powers, such as
the United States, and by regional powers, such as Nigeria in the case of West Africa. As
strategically important as peacekeeping is to peace and order worldwide, there is much to
1. The American Heritage Dictionary ofthe English Language, Fourth Edition (New
York: Houghton: Mifflin Company, 2000).
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learn about the political, economic and tactical dimensions and dynamics of
peacekeeping as an activity.
This study is an analysis ofNigeria’s peacekeeping policies, roles, and strategic
actions in West Africa from 1990 to 2005. Nigeria acts in her capacity as an individual
state and as a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
Nigeria’s peacekeeping endeavors can be traced as far back as 1960 and even before
then.2 The motivation for this inquiry stems from a need to understand the dynamics of
regional peacekeeping particularly in relation to West African peacekeeping missions.
Part of this study is also an attempt to further understand the reasons behind, and the
extent of, Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles, because they differ from the traditional United
Nations’ (UN) peacekeeping missions.
In this research, the interest in peacekeeping as a subject is from the point of view
of political scholarship or analysis. Essentially, this interest is pursued by delving into
the politics of peacekeeping in West Africa, zeroing in specifically on Nigeria’s roles.
The motivation for Nigeria’s roles will be investigated, along with the various channels
through which the roles are played. For the latter, an assessment of ECOWAS and its
monitoring group, Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG), will be made. To further enhance the depth of this analysis, an evaluation
ofNigeria’s roles in ECOWAS/ECOMOG will also be carried out.
The scope of analysis ofNigeria’s peacekeeping roles in West Africa will cover
diplomatic, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, political, socioeconomic and cultural
2. Olajide Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: George Allen and
UNWIN Ltd., 1981), 23.
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dimensions. Outside the roles of the UN and world powers such as Britain, France, and
the United States of America, little is known about the roles of individual member states
in regional alliances in peacekeeping. This information gap is particularly serious in
regions in the developing world, and especially in Africa. In West Africa, the geo
political region of focus in this study, there is a significant body of literature on
ECOMOG’s participation in different peacekeeping events in West Africa, but none
shows, for example, an in-depth analysis of the peacekeeping roles played significantly
by a country like Nigeria, a role that is unparalleled by any other country in the region.
Statement of the Problem
During the Cold War era, the West African region was relatively politically stable
but in the 1990s, the region became home to some of the world’s deadliest conflicts.3
These conflicts have been studied extensively by social scientists, political analysts and
other scholars. In many of these studies, the analyses have focused mostly on the
intervening roles of groups and organizations, such as the UN, ECOMOG, and others.
What this research finds missing, however, is an in-depth analysis of the role of
individual member states, such as Nigeria, which plays pivotal peacekeeping roles in the
West African region.
Peacekeeping is the action of a third party between warring forces, enforcing a
cease fire or other truce, usually in support of political moves towards a lasting peace
3. Rasheed Draman and David Carment, Managing Chaos In The West African Sub
Region: Assessing The Role ofECOMOG in Liberia (2001), http://http-server.carleton.cal’--
dcarmentlpapers/ECOMOG.pdf (accessed April 4, 2007).
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settlement.4 The concept of peacekeeping is, however, extensive, encompassing several
elements such as human behaviors and principles. According to Draman and Carment,
the concept of peacekeeping is derived from certain principles: the consent of the parties
to the conflict, the use of force only in self-defense and, more importantly, claims to
impartiality.5
The referenced principles are not always easy to maintain in times of conflict, and
to prevent the collateral damages of conflict, such as destruction of lives and/or
livelihoods, peacekeeping intervention finds it difficult to operate exclusively within the
stated principles. As Draman and Carment further contend, “. . . it is well documented
that these principles which constitute the basic elements of classical peacekeeping have
become problematic in many intra-state conflict situations.”6 Furthermore:
A classical function of peacekeeping is the control of violent conflicts with the
stabilization of armistice lines.. . the majority of peacekeeping during the Cold
War period was limited to separating national armies in ending hostilities between
belligerent states. Since then, the roles of peacekeepers have been diverse with
rise of demand for new functions of international military forces in response to
hostilities among ethnic groups.7
It is not by accident that the West African region experienced an explosion of
conflicts in the 1990s. Many of the states in the region became independent between
4. Net Resources International, http://www.army-technology.com/glossary/
peacekeeping.html (accessed September 9, 2009).
5. Rasheed Draman and David Carment, Managing Chaos In The West African Sub
Region: Assessing The Role ofECOMOG In Liberia (2001), http://http-server.carleton.cal-
dcarment/papers/ECOMOG.pdf (accessed April 4, 2007).
6. Ibid.
7. Ho-Won Jeong, Peacekeeping: International and Regional, http://classweb.gmu.edu
hwjaeong/peacekeeping.htm (accessed January 1, 2008).
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1957 and 1962; a period popularly referred to as “annus mirabilis”8 meaning years of
wonder. Particularly, each one of these states was ill-equipped to function as a nation.
The ill preparedness of these newly independent states (which have just emerged from
colonial rule) is so because they were not groomed to self-govern, but rather were
economically exploited by their various colonizers. As articulated by Rodney:
The combination of being oppressed, being exploited, and being disregarded is
best illustrated by the pattern of the economic infrastructure of African colonies:
notably, their roads and railways. These had a clear geographical distribution
according to the extent to which particular regions needed to be opened up to
import/export activities. Where exports were not available, roads and railways had
no place. The only slight exception is that certain roads and railways were built to
move troops and make conquest and oppression easier.9
What can be deduced from Rodney’s assertion is that exploitation of a people does not
lead or translate to development. In essence, when many of these African states attained
political independence from their European colonizers, they lacked the necessary
infrastructure and structured institutions to facilitate adequate economic, political and
social functions.
Like other regions in Africa, the end of the Cold War diminished competition for
allies by both the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and the West
(Europe and United States of America). Writing in this vein, Gros states that, “. . . the
demise of the East-West rivalry did not result in greater attention by the West to Africa’s
8. Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, 1.
9. WaIter Rodney, How Europe UnderdevelopedAfrica (Washington, DC: Howard
University Press, 1982), 164.
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problems.”° Nor did the broader international community, such as the UN, care enough
to play any active role in the reduction of many African intra-state or inter-state conflicts.
This necessitated sub-regional organizations, such as Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) with Nigeria as its major participant, to respond and help
resolve some of these conflicts.
Regulation of conflict in the West African region became imperative with the
Liberian crisis, which corresponded to the end of the Cold War. Adhering to this
urgency, and in accordance with the provisions contained in the ECOWAS mutual
defense treaty of 1981 signed in Freetown, the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC)
stepped up to take charge of the situation.
ECOWAS was established in 1975, fifteen years before ECOMOG. The initiative
for ECOWAS stemmed from a desire by some of the member states, particularly Nigeria,
for an economically and/or politically stable and developing region. In addition to
championing the ECOWAS initiative, Nigeria has continued to commit to its existence
and operation and by extension, ECOMOG. Against this background of overt
commitment by Nigeria, Aluko contends that:
The main ideas behind Nigeria’s initiative are political, security, and economic
considerations. For political reasons Nigeria wants an arrangement that will put an
end to colonial divisions in West Africa. Furthermore, she believes that such a
step will put an end to border disputes and will be an important contribution to
African unity.”
10. Jean-Germain Gros, “Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World
Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti,” Third World Quarterly 17, no.13 (1996):
445-471.
11. Olajide, Essays In Nigerian Foreign Policy, 17.
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Aluko’s assertion implies that Nigeria believes, that through economic unity, the West
African region will get closer to political unity, and that economic and political stability
enhances greater regional security.
The successive inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the West African region
since the end of the Cold War, have added extra burden to Nigeria’s roles in West Africa.
From the time of her independence in 1960, Nigeria has participated in almost every
peacekeeping effort in West Africa and beyond. Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi, in their work
titled UN Security Council: A case for Nigeria ‘s Membership, wrote that “Nigeria has
since independence made major political, economic, financial and diplomatic
contributions to the development of African countries.”12 These authors further contend
that Nigeria contributed to the resolution of inter-state and intra-state conflicts among and
within African countries. Along the line ofNigeria’s peacekeeping efforts, Aluko also
states that Nigeria’s peacekeeping endeavors can be traced as far back as 1960.13 Case
studies of two West African countries, Liberia and Sierra Leone, will afford substantial
insights into Nigeria’s roles in West Africa.
While there have been write-ups on Nigeria’s participation in the region, some of
the discussions concentrate on whether Nigeria’s overall interest in West Africa has a
bearing on her need to emerge as a regional hegemony. As Aluko contends,”...,
Nigeria remains suspect in many west African capitals. With her vast economic
resources and her enormous political and military strength, Nigeria is seen in many of
12. Chiedu E.G. Iweriebor and Martin I. Uhomoibhi, UN Security Council: A Casefor
Nigeria’s Membership (Lagos: Times Books Limited, 1999), 36.
13. Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, 23.
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these countries as working for the eventual domination of her smaller neighbors.. ~14
This statement by Aluko is further echoed by Cleaver that — “. . . This problem reflects a
wider one of the Francophone/Anglophone split within ECOWAS and also a fear of
growing Nigerian hegemony in West Africa.”5
Significance of the Study
This study has both conceptual and empirical significance. Conceptually, the
study will contribute to the existing literature on peacekeeping in West Africa, and help
bring additional academic focus to the dynamics of peacekeeping in the region. The
study is also significant from an empirical perspective, since the findings will be relevant
to other future individual/sub-regional (African or global), peacekeeping framework
analysis. More importantly, the study hopes that subsequent discussions on the subject of
inquiry, will yield focused attention by scholars of African politics, and stimulate further
debate among social science scholars and other political observers alike, about, not only
Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles, but Nigeria’s commitments and contributions in the region
and indeed, in the continent of Africa.
Though the West African sub-regional peacekeeping missions have generated
incredible amounts of interest among scholars of African politics and other political
observers, yet there is a void left on the need to understand the motivation, implication,
and extent to which an individual member-state will go to achieve regional political
14. Ibid., 17.
15 Gerry Cleaver, “Liberia: lessons for the future from the experience of ECOMOG,” in
Peacekeeping in Africa, ed. Oliver Furley and Roy May (Vermont: Brookfield, 1998), 224.
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stability. Thus far, many assessments and analyses of ECOMOG’s peacekeeping
missions and of ECOMOG as an entity, in the academic literature, have been focused on
whether ECOMOG had a clear mandate for peacekeeping, and whether it was prepared,
and capable.
Commenting on ECOWAS/ECOMOG, Hutchful, noted that “the legal arguments
around the issue of mandate and legitimacy masked deeper political and diplomatic
rivalries and conflicts of interest within ECOWAS itself, mirroring, in particular, the
linguistic divisions in the region...,”6 In his assertion, Hutchful tries to point to the
internal differences between ECOWAS member states. Other writers also contend that,
• ECOMOG lacked the experience, training and capability to carry out anything more
than rudimentary peacekeeping.”7
As indicated earlier, first, this inquiry will contribute to the literature in the areas
of West African politics as well as a framework for analyzing an individual member
state’s role in regional peacekeeping. It will also bring more focus to Nigeria’s
peacekeeping roles and peace endeavors in the West African region. Second, the
expected research findings will further enhance an understanding of: (a) the reasons
behind Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles and the extent of her foreign policy objectives for
West Africa, (b) the type of dialogue Nigeria’s foreign policy makers and policy
implementers should focus on and (c) potential areas for future research. Third, it is
16. Eboe Hutchful, “The ECOMOG Experience with Peacekeeping in West Africa,”
Published in Monograph No 36: Whiter Peacekeeping in Africa? (April, 1999), 5.
17. Rasheed Draman and David Carment, Managing Chaos in the West African Sub
Region: Assessing The Role ofECOMOG In Liberia (2001), http://http-server.carleton.cak
dcarment/papers/ECOMOG.pdf (accessed April 4, 2007).
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possible that the findings of this study and the recommendations will serve as part of a
reference point for Nigeria’s policymakers and policy implementers as well as
ECOWAS/ECOMOG’s members and policymakers for a peacekeeping framework
analysis.
Research Questions
With the above stated background, in analyzing Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in
West Africa, this study will address the following specific questions:
RQ1: What are the specific results and challenges of Nigeria’s peacekeeping
roles in West Africa?
RQ2: What are the views and responses ofNigeria’s neighbors to her
peacekeeping roles in the West African region?
Methodology
This study adopts a case study approach to analyze Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles
in West Africa. “A case study is an investigation of a specific phenomenon or entity.”8
Or as defined by Yin, a case study is a thorough evaluation of contemporary phenomenon
in the context of the actual eventJs; when limitations between phenomenon and context
are not quite obvious; and in which several sources of evidences are applied.19
This study evaluates data relating to Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in both the
Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises. Also, the study includes evaluation of historical
18. Ellen Grigsby, Analyzing Politics an Introduction to Political Science, 3Id ed.
(Belmont, CA: Thomas Wadsworth, 2005), 18.
19. Robert K. Yin, “The Case Study: Some Answers,” Administrative Science
Quarterly, 26 (March): 58.
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analysis ofNigeria’s foreign policy implementation for West Africa. The study further
examines the pattern ofNigeria’s peacekeeping endeavors, through the evaluation of
relevant theoretical literature. The literature includes documented evidence of different
peace Accords from the Nigerian government, and other such documents. Also in this
study, effort was made to highlight the parts played by the international community, such
as Britain, France, the UN and the United States of America. Because highlighting the
parts played by the international community will further show the extent ofNigeria’s
roles, especially in relation to the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises.
A descriptive research design was used in this study because it assumes a prior
knowledge of the research questions and problems before the research began. Also,
descriptive research design allows for diverse method of data collection that ensures an
adequate process and procedure in obtaining extensive information regarding the research
questions. An advantage of case study method is that it enables the researcher gain a
deeper understanding of peacekeeping efforts, particularly peacekeeping efforts in
relation to Nigeria’s roles in West Africa. According to Grigsby, case studies do give
interesting information. “For example, case studies of Spanish politics have provided
data on the process of building a democratic society in the aftermath of
authoritarianism.”20
The review of published scholarly work, Nigerian government documents and
other documents alike, will provide a reliable source for analysis. The focus of the
analysis will be on Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in West Africa. The study will examine
20. Grigsby, Analyzing Politics an Introduction to Political Science, 18.
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Nigeria’s! ECOMOG peacekeeping efforts both in Liberia and Sierra Leone versus
patterns of Nigeria’s peacekeeping endeavors in West Africa.
The research method is qualitative however, few tables of statistical data is
included. The qualitative method is used because details from the data generated, for the
purpose of analyzing peacekeeping in West Africa and analyzing Nigeria’s roles, cannot
be quantified and also, because qualitative method tens to be more flexible (allows for
broader range of utilization)—”range of techniques.” On like the quantitative method of
analysis that is commonly used in the analysis of natural science. Besides, quantitative
method tends to be more specific (concern for quantity). Furthermore, “flexible
qualitative interpretation of data can lead to a holistic view of past, present and future
issues.”21
Data Source
In using the descriptive approach, the study makes use of primary and secondary
data generated from diverse sources: (a) relevant empirical literature, consisting of
published scholarly work, government documents and gazettes, and other documents
alike, (b) a series of unstructured and informal interviews with few Nigerian diplomats
who were present and/or participated in Nigeria/ECOWAS peacekeeping decision-
making phases, (c) interviews with a few members of the Sierra Leonean community who
were eye witnesses to the ECOMOG peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, and
interviews with some Liberian refugees, and (d) interviews with a few ECOMOG
soldiers who participated in either the peacekeeping mission in Liberia and/or the
21. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, eds. Theory and Methods in Political Science (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 154.
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peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone. Peacekeeping is a critical subject of research and
policy strategy for various political reasons. It is a subject that is widely documented in
the conceptual and empirical literature in various disciplines and professions. Therefore,
there is a rich and diverse, sometimes complex pooi of information on the subject. From
the standpoint of research methodology, the very sensitive and sometimes controversial
nature of peacekeeping as a subject and as an activity implies that diverse methods should
be employed in order to gather the quantity and quality of information that would enable
a thorough analysis of the subject, especially as is pertinent for this study. To this end,
the specific methods used to obtain data for this study were:
1. Face-to-face interviews with few Nigerian diplomats and some ex-ECOMOG
officials who are very familiar with various Nigerian foreign policy issues and
were/are affiliated or partial participants in much policy discussions. Some of
these discussions resulted in the policy decisions for both the Liberian and
Sierra Leonean peacekeeping missions.
Parts of the informal/unstructured interviews were conducted with few Liberian
refugees and some Sierra Leoneans who were eyewitness to both ECOMOG missions.
The input from these individuals interviewed, though informally documented, is very
important and helped this study empirically, by offering their first-hand observation. For
example, one of the diplomats interviewed, indicated that, in many of the decision-
making phases, the general attitude in the meeting was that Nigeria has the resources to
secure the West African region. Another stated that the main people in Abuja had
indicated that West Africa was of utmost importance to Nigeria.
2. A comprehensive review of all unclassified government documents provided,
upon request to the researcher, by the Nigerian Institute of International
Affairs, Lagos and Abuja; and Nigerian Consulate, Atlanta. Other data
sources are: Nigerian government records from several different accord
14
proceedings e.g., from the Abuja Accord communiqués, also other documents
such as Nigerian Journal ofInternational Affairs (multiple volumes). Several
newspaper clippings detailing Nigeria’s participations in various
peacekeeping missions as well as Nigeria’s, participations in ECOWAS!
ECOMOG peacekeeping missions as they evolve; there were many other non
governmental publications obtained from Nigerian Consulate, Atlanta,
magazine articles, internet articles and reports as well as other relevant
documents.
3. Extensive review of the empirical literature on peacekeeping around the
world. The methods described above resulted in primary and secondary data
that informed the analysis and conclusions in this study. All the primary data
came from the interviews, and the data was valuable in detailing the sequence
of events particularly in the decisions taken to embark on the Liberian
peacekeeping and peace enforcement mission as well as the decision to
continue with the Sierra Leonean peacekeeping mission despite Nigeria’s
heavy casualties.
Secondary data came from all the other sources except the interviews. Generally,
the data was useful in addressing Nigeria’s motivation and commitment to political
stability and economic sustainability in West Africa. Many of these secondary data also
helped tremendously in stating historical backgrounds ofNigeria’s geopolitical structure,
her relationship with her immediate neighbors and other such accounts.
In this study, most of the documents analyzed were magazine, internet articles,
and scholarly literature. Information from published scholarly work centers on Nigeria’s
foreign policy as it relates to Africa but particularly to the West African region. In
addition, documents dealing with ECOWAS affairs were evaluated as well, since the
ECOWAS organization remains a large part ofNigeria’s foreign policy preoccupation.
There are other documents such as the Protocol Relating to the Mediation for
Conflict Prevention Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping, and Security; ECO WAS
Decisions ofthe Council Documents (1989 1992) and ECO WAS Resolutions, as well as
15
other books that were quite useful. Including Ambassador Olu Adeniji’s Mechanismsfor
Conflict Management in West Africa.~ Politics ofHarmonization; Muhammad Juma
Kuna’ s The Role ofNigeria in Peace Building, Conflict Resolution, and Peacekeeping
Since 1960; Ayo Akinbobola’s The Nature and Context ofNigeria ‘s Foreign Assistance:
The Politics ofIts Implementation and many other such literature.
Definition of Terms
Africa-Center-Piece: Nigerian policy for African affairs, especially policy for
the West African region. It simply means African affairs are the cornerstone ofNigeria’s
foreign policy.
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL): Liberia Armed Forces that supported the
initially elected government of Charles Taylor.
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): Established in
1975, is an organization of fifteen West African nations that have agreed to share
common market, technical ideas, cultural and social exchanges, with an eventual
economic integration in the West African region. Since January 2007 ECOWAS has a
commissioner format administration led by a president. Its secretariat is located in
Abuja, Nigeria and has the following commissioners: agriculture, environment and water
resources; human and gender development; Infrastructure and micro-economic policy;
political affairs, peace and security and trade and customs for free movement of its
citizens.
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Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG): This body was formed in 1990 and is made up of military troops from
some ECOWAS member-states, to help gain cease-fire and restore peace to the crisis in
Liberia and has since remained as a security arm of ECOWAS. Since its creation,
ECOMOG has been involved in several peacekeeping missions (Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Côte d’lvoier and Sudan) in Africa.
Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA): This is a working
group pm in transition issues, and social council assigned to address action point 14 of
the Secretary General’s report on “strengthening of the United Nations Agenda for
further changes.” The ECHA working group is partially responsible for the development
of Inter-agency Framework for Conflict Analysis (IAFCA) framework for the analysis
of peacekeeping.
Extra-African-Countries: European countries, particularly Britain and France
that colonized most of West Africa. These countries tend to have influence on their ex
colonies as well as extensive bilateral relationship.
Liberia National Transitional Government-I (LNTG-I)/LNTG-II: Due to a
considerable political unrest and violence that precluded any stable leadership in power
from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. A power-sharing agreement in 2003 largely ended
the fighting and created a National Transitional Government (NTG). The NTG, supported
by United Nations peacekeeping troops, replaced the government under the 1986
constitution and ruled until a democratically elected administration was installed in 2006.
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National Interest: As it relates to this study, is a term used by Nigeria, to
articulate reasons or the need for her foreign policy objectives. It is based on the national
interest policy that Nigeria formulates her foreign policy agendas, particularly as it relates
to West African affairs.
Organization of African Union (OAU), now African Union (AU): Is an
organization of all nations within the African continent, established to address African
issues. The OAU also supported ECOWAS decision to send ECOMOG into Liberia.
Nigeria has been a member of OAU since its inception in 1963.
Ring-Countries: The West African countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger Republic
and the Republic of Benin), that surround Nigeria at four coordinates. These countries
are also considered Nigeria’s immediate neighbors and have on occasion, had border
disputes with Nigeria, particularly Cameroon. Currently, based on mutual agreement by
both Nigeria and Cameroon, they have worked out an amicable settlement as laid out by
the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission.
Standing Mediation Committee (SMC): A committee set up by ECOWAS
members to figure out how to initiate the peace process at the onset of the Liberian crisis
in 1990, and is made of five ECOWAS members. Based on the recommendation of this
committee, ECOWAS then created a peacekeeping peace enforcement unit, ECOMOG,
to help with the cease-fire initiative in the crisis in Liberia.
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs): Economic programs that restructure
an economy so that it allows proper pricing of goods and services while allowing private
sector the latitude to operate within adequate market values and structure. In the 1 980s
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SAPs was one of the conditions imposed on many developing nations including Nigeria,
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
Technical Aid Corps (TAC): Nigeria’s initiative, which seeks to promote socio
economic development in friendly developing countries. This Nigerian initiative was
established in 1987 and has since sent various professionals including nurses, doctors,
engineers, and architects, as technical aid assistants to several countries in Africa and
beyond.
Transition: Refers to the period of a crisis when external assistance is most
crucial in supporting and underpinning still fragile cease fires, or peace processes, by
helping to create the conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equity.
Transnational Cooperation (TNC), some times called Multinational
Enterprise (MNE): A large corporation that manages products, productions and
delivery of services to many countries. TNCs tend to be involved in several economic
situations that are linked to unequal trade arrangements and other stringent financial
programs that many West African countries, have been subjected to.
Literature Review
For this study’s objective, quite relevant for review is a substantial amount of the
theoretical and empirical literature on Nigeria’s national interests, foreign policy,
contemporary conflicts in Africa, international politics/relations, international
cooperation in economics and security, peacekeeping in Africa, ECOWAS and
ECOMOG.
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The evaluation of literature on the above listed areas and other such relevant
literature was necessary because the literature facilitates a better understanding of
Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in the West African region. Equally, the literature reviewed
pinpoints Nigeria’s participation and position in and within the UN general assembly. In
their argument for Nigeria’s membership in the UN’s Security Council, Iweriebor and
Uhomoibhi detailed the various attempts by Nigeria, to become a member of the UN’s
Security Council. They took a look at the non-African permanent representation in the
UN Security Council and contend that, given the present world condition, the UN is out-
of-sync with the global political environment. Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi further argued
that, at its inception, the UN included only three African countries - Ethiopia, Liberia and
Egypt. Currently, however, the continent of Africa occupies 54 seats at the UN general
assembly.
In Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi’s view, “the continent needs and deserves to be
represented permanently in the UN Security Council, and that Nigeria should be Africa’s
representative.”22 Furthermore, they contend, “the moral imperative and credibility of
Nigeria’s candidacy for Africa’s permanent seat in the UN Security Council are
predicated on the country’s ability and willingness to contribute significantly to the
maintenance of international peace and security.”23
These authors further articulate that, “. . . Nigeria naturally sees its destiny
intertwined with the dynamics of changes in the external environment; and a responsible
22. Chiedu E.G. Iweriebor and Martin I. Uhomoibhi, UN Security Council: A casefor
Nigeria’s Membership (Lagos: Ikeja, Times Books Limited, 1999), 1.
23. Ibid.
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member of the international community.., in relation to the concerts of nations at the
sub-regional and international levels.”24
There is no consensus in the AU, based on the literature reviewed, that Nigeria
should be one of Africa’s permanent representatives to the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC). Nonetheless, Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi’s argument is relevant,
because it shows Nigeria’s continuous and overt commitment both sub-regionally and to
the broader international arena. In the same vein, Ate and Akinterinwa in their 1992
work, Nigeria and Its Immediate Neighbors, note that:
it was demonstrated that Nigeria’s political stability could be undermined by
foreign elements, using as staging point not only adjacent off-shore islands, such
as Malabo, Sao Tome and Principe, but also Chad, Benin and Cameroun. It was
for this reason that Nigerians raised with great alarm to the discovery of South
African’s undercover attempts to establish in the Equatorial Guinea in 1987. Also
for these reason Nigerians have to be wary about Americans, Israeli and French
military and intelligence activities in Chad, Cameroun, Niger and Benin
Republic.25
These incidents depicted by Ate and Akinterinwa indicate that “France is aiming towards
a total consolidation of its hegemony in the contiguous area by calibrated penetration of
the economy of Nigeria, the only Anglo-phone and also the largest population in the
region, which is surrounded by four smaller Franco-phone counties.”26
24. Chiedu E.G. Iweriebor and Martin I. Uhomoibhi, “Nigeria’s Role in Africa’s
Development,” UN Security Council: A case for Nigeria’s Membership (Ikeja, Lagos: Times
Books Limited, 1999), 1.
25. Bola A. Akinterinwa, “French Security Arrangements with Francophone Africa:
Implications for Nigeria’s Relations with Its Immediate Neighbours” in Bassey E. Ate and Bola
A. Akinterinwa, Nigeria and its Immediate Neighbours, (Lagos: Victoria Island, Nigerian
Institute of International Affairs, 1992), 181.
26. Ibid. 7.
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The points made by Ate and Akinterinwa are quite important in the attempt to
appraise Nigeria’s relationship with her immediate neighbors. Equally important are the
view expressed by Offiong and Idise in their 1999 work, The Determinant ofAfrican
Foreign Relations, Continuities, Changes and Constraint: A Theoretical Overview. They
state that, “only a country in a secure environment can really be effective in her foreign
pursuit. Since it is not possible for her to be an island unto herself, Nigeria must interact
with other state actors. But she has to be discriminatory in her approach and prioritize
the importance to its own existence.”27 Here Offiong and Idise by their statement, show
why it is important for Nigeria to continue to participate in a bilateral or multilateral
manner, because cooperation among other ECOWAS member states will lead to better
economic integration in the West African region.
Alluding to Nigeria and the new century, Yomi Akinyeye in his work, Nigeria ‘s
Defense Policies: Perspectivesfor New Century, contends that, “in projecting into the
21st century, the article advocates a people-centered defense policy that incorporates
economic and defense ties with Nigeria’s immediate neighbors, and democracy, social
justice and environmental protection.”28 In this, Akinyeye attempts to show a paradigm
of defense incorporation. That is, a model where, in addition to her defense policies,
Nigeria also tries to incorporate security, economic, politics and diplomacy. He states
that, “although, scholars of international relations and strategic studies define defense in
27. Hassan A. Saliu, “Reflections on Four Decades of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy” in
Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, 25, no.1 & 2, (1999), 21.
28. Yomi Akinyeye, “Nigeria’s Defense Policy: Perspectives for a New Century” in
igerian Journal ofInternational Affairs, 26, no.1, (2000), 7.
22
different ways, there is a broad consensus that, it refers to the protection of a nation’s
goals and threats.”29 Or as Mountcastle writes and citing Roskin:
Because the national interest is the foundation for both the National Security
Strategy and its supporting National Military political context form which the
details of the national interest emerge. The guiding concept of national interest is
more often assumed than analyzed in the dynamic context of domestic and
international politics.30
In a different argument, Ogaba Oche in his work Principles ofInternational
Relations, concurs with Akinyeye’ s assertions and states that, “it is important to look at
foreign policy in a more depth because generally, they define the purposes and pursuits of
states in the international system, and what principles those states tend to regard as being
uppermost in their hierarchy of values. . . ~ Similarly, Ate continues within the context
ofNigeria and its immediate neighbors and contends that, “the sub-region is vital to
Nigeria’s survival, plainly because Nigeria’s vital assets are located within. . . Nigeria
must treat this sub-region as a natural base from which to project its national interest.”32
Bukar Bukarambe, in Nigeria ‘s Foreign Policy in Africa 1960-1999, examines the
period between the two landmark years (1960 year of Nigeria’s political independence
29. Ibid., 7.
30. National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy, a paper present by Michael G.
Roskin, ed., John, W. Mountcastle, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, (PA:
Carlisle Barracks, 1994).
31. Ogaba Oche, “Principles of International Relations” in Selected Readings on
Nigeria ‘s Foreign Policy and international Relations, ed. R.A. Akindele and Bassey E. Ate
(Lagos: Victoria Island, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2000), 1.
32. Bassey E. Ate, “Nigeria’s Relations with Its Immediate Neighbors: A Security-
Political Analysis” in Selected Readings on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and international
Relations, ed. R.A. Akindele and Bassey E. Ate (Lagos: Victoria Island, Nigerian
Institute of International Affairs, 2000), 172-180.
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and 1999 — year that ended the Century), and discusses the various changes in world
affairs and their impact on Nigeria’s international relations. In spite of profound world
events such as the Cold War, end of colonialism, the new world order, and global
economy, Bukarambe suggests that,”... the period spanning thirty-nine years affords
enough time for Nigeria’s national institutions responsible for international relations to
evolve and mature in their own right irrespective of the events within the country.”33 In
Aims and Objectives ofForeign Policy, Offiong and Idise contend that ultimately, the
balance between external affairs and domestic matters is what should constitute the actual
national interest(s). “A balance must be created between domestic and foreign policy in
the sense that the pursuance of one policy does not lead to unnecessary utter neglect of
the other.”34 This statement is quite important since very often, matters of external
affairs are confused or stated as “national interest”, as Offiong and Idise articulated here:
National interest is a concept frequently used in understanding the foreign policy
of a particular state. Often times, national interests are really the interests of a
selected group of national leaders, or even the interest of the head of state,
During the overthrow of Milton Obote by Idi Amin of Uganda, Amin made an
order for 50, 000 Asians to leave Uganda on the fact that their continued
habitation of the country was not in Uganda’s national interest.. .Amin never
cared about the consequences of his action on the economy. .
33. Bukar Bukarambe, “Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in Africa 1960-1999,” in Selected
Readings on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and international Relations, ed. R.A. Akindele and Bassey
E. Ate (Lagos: Victoria Island, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2000), 100-101.
34. 0. J. Offiong and G. E. Idise, “The Determinants of African Foreign Relations,
Continuities, Changes and Constraints: A theoretical Overview,” Nigerian Journal of
International Affairs 25, no. 1 (1999), 89.
35. Ibid., 92.
24
Similarly, Nwoke in his 2000 work, An Overview ofNigeria ‘s International
Economic Relations, argues that Nigeria is a neocolonial and a dependent society; that
this pattern of society, does not lead to economic liberation. He indicated that because of
the dependent and neocolonial nature ofNigerian governments since independence,
Nigeria’s external economic policies will always dictate the internal or domestic
economic realities, which is, an underdeveloped economy.36 Nwoke’s argument points
to the remarkable difference between Nigeria’s domestic and foreign policy, both in
enactment and implementation.
Nwoke further argues that, “. . . throughout the history of the nation’s
international economic relations, the attitude ofNigerian governments have been, that of
less than nationalist and independent approach. In other words, since independence, in
view of neocolonialism, no Nigerian governments’ economic diplomacy has been geared
towards as it points to the extent Nigerian regimes have gone in their quests, to establish
and maintain good international relations, especially regional relationships, and the
dichotomy between Nigeria’s domestic (internal) and international policies, particularly
at the regional level.
The deduction in this regard, is that, despite Nigeria’s economic problems such as
underdeveloped economy, extensive national debt, and many such domestic problems
caused by the lack of economic sustainability, Nigeria has managed to pursue
peacekeeping campaigns; either unilaterally and/or in multilateral effort with other
ECOWAS member states. In either case, this inquiry has found that Nigeria almost
36. Chibuzo Nwoke, “An Overview of Nigeria’s International Economic Relations”, in
Selected Reading on Nigeria ‘s Foreign Policy and International Relations (Lagos: Victoria
Island, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2000), 70.
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always absorbs eighty to ninety percent of the financial burden of these peacekeeping
endeavors.
Theoretical Framework
For this study, the approaches employed and discussed are the Inter-Agency
Framework for Conflict Analysis (IAFCA) or Framework for Conflict Analysis, and the
Contemporary History also known as Descriptive-inductive. These perspectives serve as
lenses for viewing and analyzing the concept of, and dynamics of peacekeeping. First is
the inter-agency framework for conflict analysis, a framework which was developed by a
UN working group — UNDG-ECHA, and focuses on three important elements of
peacekeeping: conflict analysis, analysis of ongoing response, strategic and program
planning. This framework is useful for this study since the investigative analysis of
Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in West Africa encompasses the above mentioned three
elements as depicted in Table 1.
Conflict analysis is necessary because it facilitates understanding of the causes
and consequences of violent conflict, as well as the dynamics supporting peace efforts
made by Nigeria and ECOWAS diplomats, and the efforts by ECOMOG troops towards
cease-fire. According to UNDG-ECHA, this framework also identifies all relevant
conflict factors that have contributed and may further contribute to the resurgence of
violent conflict.37 One of the important aspects of IAFCA, which helps to better analyze
37. Common Inter-Agency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition (November
04). http://www.undg.org/index.cfm (accessed April 24, 2007).
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Table 1: Overview of IAFCA
Element 1: Conflict Analysis
Step 1 Analysis of Key Conflict Factors
Step 2 Actor Analysis
Step 3 Analysis of Capacities for Peace
Element 2: Analysis of Ongoing Responses
Step 1 Mapping of Ongoing Responses
Step 2 Assessment of the Impact of Ongoing Responses in relation to Conflict
Element 3: Strategic & Programmatic Conclusions for Transition Planning
Step 1 Strategic Recommendations for Transition Planning
Step 2 Programmatic Recommendations for Transition Programming
Source: Inter-agency framework for conflict analysis in transition situations, November
2004.
Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles, is “transition programming.” As defined by the United
Nations Development Group (UNDO) and Executive Committee on Humanitarian
Affairs (ECHA), the aim of transition programming is to “help to create the conditions
for political stability, security, justice and social equity,”38 as sought by Nigeria and
ECOWAS officials.
Conflict analysis include: identifying key conflict factors such as the origin of the
conflict; identifying individuals or groups (Actor analysis) engaged in, and/or affected by
the conflict; and analysis of capacities for peace—capacities for peace as defined by
UNDG_ECHA, refers to structures, mechanisms, processes and institutions that exist in
38. Ibid.
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society in order to peacefully and constructively manage conflict. In this instance, the
assumption by IAFCA is that typically, capacities for peace involves informal approaches
to conflict resolution, which may involve authorities, strong civil society, a cultural
tolerance, community/inter-village meetings, courts and other such entities, as was
applied initially to Liberia. When ECOWAS ambassadors tried to mediate between the
four warring factions—the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) loyal to Samuel Doe, the
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor, and other divisions
such as United Liberation Movement ofLiberiafor Democracy-Johnson faction
(ULIMO-J), and the United Liberation Movement ofLiberiafor Democracy-Kromah
faction (ULIMO-K).
The second element of IAFCA is analysis of ongoing responses. This includes:
mapping of ongoing responses—assessing how effective initiatives and programs put in
place in a transition situation are aligned with the set of main concerns,39 such as the
immediate and structural conflict factors, as well as factors considered to be key peace
deterrents (“spoilers”), and assessment of impact of ongoing responses in relation to
conflict.
The strategic and programmatic conclusions for transition planning, is a necessary
tool for this study because it allows for testing and evaluating initiatives, programs and
other such components, put in place as a means of transitioning from conflict to peace.
These include: strategic recommendations for transition planning; and programmatic
recommendations for transition programming. In this case, IAFCA presumes that the
39. Common Inter-Agency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition (November
2004), http://www.undg.org/index.cfm (accessed April 24, 2007).
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objective of programmatic conclusions for transition planning is to contribute to the
formulation of the overall strategy. In particular, while the conflict analysis helped
identifS’ priority proximate and structural conflict factors that should be considered
priority areas and of particular concern for the development of transition planning, the
assessment ofongoing responses contributed to highlight:
• Existing gaps and related possible new areas of engagement over the short and
longer-term, in line with the conflict analysis;
• The need to strengthen ongoing interventions and programs (e.g. in relation to
strengthening capacities for peace, etc);
• The need to refocus ongoing interventions, from a conflict sensitive
perspective.40
According to UNDG-ECHA, IAFCA builds the following key assumptions. Each
transition situation is unique, so that the analysis needs to be context-specific (as it
applies to a particular conflict or country in crisis). Conflicts are not mono-causal
phenomena and arise from a set of interconnected conflict factors and dynamics. As was
seen in the Liberian crisis—there were several causes to the violent conflict in Liberia,
Namely: disconnect with government institutions, lack of access to justice, lack of access
to reliable appropriate mechanism for resolving disputes and other issues alike.
Transition programming of the UN system should aim at “doing no harm” and
minimizing unintended negative impacts.
1. Transition programming of the UN system should aim at maximizing its peace
building impact in the aftermath of the crisis, as well as over the longer-term.
40. Ibid.
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2. Efforts should be made to ensure national ownership and seek the
participation of all conflict parties in the process of the analysis. Furthermore,
UNDG-ECHA explains that IAFCA has been developed, in order to
contribute to the following objectives:
(a) To ensure a common analytical framework for understanding the
underlying causes and consequences of violent conflict, as well as the
dynamics supporting or undermining peace efforts in a transition
situation,41 as was the situation with ECOMOG troops in Liberia.
(b) To support a conflict sensitive approach to programming within the UN
system in a transition situation; particularly with the civilian population
caught in a violent conflict, as was the case with the Liberian and Sierra
Leonean crises; for example, “. . . As is all too common in African
conflicts, civilians became the preferred targets of the armed fractions
,,42
(c) To build a common approach to post-conflict needs assessment, or other
inter-a planning instruments, such as ECOWAS/ECOMOG, and the UN
humanitarian unit, as well as facilitate the development of an overall
targeted transition strategy.
The IAFCA equally builds on the various experiences of the UN system with conflict
analysis, especially on the recent inter-state conflicts in West Africa.43
Furthermore, and with respect to “capacity for peace”, Cleaver writes in Liberia:
lessonsfor the future from the experience ofECOMOG “the second fundamental problem
that faced the ECOMOG forces arriving in August 1990 was that they had failed to
41. This refers to “the period of a crisis when external assistance is most crucial in
supporting and underpinning still fragile cease fires, or peace processes, by helping to create the
conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equity,” [JNDG ECHA Working
Group on Transition Issues.
42. Gerry Cleaver, “Liberia: lessons for the future from the experience of ECOMOG,” in
Peacekeeping in Africa, ed. Oliver Furley and Roy May (Vermont: Brookfield, 1998), 223.
43. Common Inter-Agency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition (November
2004). http://www.undg.org/index.cfm (accessed April 24, 2007).
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obtain the consent of the belligerent parties to their mission.”44 IAFCA also contains
other characteristics essential for this study, such as the ability to interpret the dynamics
and logistics of peacekeeping (“broadly defined to include ethnographic, cultural,
religious factors, etc.”).45 According to UNDG-ECHA, the relevance of utilizing these
various characteristics contained in IAFCA is that each situation is unique and complex;
dynamics do not reflect a steady, sequential or uninterrupted path of progress from
conflict to peace; often a “no war, no peace” situation and humanitarian activities might
increase initially.
Critique of IAFCA View
IAFCA view can be described as a set of policy analysis tools that is helpful in
understanding the underlying causes and consequences of violent conflicts, as well as the
issues supporting peace efforts in transition situation.46 A major criticism made against
IAFCA approach is that part of its assumptions, such as its informal approach to conflict
solution, which involves authorities, civil society and cultural tolerance, may not be
attainable. IAFCA has considered the fact that each conflict situation is unique, but what
it has not taken into account, is that perhaps, particularly in violent conflict situation,
there may not be a civil society, a legitimate authority and/or any tangible cultural
44. Gerry Cleaver, “Liberia: lessons for the future from the experience of ECOMOG,”
225.
45. Common Inter-Agency Framework for Conflict Analysis in Transition (November
2004), http://www.undg.org/index.cfm (accessed April 24, 2007).
46. Ibid.
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tolerance. IAFCA has ignored these possible limitations, by stipulating these limitations
as standards for capacities for peace in a transition situation following violent conflict.
Furthermore, one of the above stated limitations such as cultural tolerance, might
have been a, or part of the precipitant of the violent conflict in the first place. IAFCA’s
stipulated formats for capacities for peace, seem straight forward, free of inherent conflict
related issues such as social and cultural constraints. IAFCA is limited in its assumptions
that understanding proximate or immediate conflict factors is the most crucial. This is
not always so, as the crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone have proven; though the IAFCA
model states, that it’s stipulated structure when followed, its inputs become assets for
long-term peace building and development. So far, this claim has not been fully tested,
as the IAFCA’s approach is a recent (2004) development.
As the U.S. Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations asserts, lack
of reliable and appropriate mechanism for resolving dispute is through the state system.
Rather, peace stability and humanitarian operations should involve the interaction of
internal organizations and nongovernmental organizations. They indicated that the UN
post-conflict responses are based on the standardized IAFCA structure for conflict to help
overcome structures that lead to violent conflict. But the standardization of the IAFCA’s
model is a problem—since all violent conflicts are not the same.47
The next analytical framework used for analysis in this study is the
“contemporary history,” also known as “descriptive-inductive” or “reflective history” as
47. Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations “Guide for
Participating in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations,” http://www.usip.org/programs
centers/center~post~conflict-peace-and-stability-0Perati011S (accessed March 6, 2010).
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articulated by Hegel, and many others, contemporary history falls under the broad
spectrum of “institutionalism.” Contemporary history is used in this study to properly
understand and analyze Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in West Africa from 1990 2005
and also to understand the motivation behind Nigeria’s policies for West Africa.
Contemporary history allows for further modification (depending on the particular
situation) of its application.
According to Rhodes, contemporary history is used to “describe and analyze
phenomena that have occurred in the past which are used to explain contemporary
political phenomena with reference to past events.”48 Rhodes further explains that,
contemporary history employs the techniques of the historian and explores specific
events, eras, people and institutions, generating studies which systematically describe and
analyze phenomena that have occurred in the past.49
Furthermore, contemporary history allows for historical trace of events and issues
relevant to this study. In this instance, emphasis will be placed on the countries and cases
which relevant to the history ofNigeria’s peacekeeping roles in West Africa. This
approach is found useful for the reasons cited above. The primary justification for the
use of IAFCA and contemporary history approaches, hinges on the fact that, they both
will enhance the study’s ability to adequately convey its findings. Contemporary history
48. E. A.W. Rhodes, “The Institutional Approach,” Theory and Methods in Political
Science, ed. Scholarly and reference Division (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 43.
49. Ibid.
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is also used because it bears close resemblance to policy analysis which is, according to
Dye, “a gregarious search for the causes and consequences of public policy.”50
What this study finds further useful and appealing with the use of contemporary
history is that it accommodates variation in time period - that is, both previous and
current occurrences are adequately depicted, and will facilitate the verity of the times to
which it refers (it is better suited in the sequential traces and analysis of the various
peacekeeping events in the period 1990 2005 this study references). “. ., it is history
whose mode of representation is not really confined by limits of the time to which it
relates.”5’ In an attempt to describe in a historical context, what Nigeria’s foreign policy
objective and principles were, Sanda narrates in Past as Prelude: Continuity in Nigeria ‘s
Africa Policy, that: In 1960 they were:
• The defense ofNigeria’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national
independence;
• The creation of the necessary economic, political,, social and cultural
conditions to secure the independence of Nigeria and other African counties;
• Promotion of African unity;
• Non-partisanship in East-West ideological disputes and freedom of
association in the international system.
In the 1999 Constitution [section 19 (a) — (e)], these are:
• promotion of the national interest;
• promotion of African integration and support for African unity;
50. Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, l0~” ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
2002), 9.
51. “Hegel’ s Philosophy of History,” http://www.marxists.org/refereflce/archiveI
hegel/index.htm (accessed April 6 2007).
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• promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal
peace and mutual respect among all nations and elimination of discrimination
in all its manifestations;
• respect for international law and treaty obligations, as well as settlement of
international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and
adjudication; and
• Promotion ofajust world economic order.52
Contemporary history also builds on the assumptions that occurrences are best
understood via descriptive approaches. That rules detect behaviors, in other words,
“behaviors occurs because of a particular rule.”53 That hyperfactualism provides an
opportunity for reintegrating the empirical study of politics with the analysis of political
values.
Further, analysis ofNigeria’s roles for instance, particularly her peacekeeping
roles in West Africa is facilitated by looking back or reflecting on Nigeria’s foreign
policy implementations since her attainment of political independence in 1960.
According to Rhodes, “the hallmark of the descriptive-inductive (contemporary history)
approach is ‘hyper-factualism’ In other words, ‘observation was to come first; the fact
stood paramount’ . . . ~ What Rhodes’ assertion tries to convey here is that, whenever
contemporary history is used for a study of this nature, the outcome is almost always, a
factual chronology of series of events. A particular observation by Hegel is that,”...
52. Julie Sanda, “Past as Prelude: Continuity in Nigeria’s Africa Policy,” in Peace
aking in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: 1999-2003, 270 — 72.
53. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, eds. Theory and Methods in Political Science (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 47.
54. Marsh and Stoker, Theory and Methods in Political Science, 44.
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history investigates the particular,” which is an essential advantage for this study.
Contemporary history also allows for in-depth analysis of socio-political conflicts.
Critique of Contemporary History View
The most valued aspect of contemporary history is its ability to trace past events
as it relates to the present (factual detail of events as they occurred by date). Another of
contemporary history’s strength is that it brings attention to the relationship between
apparently related events. Thirdly, inference is drawn from the observation of frequent
occurrences. However, because of contemporary history’s use in the analysis political
institutions, it is criticized in the context of political institutions. For example, Rhodes
contends, “the study of political institutions has number of critics who may substitute
vigor for accuracy. Contemporary history he further asserts, tends to be more descriptive
rather than problem-solving or analytic in its application.55 Another weakness of
contemporary history is that it lacks the ability to “conceptualize a problem-oriented
approach; formulate a hypothesis or set of hypothesis and test hypothesis by empirical
data to eliminate untenable and formulate new ones.”56
Other more contemporary theoretical and conceptual approaches were equally
evaluated, to further determine the more suitable one/s for this study. These approaches
include the “Magic Diamond” model, developed by Gordon McCormick of the RAND
Corporation. The Magic Diamond model contains relevant elements such as the
population (non-combatants in the disputed region), the international community, and
55. Marsh and Stoker, Theory and Methods in Political Science, 48.
56. Ibid., 49.
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maintaining the perception of neutrality analysis tool. The Magic Diamond model,
however, does not quite present a needed framework for the unique analysis of this
research. It is neither suitable for analyzing the complex West African sub-regional
peacekeeping missions and their associated conflicts, which this study investigates. The
recent conflicts prevalent in the West African region are of a different nature and, as
argued by Oche, “these conflicts tend to be intra-state rather than inter-state...
Unfortunately, the current conflicts also affect neighbouring states either by way of
spreading instability or, by drawing these states into the conflict itself.”57 There are also
other conceptual theories that approach peacekeeping from a militaristic viewpoint,
meaning, analysis based on military operation only or the recently evolving Conceptual
Model of Peace Operation (CMPO), which is a theoretical “system’s engineering
information domain model” used by some scholars of peacekeeping.
Limitations of the Study
In any inquiry of this nature, certain issues will always present some level of
difficulty and problems, this study is no exception. Through the course of this endeavor,
difficulties encountered were: the non-exhaustible barrage of information, conflicting
statements from various newspaper reports, and conflicting statements of the research
area of concentration. Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in the West African region, is an on
going affair, and participation in ECOWAS/ECOMOG continues to evolve. While the
57. Ogaba Oche, “Contemporary Conflicts in Africa and the Roles of the OAU and Sub
Regional Organizations in Conflict Management,” Nigerian Journal ofInternational Affairs 25,
no.1 (1999) & no. 2 (Vol. 26) 2000.
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scope ofNigeria’s peacekeeping roles continues to develop, to include: peacemaking,
peace enforcement as well as economic assistance, and many other forms of aid.
While this study uses the case study approach which is suitable for learning more
about little known and poorly understood phenomenon, it is by nature limited in that the
findings cannot be generalized to include other situations. The interview procedure
(informal and unstructured) provides an opportunity for some control over the conditions
under which the interviewee responses are made. However, there seems to be limitations
inherent in self-report. The persons interviewed may be limited by concern for socio
politically acceptable answers.
Furthermore, while the study focuses on the political, economic and technical
dimensions of peacekeeping as an activity, there are numerous other factors related to
peacekeeping processes that are not touched by this study. Given the above stated
limitations, and some financial constraints with respect to accessibility of needed data,
this study will limit its scope of inquiry to the stated time frame 1990 to 2005.
Organization of the Study
The layout of this inquiry will comprise of five chapters. Chapter I provides the
general overview ofNigeria’s roles in West Africa including: statement of the problem,
significance of the study, research questions, methodology, definition of term, literature
review, theoretical framework, limitations of study, and organization of the study.
Chapter II looks at Nigeria’s geopolitical structure and Nigeria’s roles in the West
African region in its historical context. This chapter further looks at Nigeria as a major
player in the region and beyond. As stated earlier, regional policy takes up a greater part
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ofNigeria’s foreign policy makeup. A more in-depth evaluation ofNigeria’s foreign
policy is therefore required. This necessarily includes Nigeria’s economic assistance to
various countries within the West African region and other African regions,
peacemaking, regional political rivalry, and the Extra-African countries. Chapter III
evaluates Nigeria’s international relations, including her position in the broader African
context, her contributions in the areas of diplomacy, economic, cultural, and socio
political. This chapter also investigates Nigeria’s need for regional security, her military
strength and her relationships with Britain, France the United Nations, and the United
States of America. Chapter IV analyzes data in relation to peacekeeping in West Africa,
and examines Nigeria’s role in ECOMOG and ECOWAS, and the relationship between
ECOWAS and ECOMOG from 1990 to 2005. It further analyzes ECOMOG’s
participation in the West African sub-region, with the aid of a case study of Liberia and
Sierra Leone. The study also evaluates ECOMOG as a sub-regional peacekeeping unit
within ECOWAS; analyzes its operational structure; its military strengths; its initial
mandates; and its directives and limitations as a functioning unit of ECOWAS. Chapter
V details the research findings through data analyses and a conclusion with suggested
recommendations, issues needing reviews, issues corrected as a result of challenges and




Nigeria is extremely diverse, comprising of more than 200 ethnic groups with
more than twice that size in sub-groups and about 300 dialects and languages. According
to Cohen and Goldman: “. . . Estimates of the number of distinct ethnic groupings varied
from 250 to as many as 400. The most widely used marker was that of language. In
most cases, people who spoke a distinct language having a separate term for the language
and/or its speakers saw themselves, or were viewed by others, as ethnically different.”
These groups were fabricated together, to function as a unit by the colonial British for
their benefits. There can be several sub-groups within one ethnic group. For example,
there are many groups within the ethnic Igbo people and these different sub-groups speak
various Ibo dialects.
Historically, the purpose of the amalgamation of these very diverse groups of
people was not to organize and establish a country, but to further assist the colonial
British in achieving and maintaining relative decorum while they engaged in the
1. “Nigeria: A Country Study,” 5th ed. Federal Research Division, Library ofCongress,
ed. Ronald Cohen and Abe Goldman (Washington, DC 1992): http://lccn.loc.gov/92009026
(a ce ed August 26, 2009).
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extraction of resources from this region ofNigeria as well as that sub-region of Africa.
Case in point:
Like so many other modern African states, Nigeria is the creation of European
imperialism. Its very name—after the great Niger River, the country’s dominating
physical feature was suggested in the 1890s by British journalist Flora Shaw,
who later became the wife of colonial governor Frederick Lugard. The modern
history ofNigeria as a political state encompassing 250 to 400 ethnic groups of
widely varied cultures and modes of political organization—dates from the
completion of the British conquest in 1903 and the amalgamation of northern and
southern Nigeria into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria in 1914. The history
of the Nigerian people extends backward in time for some three millennia.2
As Rodney observed in his renowned book, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa:
In addition to private companies, the colonial states also engaged directly in the
economic exploitation and impoverishment of the Africa. The equivalent of the
colonial office in each colonizing country worked hand in hand with their
governors in Africa to carry out a number of functions, the principal ones being as
follows: (1) To protect national interests against competition from other
capitalists. (2) To arbitrate the conflicts between their own capitalists. (3) To
guarantee optimum conditions under which private companies could exploit
Africans. The last mentioned object was the most crucial.3
While Rodney’s arguments here, is not limited to the Nigerian situation, however, it is
more relevant to Nigeria because of her very diverse population. Pre-colonial era the
different groups of people that make up Nigeria today, practiced group social structure
that ranged from classical segmented system, to what Schrader called “Ritually Stratified
Segmented System of self governance” (see Figure 1).
2. “Nigeria: a country study” 5th ed. Federal Research Division, Library ofCongress,
ed. Helen Chapin Metz, (Washington: D.C., 1992): http://lccn.loc.gov/92009O26 (accessed
August 26, 2009).
3. Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, DC: Howard
niversity Press, 1982), 164.
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Figure 1. Ritually Stratified Segmented System
Source: African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation.
Upon the arrival of the colonial British, and since the eventual distortion of these
groups cohesive orderly system of life, Nigerians have been striving for a political
structure that is both suitable and functional to their unique circumstance (the
amalgamation of these very diverse groups of people).
From the onset ofNigeria as an independent state on October 1, 1960, Nigeria has
had very dynamic/unstable governance—changing from one administration to another
(thirteen different governments to be precise) and the majority of these times were under
military governance. This lack of consistency in governance resulted in constantly
changing public policy. In spite of this varying governance, Nigeria has remained quite
consistent in her policy towards Africa, particularly her policy towards the West African
region.
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As indicated earlier, Nigeria is a large country, surrounded at its four coordinates
by five smaller countries that can be susceptible to influence by the Extra-African
countries. Besides this fact, Nigeria’s experience with colonialism and civil war, have
continued to spur and compel her to seek regional stability. Writing in this vein,
Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi stated that, “Nigeria has since independence made major
political, economical, financial and diplomatic contributions to the development of
African countries.”4 On his part, Aluko contends that:
For analytical purposes Nigerian foreign policy could be said to operate within
three concentric circles. The inner most circle consists of Nigerian policy towards
her neighbors in the West Africa: the inner one is policy towards the rest of
Africa: and the outer circle policy towards the larger international system.5
Aluko’s above assertion is supported by several contributions made by Nigeria towards
the attainment of peace in the West African region and beyond. As Iweriebor and
Uhomoibhi further asserted, “. . . in the long drawn internal conflict in Chad, Nigeria
from the late 1 970s attempted to intervene to bring peace among the contending parties.
She has convened peace conferences to resolve the Sudanese conflict. Nigeria also
intervened multilaterally through the OAU in the attempts to resolve the Morocco
Saharavi conflict.”6
Apart from diplomatic endeavors and financial contributions, Nigeria has also
contributed troops in several areas of the West African region, where there was a conflict
and in the process, has lost many soldiers. According to Ibrahim Gambari, in January of
4. Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi, “Nigeria’s Role in Africa’s Development,” 39.
5. Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, 13.
6. Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi, “Nigeria’s Role in Africa’s Development,” 39.
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1999, Nigeria lost 700 soldiers in Sierra Leone.7 It is quite obvious that regional policy
issues, constitutes major aspect ofNigeria’s Foreign policy objectives, despite her
constantly changing government, her underdeveloped economy, and the fractures in her
internal political structure, Nigeria strives to maintain her foreign policy objectives,
particularly towards West Africa.
This study has found that Nigeria’s geographical location as identified above, is
one of the contributing factors to her regional participation/contributions, another being
her enormous natural resources as well as the size of her population. Secondly, these
findings show, that regardless of the reason(s), Nigeria is in a unique position (a large
country with huge population, and located between smaller countries). In spite of her
unique position, Nigeria is trying to navigate through the ever so complex, world politics
that is further compounded with: the New World Order, The Global Market and more.
From globalization, to technology innovations, and global communication advancements,
to other more localized issues such as currency devaluation, national debt, and other
domestic issues.
In addition to the above global issues, Nigeria is also trying to deal with more
pressing domestic issues (high unemployment, underdeveloped economy, etc.), through a
Federal system of governance, that, to a certain extent, represents democracy. In addition
to her domestic issues and additional global issues from politics of unequal
development, the World Trade Organization (WTO), to UN’s treaty of firearms, as well
as regional and global peacekeeping mission, Nigeria tries to maintain a consistent
7. Ibrahim Gambari, “at the graduation lecture of Course 16 of the Nigeria Defense
liege,” by Molly Kilete, http://wwvvw.sunnewsonline.com news (accessed August 10, 2007):
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foreign policy of Africa-center-piece policy, which several indications through the course
of this inquiry has shown. Contrary to the revealed Africa-center-piece policy, some
political observers and political scientists have continued to state Nigeria’s intent for
regional hegemony.
Despite the assertions by these political observers of her hegemonic intent,
perhaps more obvious to her claim, is Nigeria’s geopolitical location. Nigeria is located
on the west coast of Africa, between latitude 4° and 14° N longitudes 3° and 15° E
Meridian. She is bordered on the West by the Republic of Benin, on the North by Niger,
on the East by Chad and Cameroon, and on the South by the Gulf of Guinea. In essence,
Nigeria is surrounded by four to five Francophone countries who can be susceptible to
France influence (see Figure 2). It is in light of this potential external threat that Nigeria
endeavors to ensure regional political stability and tranquility. Nigeria is in search of
continental and/or sub-regional security. But to search for security implies that there is a
need for security or a prior recognition of insecurity.8
As stated earlier, Nigeria endeavors to achieve regional political stability because
she perceives external threat to her internal and regional security. As Aluko contends:
The experience of the last civil war when Dahomey Dahomey (now Republic of
Benin) was used briefly in 1969 for airlifting arms and relief supplies to Biafra
brought home this point to the Nigerian leaders more clearly than ever.. . one of
the ideas behind Nigeria’s intense campaign for the formation of a West African
economic community is to reduce dependence on extra-African countries.9
8. Bola A. Akinterinwa, “French Security Arrangements with Francophone Africa:
Implications for Nigeria’s Relations with Its Immediate Neighbours,” in Nigeria and its
Immediate Neighbours, ed., Bassey E. Ate and Bola A. Akinterinwa (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of
International Affairs, 1992), 181.
9. Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, 13.
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Figure 2. Map of Nigeria (showing Nigeria and her immediate neighbors)
Source: Nigeria Political Map by Maps.com - http://www.rnaps.com/ref_map.aspx?
pid12233
Also given that “French security arrangements with Francophone Africa have
raised a number of problems. . .“ Therefore, Nigeria sees France “as an obstacle to the
achievement of Africa’s interests. In this context, French security links with Africa are
generally seen to be detrimental to Africa’s resolve to see African problems solved by
Africans themselves. .
The Country Brief of March 2008 puts Nigeria’s population at 140 million. This
makes Nigeria the most populous country in Africa and the eighth most populous country
10. Akinterinwa, “French Security Arrangements with Francophone Africa: Implications
for Nigeria’s Relations with Its Immediate Neighbours,” 191.
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in the world.’~ These factors and the ones mentioned above, have made it all the more
possible to continue with her commitment to peacekeeping roles in the region.
Nigeria is currently organized into thirty-six states. These states, plus the Federal
Capital Territory—Abuja constitute the Federal Republic of Nigeria. As indicated
earlier, Nigeria practice a federal system of governance, this is of a representative nature
where, representatives from each of the states form the national assembly. In this
centralized federal system of governance, none of the thirty-six states are economically
independent and must, therefore, depend on the federal government for their annual
operating budgets.
The above factors, coupled with other external forces such as the Structural
Adjustment Program (SAP), and currency devaluations, which in many cases, are
influenced by the transnational corporations (TNCs). These TNCs are sometimes allies
of some corrupt leaders who are used to excessive and extensive corruption practices, add
to exacerbate the fracture in Nigeria’s internal political structure. As Sunday Dare’s
article, A Continent in Crisis Africa and Globalization, reflects:
Because of the twin problems of rogue leadership and the exploitative tendencies
of TNCs, Africa is caught between a rock and a hard place. As the history of
conflicts in Africa shows, the extraction of mineral resources creates and
reinforces government corruption, which easily begets repressive societies. As
would be expected, poverty, unemployment, and insecurity spread, while social
services decay. 12
11. Kenoye Kelvin Eke, “Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Under Two Military Governments,
1966-1979: An analysis ofthe Gowan and Muhammad/Obasanjo Regimes, “African Studies 16.
(1990): 9.
12. Sunday Dare, Dollars and Sense Magazine (July/August 2001), http://www.third
rldtraveler.com/Africa/Continent_Crisis.html (accessed June 2005).
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There are other issues such as Nigeria/n dependency on foreign goods and almost
total dependent on crude oil revenues, these issues, add to Nigeria’s internal political
fractures.
Nigeria’s Roles in West Africa
It is beyond the scope of this research to chronicle every aspect ofNigeria’s
foreign policy, especially in relation to Africa in general, and the West African sub
region in particular. It is appropriate however, to put into this study’s frame of reference,
the objectives and realities of Nigeria’s policy for Africa.
For better understanding of the issues central to this study, it is necessary to
review Nigeria’s foreign policy towards the West African region. It is also important to
show how the roles of foreign policy are intertwined or interrelated with the roles of
public policy. In Dye’s views, “policy analysis is finding out what governments do, why
they do it, and what difference, if any, it makes.”3 Some of the relevant documents
reviewed revealed that part ofNigeria’s national interests include: protection or defense
of the country’s sovereignty, as well as independence and territorial integrity from acts of
aggression, serve as the raw material out of which the foreign policy of the nation is
made.’4 As Aluko aptly puts it:
Nigeria’s foreign policy.., is seen like this by the federal government. For
security and political reasons the Lagos authorities consider their policy towards,
and relations with, their neighbours as of the utmost priority and hence their
efforts to establish the Chad Basin Commission and the Niger River Community
13. Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 10th ed. (NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), 4.
14. Ogaba Oche, “Nigeria As A Regional Power And Representative in A Reformed
United Nations Security Council,” in Nigeria and the Development ofAfrican Union, ed. Bola A.
Akinterinwa (Nigeria: Vantage, 2005), 2.
48
in 1964, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in
1975.15
Aluko’s view is similar to the views of some political scholars such as Yoroms,
and Gambari, others contend that Nigeria’s foreign policy enactments and
implementation particularly in West Africa, appears to operate in a backwards manner or
order. In other words, Nigeria since independence tends to go to many lengths to achieve
her foreign policy objectives. They further argue that Nigeria would be economically and
politically, better positioned had she invested and/or committed to her domestic policies,
similar to her foreign policy commitment. After all, should domestic affairs not
supersede any other form of “national interest?” these scholars further indicate that
Nigeria’s domestic policies have bearing on her external political image. In the past they
contend, Nigeria paid great attention to domestic policy regardless of her Africa-center-
peace policy.
This study also found that Nigeria or at least, some of her past regimes did not
consider it a complete misnomer to be steadfast with what she considers her regional
foreign policy. Though, she lacks similar consistency or continuity with her domestic
policies, she does not think that it is a misguided priority to continue to champion
regional peacemaking and peacekeeping missions.
Domestic policies aside, both domestic and foreign policy may operate on two
different spheres—national and international but they are not isolated from each other;
and either one can dictate the direction of internal or external political out. For example,
Nigeria’s ability to carry out peacekeeping missions in West Africa and beyond
15. Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, 3.
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(international affairs), depends mainly on her ability to generate the financial means as
well as her ability to recruit the needed soldiers (internal affairs), and as such, there
should be some level of, or need for consistence between international and domestic
policy formulation.
The point here is that Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation since independence has
remained consistent no matter how unstructured the implementations are. As Yoroms
asserts, “blowing cold, hot or firm, depending on the circumstances in which she found
herself.”6 Yoroms further argues that:
Nigeria has engaged herself in tackling intractable conflicts and issues on the
continent of Africa and the world at large. The foundation of this is rooted on the
principle of ‘Africa as the Center-piece ofNigeria’s foreign policy, which has
been in practice since independence and was only concretized during the Murtala
Obasanjor regime.
Ibrahim Gambari, commenting on his observation of Major-General Buhari’s
administration noted, that the principle:
was imprecise and weak in its implementation. Several questions were raised
which were not adequately addressed, let alone resolved. Should we, for
example, be a fire brigade, available at any time and place on the continent, to put
conflagration? Alternatively, should we respond selectively to crisis areas on the
continent that are closer to home or closer to our fundamental security and
national interests objectives?
From the first republic, Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation was the
responsibility of the federal cabinet. The process was usually dominated by the Prime
16. Gani Joses Yoroms, “ECOMOG and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy,” in Nigeria’s New
Foreign Policy Thrust: Essays in Honour ofAmbassador Oluyemi AdenUi, CON. ed. Bola A.




Minister.’9 Regardless of who (civilian or military) is in charge of government, the
foreign policy implementation and possibly formulation have remained consistent
particularly with regards to West Africa and the broader Africa. This is because Nigeria
believes that an unstable region could and will impact her internal stability, and as such
remains committed to her peacekeeping roles in West Africa. As a former Minister of
Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs, detailed in a keynote address:
“.. . Although the cost in terms of human and material resources are considered
quite high, they are regarded as necessary sacrifice for the attainment of peace and
stability within the sub-region. ~ In other words, Nigeria can afford to make
sacrifices in terms of her national welfare in lieu of regional stability. After all,
Nigeria argues, regional instability could devastate internal stability. Moreover,
there are other more complex variables involved in the formulation of national
policies including: the federal character principles, equal representation of all
states within the federation, or “national interest must be conceived and in such a
manner that it incorporates the particularistic interest of the component member-
units of the Federation.”2’
Economic Assistance
It is against the foregoing background that Nigeria continues relentlessly to
sponsor, assist and support many African states that have needed and/or requested her
assistance, whether with economic, technical and/or human resources (Table 2).
19. Kenoye Kelvin Eke, “Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Under Two Military Governments,
1966-1979: An analysis of the Gowan and Muhammad/Obasanjo Regimes,” African Studies 16
(1990): 9.
20. Alhaji Sule Lamido, “Nigeria’s Foreign Policy” in Selected Readings on Nigeria’s
Foreign Policy And International Relations, ed. R.A. Akindele and Bassey E. Ate, NIIA
Enlightenment Course Series. Vol. 1, N° 1. (2000).
21. R. A. Akindele, “The 1999 Constitution and Foreign Policy,” in Selected Readings
on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy And International Relations, ed. R.A. Akindele and Bassey E. Ate,
NIIA Enlightenment Course Series, 1, (2000), 67.
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Table 2. Patterns of Nigeria’s Financial Assistance to Africa




4 Burkina Faso 407,875





10 Guinea Bissau 500,000
11 Cape Verde 60,775
12 Mozambique 675,890




17 Sao Tome and Principé 124,000
Source: The Nature and Context ofNigeria’s Foreign Assistance: The Politics of Its
Implementation, in Nigerian Journal ofInternational Affairs 25, no. 1 (1999): 20-26.
As Yomi Akinyeye contends, Nigeria after independence chose the doctrine of
African-center-piece policy and has continued to put African interest in the forefront of
her foreign pursuits.22 Additionally, there are several instances where Nigeria
contributed, and continues to contribute to regional and continental economic
development. A clear example of this was noted by Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi:
In the economic and financial spheres Nigeria has similarly contributed to
economic projects and provided financial resources to promote the development
of African countries and regional economic activities. In the area of industrial
projects she has invested in sugar and cements plants in Benin Republic and Iron
ore mining in Guinea. In terms of financial resources for development purposes,
Nigeria established the Nigeria Trust Fund within the African Development Bank.
This Trust Fund provides concessional loans to African countries to undertake
22. Yomi Akinyeye, “Nigeria’s Defense Policy: Perspectives for a New Century,” in
Nigerian Journal ofInternational Affairs 26, no.1 (2000): 67.
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development projects with long and convenient payment terms. Aside from direct
economic and financial aid, Nigeria has attempted to move African development
to a stage and condition in which it would be based on extensive economic
production and interaction and active economic and commercial exchange of
goods and services within Africa which provides goods and services within and
among African countries. This requires the creation of a vastly productive
industrial and agricultural capacity within Africa which would provide the goods
and services to be exchanged. But to facilitate this commercial exchange system
requires the creation of regional economic arrangements or groups where this
process will commence and the eventual attainment of this interaction at the
continental level through an economic community and a common market. Thus,
at the sub-regional level, Nigeria was at the forefront of the creation of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975,
an organization which was to promote co-operation and development in all fields
of economic activity, including industry, transportation, energy, agriculture,
natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and to promote
co-operation and development in social and cultural matters for the purpose of
raising the standard of living of the African peoples,. ~
In spite of issues with border disputes, either with Chad, Niger, or the more trying
Cameroon/Nigeria (Bakassi Cross-River State) disputes, these issues have not dampened
Nigeria’s willingness to continue to extend a hand in assistance, to various states within
the West African region and beyond. Additionally, Nigeria, whether in staying true to the
last instrument of statehood her foreign policy stance or adhering to “Nigeria’s good
neighbourliness policy,” remains adamant on all levels of international assistance, which
as indicated by Saliu, “is a consistent theme in the country’s foreign policy.”24
Nigeria’s assistance to her neighbors takes the form of loans, intellectual capital,
and/or the provision and maintenance of institutions. For example, “To date, Nigeria
23. Chiedu E.G. Iweriebor and Martin I. Uhomoibhi, Nigeria’s Role in Africa’s
Development: UN Security Council: A casefor Nigeria’s Membership (Lagos: Times Books
Limited, 1999), 37-38.
24. Hassan A. Saliu, Nigerian Journal ofInternational Affair: Reflection ofFour
Decades ofNigeria’s Foreign Policy, Vol. 25, N 1(1999), 62
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maintains a polytechnic in Equatorial Guinea and contributed to road construction and
other infrastructural facilities.”25 Even though Nigeria, in the international sphere, may
not be accorded recognition for her numerous forms of assistance, her very overt efforts
in these areas cannot be denied in Africa, as well as around the world. The above
statement is further supported by Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi’s assertion that:
All exposition of Nigeria’s contributions to various African countries within and
outside Africa will run into several volumes. But Nigeria’s contributions can be
briefly outlined in terms of bilateral aid to the African world and contributions to
world peace and security through the United Nations system.26
Furthermore, the inquiry reveals that, consistently, at all levels, whether
regionally and/or worldwide, Nigeria continues to assist financially and otherwise, as the
need demands. As evidenced by the UN report of, 17 September 2005, the Secretary
General Kofi Annan, stated that, the Nigerian government, in addition to donating to the
Tsunami relief fund, has also extended the sum of 1 million dollars towards relief for
victims of hurricane Katrina in the United States. 27 Additionally, and further giving
credence to this study’s fundamental inquiry, is the above stated UN report. Equally
alluding to these facts, Ayo Akinbobola contends that, Nigeria provides aid and
25. Hassan A. Saliu, Nigerian Journal ofInternational Affairs: Reflection ofFour
Decades ofNigeria’s Foreign Policy 25, no.1(1999): 63.
26. Chiedu E.G. Iweriebor and Martin I. Uhomoibhi, Nigeria’s Role in Africa’s
Development: UN Security Council: A casefor Nigeria’s Membership (Lagos: Times Books
Limited, 1999), 36.
27. UN Report of 17 September 2005, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?
NewsID=l5866&Cr (accessed May 21, 2008).
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assistance to diverse areas, which is not predicated on exploitation. The provision of aid
is an important part ofNigeria’s foreign policy.28
The general assumption of foreign aid to countries in Africa including Nigeria is
that comes from the west Britain, France, the United States, etc.: hardly are there any
assumptions of aid from within the West African region. As noted by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and cited by Akinbobola, foreign
aid is “the flow of responses from the industrialized countries to the less developing
countries.”29 Moreover, majority of theses aid from industrialized countries is in form of
loans and through either the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
almost always, with conditions such as devaluation of the receiving country’s currency,
and/or the subjection of its citizens to some form of a Structural Adjustment Program
(SAP).
In essence, there are several categories of foreign aid and is is not always from the
industrialized to the developing countries. Viewing foreign aid from a more divergent
perspective, Akinbobola states that, in practice, foreign aid has been the subject of much
international controversy. Part of the basis for this controversy is that the donors have
mostly been countries of the Northern hemisphere. This has tended to generate immense
geo-political concerns in aid relations and in international politics.30 He further observed
28. Ayo Akinbobola, “The Nature and Context of Nigeria’s Foreign Assistance: The
Politics of Its Implementation,” in Nigerian Journal ofInternational Affair: Reflection ofFour




that the international controversy results from the categories, manners, and practices with
which the aid is delivered. Akinbobola in his contention and citing Morgenthau, states
that there are six types of aid, which include: humanitarian, subsistence, military,
prestige, economic development and bribery3’
In further elaboration of these types of aid, Akinbobola, further alluding to
Morgenthau’s suggestion, noted that almost all of the above mentioned aid have political
implications “all but humanitarian aid is used to pursue political objectives. Even
humanitarian aid assumes political role where it operates within a political framework, in
which case, it begins to perform political functions.”32 No wonder most types of foreign
aid generate international controversy, On the other hand, Akinbobla asserts:
Nigeria’s assistance to other countries has involved all the major forms of aid.
There has been no real emphasis on any particular category. However, there
appears to have a greater emphasis on bilateral than multilateral assistance which
only recently began to gain added impetus in the foreign economic policy in the
Second Republic compared to the First which was largely dominated by the
technical assistance.33
The UN Limited Role and Nigeria’s Commitment
The end of the Cold War diminished competition for allies in Africa by the
“superpowers.” The United Nations as well has limited its role and the extent of its
peacemaking, even though, as stipulated in the UN Charter, the main responsibility of the
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 24.
33. Akinbobola, “The Nature and Context of Nigeria’s Foreign Assistance: The Politics
of Its Implementation,” 25.
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maintenance of international peace and security rests with the UN Security Council.34
This scenario of limited role by the international body, created a subsequent void,
particularly as the nature of conflicts has also changed. According to Furley and May’s
explanation;
In years peacekeeping in Africa has been attempted, it has developed into
extraordinary functionary. It is closely allied with peacemaking involving the political
process of bringing the warring factions together securing cease-fire and establishing
peace talks and helping to negotiating peace accords.35
Nigeria’s audacity for commitment to regional peace and security comes from
several stated factors, but her tenacity and capacity for peacemaking in the West African
region and beyond, stems from immensely increased resources. According to Olajide
Aluko in his work, Essays In Nigerian Foreign Policy, there can be no doubt that the
most powerful factor in Nigeria’s more determined and positive line in the affairs of the
African continent has been her own increased economic and military strength,”36 and
according to the UN report of February 1, 2006, on troop contribution:
By 2005, Nigeria has been named among the largest contributors of troops to UN
peacekeeping missions. A ranking completed by the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations on a monthly basis showed that as at April this year,
34. Chapter V of The United Nations Charter: of the United Nations signed in San
rancisco on 26 June 1945, http://www.un.org.aboutum/charter/ (accessed August 3, 2007).
35. “Peacekeeping in Africa,” ed. Oliver Furley, and Roy May (Vermont: Brookfield,
98), 3.
36. Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, 32.
57
Nigeria is actually the fourth largest contributors to the UN peacekeeping
missions coming after Pakistan, Bangladesh and India37 (see Table 3).
Table 3. Top Ten Contributors of Military Troops and Police Personnel to UN
Operations
Rank Country Total Monthly 2005 2004 2003
1 Pakistan 264,236 7,340 114,235 94,344 55,657
2 Bangladesh 233,393 6,483 103,007 87,344 43,042
3 India 146,539 4,071 75,708 36,902 33,929
4 Nigeria 111,886 3,108 36,068 41,485 34,333
5 Ghana 98,577 2,738 36,799 36,350 25,428
6 Nepal 84,537 2,348 41,551 28,501 14,485
7 Jordan 79,648 2,212 36,180 24,507 18,961
8 Uruguay 76,476 2,124 29,644 25,743 21,089
9 Ethiopia 72,439 2,012 41,041 30,315 1,083




Resolution 60 180 requests the Secretary General to provide a list of the top ten providers of military
personnel and civilian police to United Nations missions. Base on the average monthly contributions in the
previous three calendar years.
Data for monthly contributions has been obtained from DPKO. Yearly averages have
been complied on the basis of cumulative totals for each contributor, divided by 12
months Peacemaking as articulated by Furley and May, is the process that may
accompany either peacekeeping or peace enforcement an ongoing process.38 There is
however, an African tradition of peacemaking—meaning that historically, Africans have
a traditional approach to peacemaking. This involves community leaders who in the past,
37. http://www.punchng.com/Articl.aspx?theartic, Empowered Newswire, a US- based
Nigerian news agency (accessed June 1, 2008).
38. “Peacekeeping in Africa,” eds. Oliver Furley, and Roy May (Vermont: Brookfield,
1998), 5.
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sometimes served as both traditional and spiritual leaders who had power over the
ordinary citizens. With the arrival of the colonizers, and their subsequent control of all
affairs, it became the duty of these individual new corners to administer solutions to
issues, with the traditional leaders as intermediaries between families, groups,
communities, as well as between clans and tribes. But with the advent of the new
independent states (formally colonized states), the United Nations, Human Right
Organizations, Global Village, the New World Order, peacemaking has taken on new
forms of administration, particularly as disputes have taken on new forms of
manifestation too, and with more deadly consequences.
Regional Political Rivalry
In addition to striving for regional political stability and economic sustainability,
Nigeria has to also develop policies to encourage cooperation among member states to
strive for a more tranquil territory. In the analysis of the West African region, the inquiry
revealed that, there are issues that work against a more solid political and economic
integration of the region. These key issues are border disputes, the difference between
the Anglo-phone and Franco-phone states, and the vital interests of the ex-colonizers,
particularly the French and the British.
There are other issues, but of those identified above, the most challenging is the
border disputes—a consequence of colonial boundaries. To look more closely, since
independence, Nigeria has had to deal with one area of border conflict or another. As
depicted in Figure 3, Nigeria shares borders with five other countries at all four
coordinates of the country. According to Akindele and Ate, “since independence,
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Nigeria’s relationship with its contiguous neighbours has been marked essentially by
mutual suspicions, distrust and outright alienation.”39 What these authors attempted to
establish, is the impediment of the various artificial borders introduced by the colonizers
and how incredibly daunting it has become for all concerned.
To better understand the implication(s) of border disputes, an understanding of the
concept of “region,” is quite pertinent in this research. Region, as well as the twin
concept of regionalism, is a critical concept in the field of political science. According to
Ferris, for example, “the study of regionalism is the study of the relations between people
and the places in which they live.”40 In line with Ferris’ assertion, and, despite some
security breaches and threats to her citizens, Nigeria, tries to devise ways to achieve
amicable arrangement with the other governments of the disputed areas. For example,
In May 1981, some Camerounian troops ambushed and killed five Nigerian
soldiers at Ikang, a border town adjoining Cross River State, raising a storm of
protest by Nigerians for retaliation. Some years after this unprovoked aggression,
Camerounian security personnel, again blatantly occupied Nigerian villages,
hoisted their flag, collected taxes and generally terrorized the bewildered
villagers. In 1983, there was an attempt by Chadian soldiers to similarly overrun
and occupy Nigerian islands on the Lake Chad, a body of water which Nigeria
shares with Chad, Niger and Cameroun. In early 1987 it was widely reported in
the Nigerian Press (later confirmed by the authorities) that Equatorial Guinea an
Island territory formally ruled by Spain—just fifteen minutes by air from the
Nigerian south-eastern coast, had permitted apartheid South Africa to establish a
foot-hold in that territory. The real significance for Nigerians of this ‘discovery’
was that South Africa had a hidden design to use this contact for purposes of
surprise military attack and/or electronic surveillance against Nigeria. And more
recently in May 1991, some Cameroun security personnel abducted six Nigerians
from Mbo Local Government Area in Akwa Ibom State, took them into
39. R. A. Akindele and Bassey E. Ate, Selected Reading on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy
and International Relations (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Victoria Island,
2000), 172.
40. William R. Ferris, “Region as Art” in Regional studies: The interplay ofLand and
People, ed. Glen E. Lich (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1992), 3.
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Cameroun territory where they were detained and tortured for about two weeks
before being released, after diplomatic intervention by the Nigerian government.4’
Part ofNigeria’s decision to treat the border disputes with caution and moral
consideration stems from the fact that, peoples from these disputed areas are ethno
culturally linked to similar populations in Nigeria. Equally, many Nigerian citizens share
history, geography, kith, and kin with other groups of people from these areas of dispute.
These interrelationships make the installation of physical demarcation a difficult
proposition for the governments concerned. Ate and Akinterinwa argue, “features that
bind and also strain—meaning that the fact of history generally should be regarded as a
binding factor which, if constructively harnessed, ought to promote a harmonious
relationship rather than conflict.”42
Secondly, the other key issue which exacerbates regional political rivalry among
the various states in the West African region is the Anglo-phone/Franco-phone
dichotomy. This problem was precipitated by France, who had and still has major
influence on several states in the region, and whose influence continues to hinder
complete political integration of the region. On this point, Aluko’ s contention is
enlightening.
It is no secret that it has been the cardinal policy of the French to encourage close
co-operation among its former West African colonies in order to counterbalance
the weight of Nigeria. In pursuit of this policy the French inspired the
establishment of an exclusively francophone West African economic community
41. Bassey E. Ate and Bola A. Akinterinwa, “Nigeria and its Immediate Neighbours,”
(Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Victoria Island, 1992), 1.
42. Bassey E. Ate, Nigeria’s Relations with its Immediate Neighbours: A Security
Political Analysis in Selected Reading on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and International Relations
(Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Victoria Island, 2000), 176.
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between 1971 and 1972, the Communaute Economique de I’Afrique de I’Quest
(CEAO) whose final agreement was signed in Abidjan in April 1973..
The establishment of this exclusively Franco-phone economic organization was to deter
or forestall the formation of ECOWAS.
Another key issue and a major obstacle to regional political integration, is the
vital interests of the ex-colonizers, particularly the French. The very overt presence of
the French and their military in the West Africa region, poses a security threat, and also
has negative influences on regional political integration. Moreover, the French presence
influences regional political rivalry among some smaller Franco-phone countries that
depend on France for their security. Consequently, Nigeria, in order not to undermine its
quest for regional security and political stability, is taking steps towards a new policy
agenda for the contiguous sub-region; it is in this regard that Ate advised that Nigeria,
“must take a serious account of the French position as a ‘regional’ actor. This does not
mean that we should regard the presence of France as an inhibitive factor on Nigeria’s
Policy.”44
Additionally, Nigeria has to be conscious of the strategic significance of regional
political unity for West Africa, such as the North-East corridor and the maritime states of
Cross River and Akwa Thom. In the same view Ate points out that, “Hence there is a
substantial truth in saying that Nigeria’s national security interests are intertwined with
43. Olajide Aluko, “Essays In Nigerian Foreign Policy,” George Allen and UNWIN
d., (London: WCIA 1LU, 1981), 17.
44. Bassey E. Ate, Nigeria’s Relations with its Immediate Neighbours: A Security
Political Analysis in Selected Reading on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and International Relations
(Lagos: Victoria Island, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs 2000), 176.
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the systemic security of the sub-region.”45 Nigeria notwithstanding, any state with
complete sovereignty will want and needs security for its citizens.
As found by this inquiry, there is a huge policy difference between Nigeria’s
domestic and foreign policy. While externally, Nigeria has maintained a consistent
“Africa-center-piece policy,” internally, it lacks similar consistency.
The lack of consistency for example, in internal (domestic) economic policies,
which itself, is as a result of none existence of well established and/or poorly established
and operated government institutions, e.g., in December 1983, Shagari’s administration
(civil) was displaced by the Buhari’s administration (military) and twenty months later
(August) 1985, the Babangida’s military administration took over power from the
Buhari’s regime. With the constantly changing government, there was no time for policy
implementation or time to ascertain the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of any
implemented policy. According to Abubakar Momoh, in the Political Economy of
Transition to Civil Rule:
Following his ascendance to power; IBB set in place the Political Transition
Program (PTP) and the Economic Transition Program (ETP). It was in this
context that the transition to civil rule and the SAP were conceived... The result
of this being the sensitisation of Nigerians into accepting thee nebulous,
Maradona syndrome—a culture characterized by roguery and swindling. The
combination interplay of PTP and ETP created an emergency (new) SAP class,
which further improvised the workers, peasants and middle class.
45. Ibid., 175.
46. Abubakar Momoh, “The Political Economy of Transition to Civil Rule,” in The
Political Economy Nigeria Under Military Rule: 1 984-1993 (Harare, Zimbabwe: SAPES Books,
1995), 16.
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The point here is that, granted, external political environment is different from domestic
environment, every Nigerian government (civilian or military), managed to maintain the
Africa center piece policy showing level of consistency. In contrast and as indicated
above, since national and international affairs both can dictate the direction of one or the
other, their relative economic/political issues should impact on another.
Extra-African Countries
Due to the dependent nature of virtually all the states in the West African sub
region, Nigeria included, on the extra-African countries, for intricate network of
economic, military and some levels of cultural ties, a complete independence of these
states may be unattainable. For example, About ten Franco-phone countries affiliated
their currencies to the Communaute Financiere Africaine (CFA) franc, to the French
franc.47 Issues such as that of the currency affiliation could result in an indirect control
of these countries’ foreign reserves by France. It is matters such as the currency
affiliation, that add to further motivate Nigeria’s need for regional economic
sustainability hence, her relentless efforts for the creation of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 and other similar economic integration
endeavors.
Virtually all countries in the West African region were colonized by some
European countries, particularly Britain and France, for more than half a century. Over
this period of colonization, none of these countries were able to develop adequate
47. Mohamed Belmakki, African Sub-regional Organizations in Peacekeeping and
Peacemaking: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), (California:
Monterey, 2005), 24.
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economic institutions, infrastructure as well as political structures. Consequently, these
counties have built a relationship of ‘intricate network of economic, political and some
cultural ties,’48 with their ex-colonizers. This type of relationship is that of dependency
meaning that though, these African countries are now “politically independent,” they are
still very dependent on their ex-coionizers (the Extra-African countries) for many of their
economic, financial, military, and other such technical needs.
The relationship as stated above is seen as these: the African countries are
dependent on the Extra-African countries, but in reality, the relationship is more
complex, because even though the Extra-African-countries are economically developed
and politically more established, they look to their ex-colonies for some of their raw
materials such as rubber, coco, crude oil, to name but a few. Thus each side finds de
linking from one another, a difficult proposition. Despite these scenarios however, terms
of trade or terms of exchange of one good with another, are unequal and as Kunirum Osia
alluded to, developing countries, particularly African counties, are still at an unequal
level of economic development vis-a-vis the industrialized counties which seem to be the
purveyors of globalization.49
The final analysis of this chapter is that Nigeria since her independence in 1960
and before, has sought ways to help eliminate and/or prevent any and all African nations
from colonial rule and the negative impacts of colonization, by championing various
48. Ibid.
49. Kunirum Osia, “Globalization and the Politics of Unequal Development” in:
International Seminar (London: November 11, 2003), 1.
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causes that promotes economic sustainability, political stability as well as regional
security in West Africa and beyond.
Sometimes these causes have generated controversial questions from political
observers, as to Nigeria’s motivation for championing regional peacekeeping efforts or
her intent for extending economic assistance in the region. So far, the findings in this
study have not indicated that Nigeria’s motivation for her peacekeeping roles in West
Africa is for reasons other than regional political stability and security. As observed by
Yoroms;
the fl.indamental objectives ofNigeria’s foreign policy clearly delineated her
concerns for African regional security and development. These, among others
include: The creation of relevant political conditions in Africa and the rest of the
world to facilitate the preservation of the territorial integrity and security of all
African countries, while at the same time fostering national self-reliance and rapid
economic development in Africa;.
Finally, the analysis ofNigeria’s peacekeeping role in West African from the
point of view of the Inter-Agency Framework for conflict Analysis in Transition
(IAFCA), introduces a new dimension of analyzing a regional peacekeeping missions
particularly as it relates to roles played by individual countries.
50. Gani Yoroms, “Nigeria and security in Africa” Nigeria and the Development of
African Union, ed. Bola A. Akinterinwa (Nigeria: Vantage, 2005), 231.
CHAPTER III
NIGERIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA
Historical Background
From1958 to the time of her political independence in 1960 and from the
formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and beyond, Nigeria has
been at the helm of all affairs of African unity. This applied particularly, in relation to
the de-colonization process of many African nations and the eventual dismantling of
apartheid in Southern Africa. Thus, Akinterinwa observed that,”... Nigeria has, until
now, been very instrumental to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa.”
(Equally, either unilaterally or) Nigeria has been involved in many roles in
Africa: as a member of one of the international organizations, including the AOU, now
African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or
the Commonwealth of Nations. As a member of the United Nations Organization (UNO)
Nigeria has participated in many of its programs, such as the United Nations Technical
Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC) created in 1970. On several occasions
Nigeria embarked on ways and means of advancing positive African issues and causes,
especially issues affecting her immediate neighbours, from the Gulf of Guinea, to Benin
Republic, the Cameroons, to Chad and Niger Republic as well as causes of Africans in
the Diaspora. Sule Lamido has pointed one such instance when he stated that:
1. Bola A. Akinterinwa, “Africa in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, 1960-2005,” in Nigeria and
the Development ofAfrican Union, ed. Bola A. Akinterinwa (Nigeria: Vantage, 2005), 3.
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To further consolidate relations with our neighbours and to provide alternate
mechanism for constructive engagement with our neighbours on economic,
political, maritime and boundary issues, we have reactivated the Gulf of Guinea
Commission and expanded the membership to include all countries sharing
common maritime borders within the Gulf of Guinea Basin. These include
Nigeria, Cameroun, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Gabon, Angola,
Congo Brazzaville and Congo Kinshasha.2
In addition to the TCDC, Nigeria in 1987, established the Technical Aid Corp
(TAC). According to Mamman Daura, “TAC Scheme is a whole-owned (fully funded)
Nigeria initiative, which seeks to promote socio-economic development in friendly
developing countries of the South.”3 Table 4 depicts the various countries that have
benefited from TAC since its inception. Though TAC was established in 1987, Nigeria,
long before then and as evidenced in the earlier chapter, has since her political
independence, given various forms of assistance to many countries. Case in point,
“Nigerian Technical Aid Corp was formally established in 1987 out of a desire by the
Nigerian government to streamline the hitherto uncoordinated foreign aid and technical
assistance programme.”4
2. Alhaji Sule Lamido, “Nigeria’s Foreign Policy,” in Selected Readings on Nigeria’s
Foreign Policy And International Relations, ed. By R.A. Akindele and Bassey E. Ate, NIIA
Enlightenment Course Series 1, no.1 (2000): xvi.
3. Mamman Daura, “Nigeria’s Technical Aid Corps Programme: From Capacity-
Building to International confidence And Peace-Building,” in Nigeria and the Development of
African Union, ed. Bola A. Akinterinwa (Nigeria: Vantage, 2005), 371.
4. Ibid., 373.
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N 0 ~ 0 ‘~ v ~0 Counines 2004
1. ANC (Morogoro) 16 - - - - - -
2. Angola 4 - - - - - - -
3. Belize 65 - 1 II - 3 3 3
4. Benin 12 - - - - - - - -
5. Burkina Faso 9 - - - - - - - 2
6. Cape Verde 21 - - - - - - - 8
7. C.A.R. 19 3 - - - - - - -
8. Comoros 22 - - I - 3 - - -
9. Djibouti 3 - - - - - - - -
10. Dorninica 31 - - - - - 4 - 2
II. Eq.Guinea 165 - - 4 1 1 6 - 4
12. Ethiopia 100 - - - - - - 1 5
13. Fiji 57 - - - - 2 - - 5
14. The Gambia 363 14 1 21 - - 9 - 51
15. Ghana I - - - - - - - -
16. Guyana 2 - - - - - - -
17. Jamaica 97 - - - - - - - 10
18. Rwanda 47 - - - - - 2 - 3
19. Lesotho 34 - - - - - - -
20. Liberia 1 - - - - - - - -
21. Mozambique 80 - - 1 - - - - -
22. Namibta 134 - 2 - - - - - 3
23. Niger 20 - - - - 2 - - -
24. Senegal 12 - - - - - - - -
25. Seychellies 45 - - - - - - 3
26. Sierra Leone 55 3 7
27. Swaziland 26 3 2
28. Zambia 181 2 16 1 4
29. St. Kitts & Nevis 4
30. Kenya 13
31. Tanzania 9 1
32. Shelter Afrique 3 3
33. Uganda 24 4 1 6
TOTAL 1,677 21 9 58 1 13 26 2 122
Whether the issue is with the United Nations, the Economic Community of West
African States, or the African Union, Nigeria has never hesitated to participate at
significant levels. Echoing similar sentiments, Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi contend that, in
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addition to contributing tremendously to the development of African countries, Nigeria
has provided free untied aid in the areas of technical assistance (various specialties),
financial assistance and economic investments, and conflict resolution among several
African countries unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally through the OAU and other
regional arrangements. For example, Nigeria, as far back as 1962, sent troops to help
quell the mutiny against Tanganyika; also in 1981, Nigeria spear-headed the first ever
OAU peace-keeping operations to resolve the conflict in Chad.5
In the course of this study, the literature reviewed showed that Nigeria’s
willingness to participate in any international matters necessitating assistance (in both
financial and human resources), be it on the continental level, global level, or both, is a
policy based principally on the will to limit and if possible, eradicate general human
suffering. It is also quite ironic that Nigeria strives very hard at the international level to
prevent human suffering, but lacks the same zeal internally. Or as “Larry King of the
Cable Network News (CNN) organization once stated, Nigeria exports what she does not
have while importing what she has in abundance.”6 What Mr. King saw as ironic and
was alluding to, is Nigeria’s ability to assist in bringing peace to Liberia and Sierra
Leone, by enhancing the installation of the then, democratically elected presidents of both
counties, whereas, her own head of state (General - Sani Abacha) at that time, was
5. Chiedu E.G. Iweriebor and Martin I. Uhomoibhi, “Nigeria’s Role in Africa’s
Development,” UN Security Council: A Casefor Nigeria ‘s Membership (Lagos: Times Books
Limited, 1999), 36.
6. Nuhu Yaqub, “Olusegun Obasanjo And Developments in Africa: Taking A Long
View From The Past Into The Present And The Future In Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Making and
Implementation,” in Nigeria and the Development ofAfrican Union, ed. Bola A. Akinterinwa
(Nigeria: Vantage, 2005), 66.
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considered a dictator. Secondly, with the abundance of crude oil a base for petroleum,
Nigeria as at then, was importing all her petroleum products; quite ironic indeed.
Nigeria’s foreign policy has remained relatively consistent especially towards
Africa. This was the same point implied by Obiozor, who stated that, “. . . historically,
Nigeria’s foreign policy has been influenced and guided by a commitment to five broadly
defined principles: Respect for the sovereignty and independence of nations, Non
Alignment, Non-Interference in the internal affairs of other nations, Multilateral
diplomacy, and Decolonization”7 Through this inquiry, Nigeria’s regional multilateral
roles can be better understood against the background of her past and current
international roles, and policy agendas set forward for future policy implementations.
Here Ate’s suggested new policy framework and indicated that, Nigeria should
institute diplomatic dialogue with governments of her immediate neighbours to solicit
their opinions or “sound them out” as it were, which is a way of building consensus on
the general proposed development and integration agenda for the region, and to establish
a common market located strategically in the trans-border areas. He further stated that,
the common market, apart from serving as a center of commercial interaction on a larger
scale which the people require, such markets in the African tradition is a unif~’ing force
that strengthens existing socio-ethno-cultural and personal ties.8
7. George A. Obiozor, “Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and the Challenges of Unipolarity,” in
Nigeria’s New Foreign Policy Thrust: Essays in Honour ofAmbassador Oluyemi Adenjji, CON.,
ed. Bola A. Akinterinwa (Nigeria: Vantage, 2004), 237-246.
8. Ate, “Nigeria’s Relations with its Immediate Neighbours: A Security-Political
nalysis,” 179-180.
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The above agendas, Ate argues, must include the introduction of free movement
of people and goods to facilitate participation in the larger economy of these countries.
Additionally, the creation of embracive trans-boarder local government areas, to co
ordinate activities with the commercial zones and to provide service for trans-border
communities; the author further states that, the above suggested framework should also
include broadening of areas of coordination and unified operations of the following
tangible matters: defense and intelligence, fisheries and mineral explorations, custom and
immigration, language and cultural developments, etc.9
As stated earlier, it is necessary to evaluate the vast literature on Nigeria’s foreign
policy and international politics because their details enhance the analysis ofNigeria’s
international peacekeeping roles and help direct focus on the different intricate issues
associated with peacekeeping, such as multilateral collaboration, financial obligation and
other such issues. As Magbadelo asserts:
Aside from her multilateral relations through the regional integration strategy,
Nigeria has been deeply involved in fostering bilateral relations with several
African countries, relations bordering on the economic, cultural political and
diplomatic concerns, aimed at further entrenching the bonds of friendly and
cordial relations across the African region. Nigeria believes that peaceful
coexistence among countries of Africa is a prerequisite for the creation of a
formidable regional integration institution to which all member-States would
show allegiance. This explains why the country has continued to expend huge
sums of money on peace-keeping operations in the continent.10
9. Ibid.
10. John Olushola Magbadelo, “Nigeria and Africa’s Development Concerns.” in
Nigeria and the Development ofthe African Union, ed. Bola A. Akinterinwa (Nigeria: Vantage,
2005), 43.
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Magbadelo assertions further indicates to some extent, the length and breadth
Nigeria has gone to encourage economic development though economic integration and
bring peace to African countries; or as noted by Akinterinwa, “... Nigeria is unreservedly
committed to the development of Africa.”~
In all the different literature reviewed above so far, none has confirmed any other
motive or intent by Nigeria for the multilateral roles in the West African region, other
than regional political stability/regional economic integration. It is important to note,
however, that some scholars have suggested the need for Nigeria to focus on her internal
affairs, so as to be better positioned as an eventual regional power.
Nigeria’s Position in the Broader African Context
Nigeria, for many years has played important roles in many African issues—from
the eradication of colonialism/apartheid, to peace promotion - peace enforcement, and/or
peacekeeping. One of Nigeria’s “foreign policy cardinal objectives is the promotion and
sustainment of peace in Africa.”12 Akinterinwa, writing on Nigeria’s foreign policy,
contends that, “since the attainment of political independence, Nigeria has been virtually
committed to the promotion of peace in Africa. The zeal with which the country pursues
the agenda of peace and security regime in Africa became more pronounced, particularly
after the conclusion of her 30—month civil war.. ~
11. Bola A. Akinterinwa, “Africa in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, 1960-2005,” in Nigeria




This statement by Akinterinwa continues to substantiate many earlier similar
statements by various authors on Nigeria’s multilateral roles in Africa. Similarly,
Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi observed that, “A full exposition on Nigeria’s contributions to
various African countries within and outside Africa, will run into several volumes. But
Nigeria’s contributions can be firefly outlined in terms of bilateral aid to the African
world and contributions to world peace and security through the United Nations
system.”4
To further reconcile Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi’s statement on Nigeria’s roles in
Africa and African affairs, other similar indications in political literature, also showed
that, the reason for Nigeria’s multilateral roles in West Africa, is as a result of her
geographical location, and her experience with civil war and colonialism, is why Nigeria
endeavours to ensure regional stability and tranquility. Magbadelo on his part asserts
that, “Nigeria has continued to show immense concern for issues bordering on the
development of Africa since periods before her attainment of sovereign statehood. The
country’s focus on Africa could be explained in part as a conscious resolve by both the
nationalist and post-independence leadership to shoulder the burden of the black man.15
Regardless of the fact that Nigeria herself is still struggling with economic
development lacking the necessary economic structures and infrastructure to
continuously champion African affairs, she forges ahead anyway. Echoing the same
sentiment, Gambari states that, “the effort to re-define foreign spheres where we are in a
14. Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi, UN Security Council: A case for Nigeria’s Membership,
36.
15. Magbadelo, “Nigeria and Africa’s Development Concerns,” 38.
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position to exert any real influence; where we stand best to realize our national interest; a
policy which Nigeria would play the role of a sub-continental power and where our
immediate neighbours would rightly be our priority.”6 Gambari’s assertion corresponds
to an article “The New Realism in Foreign Policy,” by National Concord.
The article by National Concord was at the time, echoing the general opinion of
the Nigerian public and other political observers, which was and is still that, Nigeria
should concentrate most of the effort put into assisting many states within the African
continent, into the structuring and restructuring ofNigeria’s socioeconomic and
sociopolitical affairs and/or on the West African region alone. Gambari concurring with
the above statement, elaborated, “There is little point in deceiving ourselves that we can
play the policeman in Africa. We cannot. And it would be ridiculous to believe
otherwise, because while ours may in fact be the most populous state on the continent, we
seem to lack the economic status necessary for effective diplomacy on a continental
basis”7 Despite all the cautions from many streams of the public opinion, Nigeria has
continued to pursue what Aluko called “promotion of African unity and solidarity,”8
either through the AU, ECOWAS/ECOMOG, or unilaterally.
In 1976 for example, Nigeria allowed the South African Peoples Organization
(SWAPO), to open offices in different cities in Nigeria and extended the same gesture to
the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African branch of Pan-African
16. Ibrahim A. Gambari, “Diplomatic Practice And Foreign Policy Theory: My
Experience As Foreign Minister And Permanent Representative of Nigeria,” 13.
17. Ibid.
18. Aluko, Essays In Nigerian Foreign Policy, 24.
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Congress (PAC) as well. The operation of these offices, facilitated coordination of
various refugee relief activities by these groups representatives. Even though Nigeria’s
actions were necessary at the time, particularly for the care of the refugees but according
to Bukar Bukarambe, “. . ., successive Nigerian governments habitually employed
rhetoric’s that cut a chord with the general public. Such strategies of rousing public
sentiments also served the additional purpose of popularizing the government of the
day.”19
Within West Africa and in the broader African continent, Nigeria has played
major roles politically, economically, and culturally and from all indications, will
continue to play major roles in these matters. Apart from the stated motivation for these
roles, Nigeria also believes, that her internal political stability indirectly depends on the
stability of the West African region. Evidence of this has been indicated in previous
chapters of this study. Furthermore, Nigeria was negotiating loans with the International
Monetary fund (IMF), to cover importation of goods and services while at the same time,
providing financial assistance and grants to some African governments - hardly the time
for any government to continue to be generous (financially or otherwise).
According Yaqub, during the civilian administration and President “Shehu
Shagari a pacifist,” and wanting to maintain Nigeria’s “Africa-center-piece policy,” not
only hosted the first OAU summit in Lagos, in April of 1980, but also provided the
Zimbabwean newly elected president (Robert Mugabe), a grant of $5 million at the
19. Bukarambe, “Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in Africa, 1960-1999,” 117.
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Zimbabwe’s independent election, that gave him power as the first post Unilateral
Declaration of Independence (UDI) era in Zimbabwe.2°
It is obvious from different statements by various authors referenced above, that
Nigeria’s roles in the continent of Africa has been extensive; these roles include
economic assistance, technical aid, diplomatic relations, regional political security
(peacekeeping peace enforcement) and social cultural endeavors, to name but a few. It is
also evident, from some African political observers that Nigeria intends to continue
playing these roles in Africa. According to Kuna, “Nigeria is the only country in the
world with the largest concentration of black people. And the most populous country in
Africa, it is perceived and perceives itself as responsible for Africa and its problems.”2’
Nigeria at the Multilateral Level
In spite ofNigeria’s undeveloped economy, various Nigerian governments have
perpetually indicated that championing African affairs and building partnership with
other nations and organizations (both regionally and globally), is the only way Nigeria
can grow economically as well as politically. According to Magbadelo, “it is note worthy
that, although these objectives ofNigeria’s foreign policy have been criticized variously
20. Nuhu Yaqub, “Olusegun Obasanjo And Developments in Africa: Taking A Long
View From The Past Into The Present And The Future In Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Making and
Implementation,” in Nigeria and the Development ofAfrican Union, ed. Bola A. Akinterinwa
(Nigeria: Vantage, 2005), 64.
21. Muhammad Juma Kuna, The Role ofNigeria in Peace Building, Conflict Resolution,
and Peacekeeping since 1960, http://www.ceddert.com publications/ceddert006.pdf (accessed
March 12, 2008).
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as overly ambitious, un-representative of the country’s core-national interests, and limited
in focus, they have continued to influence successive Nigerian governments. ~
There is really no evidential indication found by this inquiry, to support any other
reason(s) for Nigeria’s multilateral roles in Africa, than the ones state earlier, which are
that Nigeria seeks economic development though economic integration in and within the
West African region and beyond. Nigeria also believes that unstable region will affect her
domestic stability and as such endeavors through diplomatic relationships, economic
assistance, peacekeeping and peace enforcement mission, and several bilateral
collaborations in conflict resolutions around the African continent.
In Aluko’s view, “another aspect ofNigeria’s attitude to intra-African economic
co-operation is her growing anxiety over any association or regional grouping whose
activities are regarded in Lagos as being incompatible with the OAU Charter. She has not
hesitated to make other African countries aware of her concerns.”23 While Aluko is
diplomatic in his contentions of the possible precipitants ofNigeria’s multilateral
involvement in most African courses, some Nigerian political scholars such as Chuibuzo
N. Nwoke, Bassey E. Ate, and Bola A. Akinterinwa, to name a few, are not.
Nwoke on his part, pinpoints what he considers a ‘new order’ — “that will be even
more inequitable and inimical to the development aspirations and needs of the poor
developing countries than the ‘old’ order against which they have been protesting for
22. Magbadelo, “Nigeria and Africa’s Development Concerns,” 40.
23. Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, 29.
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years.”24 This study’s deduction from Nwoke’s assertions is that perhaps Nigeria’s
multilateral endeavours in Africa and particularly in the West African region, is a way to
reduce the extensive encroachment by the industrialized nations, an encroachment that
Nwoke further termed, Economic Diplomacy in a Neo-Colonial Society.
By this term (Economic Diplomacy in a Neo-Colonial Society), Nwoke infers
that, African economy is hijacked by largely European and American domination—a
practice that prevents many peasant and cottage-industry driven economies from
economic advancement, economic sustainability, and perpetual inequitable competition
in the global market. This concept is further reinforced by Kunirum Osia who notes,
“those that protest against ‘globalization’, feel that, in large measure, the continuing
deprivations, inequality and rising disparities in the level of living that they see in current
period, are distrustful not only of the agents of globalization but insist that the concept
itself does not have universal applicability.”25
The implication of Osia’ s assertion is that globalization andlor neo-colonial
economic practices are one and the same, and that at best these terms are ambiguous
designed for continuous marginalization of non- industrialized nations (almost all African
nations), by the industrialized world (mostly of Europe and North America).
Regardless of the term or terms used—”new order,” “new world order,” “old
order,” globalization, etc., what can be said about Nigeria’s international affairs, is that
she has maintained a high degree of diplomacy around the world. Despite her
24. Nwoke, “An Overview of Nigeria’s International Economic Relations,” 72-73.
25. Kunirum Osia, “Globalization and the Politics of Unequal Development” in
International Seminar (London: November 11, 2003), 1.
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undeveloped economy and constantly changing government (mostly of military regimes);
Nigeria’s diplomatic/foreign affairs policies including foreign policy implementations
have been quite consistent, especially when compared with other more established
governments.
Some authors like Yoroms, hold a different view regarding Nigeria’s foreign
policy. As he contends, “It is believed Nigerian foreign policy had no focus, but was
only pursued on the maniac quest for liberating Africa from colonial rule in a poorly
articulated manner. • ,,26 However, other authors such as Oluyemi-Kusa, hold a different
view on Nigeria’s foreign policy. She intimates that, “Any discourse on the new foreign
policy thrust for Nigeria without adequate consideration for Nigeria’s policy on Refugees
and Internally Displaced Persons, IDPs, is incomplete. ~ Similarly, Magbadelo,
contend that:
Nigeria has continued to show immense concern for issues bordering on the
development of Africa since periods preceding her attainment of sovereign
statehood. The country’s focus on Africa could be explained in part as a
conscious resolve by both the nationalists and post-independent leadership to
shoulder the burden of the black man based on awareness that Nigeria is the
abode of the black race... Indeed, Nigeria’s consistency in her concern for Africa
is evident in the adoption of Africa as the cornerstone of the country’s foreign
policy.28
Finally, Nigeria’s multilateral endeavors in Africa - regionally and in the broader
African continent, have gained little international attention. Though such attention and/or
26. Yoroms, “ECOMOG and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy,” 301.
27. Dayo Oluyemi-Kusa, “Refugees And Internally-Displaced Persons in Nigeria,” in
Nigeria ‘s New Foreign Policy Thrust: Essays in Honour ofAmbassador Oluyemi AdenUi, CON,
ed. Bola A. Akinterinwa. (Nigeria: Vantage, 2004), 283.
28. Magbadelo, “Nigeria and Africa’s Development Concerns,” 3 8-39.
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recognition would important but so far, what the inquiry in study revealed, is that Nigeria
is propelled by the need for national/regional security coupled with her experience with
external encroachment during her 30-month civil war and as such, continues to push
adamantly, towards an eventual complete African peoples’ peaceful coexistence with
each other.
Nigeria’s Military Strength
It is essential to understand that power is an important component of a viable
legitimate state or sovereignty. Power is a composite of human resources, natural
resources, economic development, socioeconomic sustainability, political stability and
other such related structures such as, financial/political institutions and the related
infrastructure. Before further analysis of Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles, this study will try
to define/explain power- both regional and global. Power in the context of world politics,
is understood to encompass wealth money, land, and other such properties that
constitute assets. However there must be balance of power. According to Claude Jr.,
“The Balance of Power is a system of political dynamics that comes into play whenever a
society articulates itself into a number of mutually independent local states. . . In such a
world the Balance of Power operates in a general way to keep the average caliber of
states low in terms of every criterion for the measurement of political power.
Another aspect of power is human resource, yet it alone is not enough to sustain
power or substitute for other necessary components of power. Large human resources
however, can give access to large armed forces and can add to enhance and or facilitate
29. mis. L. Claude, Jr. “A Critique of the Balance of Power,” in Power and International
Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), 44.
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political power within the context of world politics. As echoed by Oche, a country’s
military power can be measured essentially by the size of its armed forces and the
number and diversity of the weapons it possesses.3°
Nigeria. in spite of her enormous human resources (about 140,000,000 people),
her equally impressive natural resources, such as crude oil and other minerals, lacks an
equally impressive global political strength. One of the main reasons for this deficiency
stems from Nigeria’s lack of adequate socioeconomic structure, sustainable economic
structure and other such power—enhancing/facilitating elements as indicated above.
The main reason for Nigeria’s the lack of adequate economic development, can be
attributed to Nigeria’s undisciplined past and present leaderships (both military and
civilian). Other reasons are also due to the unequal terms of trade between the developed
world (mostly Europe and North America), and the developing world (all of Africa and
other regions of the world). Echoing the same sentiments on the unequal terms of trade;
Sunday Dare points to the insatiable appetite of the Western countries for Africa’s
diverse natural resources, as the main precipitant to perpetuate the urge for the
exploitation of the African people; initially in form of colonization and more recently,
globalization.3’
Within the continent and context of Africa and within the African, particularly in
the West African region, Nigeria’s population and her military strength (the size and
30. Ogaba Oche, “Nigeria As A Regional Power And Representative In A Reformed
United Nations Security Council”: in Nigeria and the Development ofAfrican Union, ed. Bola A.
Akinterinwa (Nigeria: Vantage, 2005), 103.
31. Sunday Dare, A Continent In Crisis: Africa and Globalization, “Dollars & Sense”
(July/August, 2001): 30-32
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military equipments), and as stated by Ogaba Oche, “the size of Nigeria’s armed forces,
which is 76, 000 strong, makes it the 46th largest in the world and one of the largest in
Africa,”32 affords her the ability as a regional power. Her military strength as the fourth
largest United Nation (UN) troop contributor also makes her a potential global political
power.
In the evaluation of almost all political crises that have occurred in several
different African countries since Nigeria’s political independence, there is hardly any
such incidence that did not involve Nigeria’s military assistance, in one form or the
other—either military equipment and/or troops. These findings are not in line with the
common assertion by some political scholars that, Nigeria seeks regional hegemony.
Thus far, what the inquiry in this chapter and the previous one shows, is that
Nigeria, from the time of her political independence to the present, has remained
committed to all causes that aim to liberate Africa and Africans from economic and for
political hardship and despite some assertions of her hegemonic intent, Nigeria has
remained steadfast in her quest for a peaceful Africa. For Nigeria to move forward
towards a better economic development and economic sustaining state, she has to be
recognized beyond her current commonly inferred status of an aspiring regional
hegemon.
Nigeria and the United Nations Security Council
Proponents ofNigeria’s viability and need for a seat in the UNs Security Council,
point to her peacekeeping endeavors as part of Nigeria’s attribute as a viable political
32. Ogaba Oche, “Nigeria as A Regional Power and Representative in A Reformed
United Nations Security Council,” 95-1 14.
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entity within the global political environment. Case in point, “Nigeria’s record in peace
keeping operations worldwide, and particularly in Africa, is impressive and second to
none in Africa. The record is a reflection of unwavering commitment to peace as
instrument of national and African development. This commitment is explained not just
by funding but also by troops’ contribution.”33 What is being expressed here by
Akinterinwa is that not only does Nigeria have the capacity (resource wise) but she has
also met the requirements in terms of her versatile contributions and commitment to
peace around the Africa and the world alike.
The expansion of the United Nations Security Council to include major countries
from the developing world, particularly from the continent of Africa, is a fundamental
necessity. Advocates for the expansion, indicate that the primary reason for the
enlargement of the UN’s Security Council, is for a more global representation. In
addition to becoming more globally representative, Iweribor and Uhomoibhi further
contend that, the UNSC should be enlarged, to represent a more democratic, transparent,
effective and accountable agency, geared for the improvement of human welfare and the
resolution of conflict word-wide.34
On the other hand, there are those who argue differently, particularly those
permanent members in United Nations Security Council, who represent continents with
fewer nations than Africa. For example, the continent of Europe with 46 countries
33. Bola A. Akinterinwa, “Nigeria and Permanent Membership of the United Nations
Security Council: Dynamics and Definienda” in Nigeria and the Development ofAfrican Union,
ed. Bola A. Akinterinwa (Nigeria: Vantage, 2005), 35- 86.
34. Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi, “Nigeria’s Role in Africa’s Development,” 2-7.
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compare to the continent of Africa with 53 countries (see Table 5), believes that Africa
should be equally represented.
Table 5. Structure of an Enlarged UNSC as Recommended by the High-Level Panel
Option A
Number of Rec. New Rec. 2-Yr.
Regional Number of P/Seats P/Seats Seats
Areas Seats Now Renewable Renewable Total Seats
Africa 55 0 2 4 6
Asia and Pacific 56 1 2 3 6
Europe 47 3 1 2 6
America 35 1 1 4 6
Total 191 5 6 13 24
Option B
Number of Rec. 4-Yr. Rec. 2-Yr.
P/Seats Seats Seats
Now Renewable Renewable Total Seats
Africa 0 2 4 6
Asia and Pacific 1 2 3 6
Europe 3 2 1 6
America 1 2 3 6
Total 5 8 11 24
Source: Nigeria and Permanent Membership of the United Nations Security Council
(Adopted from the Report of the High-level Panel).
It is important to note that, those with permanent memberships in the UNSC also
represent continents with the most industrialized countries. Despite these countries’
military powers, economic might as well as being committed to world peace,
Akenterinwa questions how many of their citizens were engaged to the maintenance of
peace in Africa. In as much as they may be contributing funds, funding alone does not
maintain peace nor resolve crises.35 Those who argue for African permanent
membership in the United Nations Security Council claim that it is only Africans who
can better represent Africa.
35. Akinterinwa, Preface, in Nigeria and the Development ofAfrican Union, 43-46.
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On the issue of African representation in the United Nations Security Council on
a permanent basis, some proponents for Nigeria’s membership argue that Nigeria should
at least occupy one of the seats supposedly reserved for Africa. In their argument, they
point to the criteria set forth by the high-level panel on the review of the UN Charter,
which includes that the eligible country must contribute most to UN financially, militarily
and diplomatically should have their involvement in decision-making increased.. •36
It is important to note here that, the United Nations former Secretary General,
Kofi Annan, established a high-level Panel to look into the possibility of the enlargement
of the United Nations Security Council. The UNSC is charged with maintaining peace
and security around the world. For the past decade and half, the numbers of crises around
the world have increased, thereby increasing activities of the UNSC. This issue has
necessitated many UN member-states to advocate for more representation at the UNSC
on permanent basis. Currently there are “only five powerful countries sit as “permanent
members” along with ten other member states, elected every two years, for a two-year
terms.”37
Since the debate has been for ways to enlarge the United Nations Security
Council, the High-level Panel has a mandate to come up with ways to improve the UN
Charter, bearing in mind “the adoption of the United Nations Millennium Declaration on
8 September 2000 by which member states resolved to intensify efforts ‘to achieve a
comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all aspects’ renewed and even increased
36. Akinterinwa, “Nigeria and Permanent Membership of the United Nations Security
Council: Dynamics and Definienda,” 63.
37. http://www.globalpoIicy.org/security/index.htm (accessed April 16, 2009).
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the scope of work of the working group. .“~ One of the recommendations of the High-
level Panel was that the United Nations Security Council should be expanded or enlarged
to accommodate the countries with significant number of input to the UN in terms of
financial, military and diplomatic sphere, to be part of the decision-making body.
Secondly, countries that are more representative of the broader membership of the
UN should be brought into the decision-making process; the effectiveness of the United
Nations Security Council must not be allowed to be impaired; and the United Nations
Security Council should be made more democratic and accountable. They concluded their
recommendation with a suggested format of expanding the United Nations Security
Council with option A and B, (see Table 5).
Based on the recommended set criteria as listed above, proponents for Nigeria’s
permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council contend that, as a result of
her peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Africa and around the world, Nigeria is the
most eligible Black African state to represent the black people of the world.
Furthermore, Akenterinwa contends that, “as at today, it is the British people that are
represented with Britain’s permanent membership of the UNSC. In the same vein, it is
the Americans, the Chinese, the French, etc. that are represented with the US, China’s
and France’s membership of the UNSC. So there is the need to have the Black people of
the world also represented.”39
38. Akinterinwa, “Nigeria and Permanent Membership of the United Nations Security
Council: Dynamics and Definienda,” 35- 86.
39. Ibid.
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It was essential to evaluate literatures dealing with Nigeria and the United
Nations, because within the UN organization, Nigeria plays an important security role (in
terms of troop contribution, peacekeeping/peace enforcement). The need to discuss
Nigeria’s qualification as Africa’s permanent representative in the United Nations
Security Council is therefore, relevant to the analysis ofNigeria’s peacekeeping roles
both regionally and globally.
CHAPTER IV
DATA ANALYSIS
This study analyzes the literature reviewed in Chapter I, via the inter-agency
framework for conflict analysis in transition (IAFCA) approach and the contemporary
history approach. These approaches are different and as such, will be treated separately.
The choice of IAFCA is primarily because it addresses peacekeeping dynamics (violent
conflicts, ongoing responses, strategic and transition planning), and focuses on the
characteristics key conflict factors, capacities for peace and mapping of ongoing
responses, involved with peacekeeping. The contemporary history approach is also used
because it analyzes peacekeeping from past and present perspective. These two
viewpoints are analyzed in respect of peacekeeping in West Africa.
The contemporary history viewpoint on Nigeria’s roles in West Africa it is
important to note that historically, Nigeria, from time of independence has sort ways to
help rid Africa of colonial rule. Equally, Nigeria has continued to extensively
contributed resources to course relating to Africa’s freedom from colonization. Nigeria
has extended her roles in Africa and West Africa in particular, to include: diplomatic,
economic assistance, cultural exchange, social and economic integration, peace
enforcement and peacekeeping. These stated roles are better presented from the
viewpoint of contemporary history, because the contemporary history utilizes descriptive
characteristics to analyze events. By so doing, details ofNigeria’s commitment to
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ECUWAS/ECOMOG, as well as the case studies of Liberia and Sierra Leone, are
presented sequentially.
Nigeria’s Commitment to ECOWAS and ECOMOG
Since its inception, Nigeria has remained committed to the Economic Community
of West African States (ECUWAS) and by extension, its monitoring group (ECOMOG).
Nigeria’s commitment to these organizations is examined in relationship to her
peacekeeping efforts in the West African region.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECUWAS) was established in 1975,
and is made up fifteen countries (see Figure 3), essentially to facilitate economic
integration among the West African States, to raise the standard of living of its citizens,
as well as to foster socioeconomic and sociopolitical relationship between its member-
states. The initiative for ECOWAS stemmed from a desire by some of the member
states, particularly Nigeria, for an economically and/or politically stable and developing
region. In addition to championing the initiative, Nigeria has continued to commit to its
existence, operation and by extension, the Economic Community of West African States
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).
Along the line ofNigeria’s commitment to ECUWAS, Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi
assert that, Nigeria contributes thirty-one percent of ECUWAS total annual budget and
on occasions supplied other resources such as petroleum products and Nigeria has helped
to construct new roads to link up member states.1 As stated earlier, after the years of
wonder, 1957-1962, many of these newly independent African states, particularly the









Figure 3. Map Showing ECOWAS Countries
Source: http://images.google.comlimages?um 1 &hl en&tbs isch: 1 &q map of+
of+west+africa&sa=N&start=54&ndsp 18
West African states, were glad to attain independence but looked forward to complete
independence for all African states.
Nigeria had always campaigned and aspired for total African independence from
their European colonizers. But after the experience of her 30-month long civil war
(Nigeria/Biafra, 1967-1970), and the experience of colonization, the need for total
African freedom from colonization, became more urgent. Therefore, Nigeria stepped up
her efforts towards the attainment of this goal.
Apart from augmenting the goal of total political independence for Africa with
both financial and human resource assistance, Nigeria also sought ways to enhance an
eventual economic integration in the West African region in the interim, and later to
include OAU/AU member-states. As stated earlier, in many of the colonized states
including Nigeria, the colonizers had not instituted adequate economic, political or any
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form of educational structure/infrastructures, nor had they endeavored to educate many of
the colonized Africans; this scenario created room for crises, including anarchy.
Incidentally, this same period (between 1960 and 1988), happened to be a period
when there was a power-stalemate in world politics, between the so called “super
powers”—the former USSR and the United States of America. This impasse necessitated
pacifying some of the newly independent African nations with the supply of arms and/or
financial assistance, so that there were less inter-state or intra-state conflicts in around
Africa. Also because the Western “super powers” encouraged peace maintenance in
most regions in Africa, they compelled the TIN which by the way, is charged by its
Charter with peacekeeping and/or peace maintenance around the world, to deploy
security personnel to maintain peace in some of these African nations under the United
Nations Security Council.
Given the fairly calm political climate in many regions in Africa, especially in the
West African region, Nigeria, though still bent on complete political independence for the
whole of Africa, began to escalate her strategies for regional economic integration. This
economic integration, if legalized, Nigeria hopes it will raise the standard of living of
many Africans regionally and on the continent level as well.2
With the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975 (made up of 16 West African states
initially and currently 15), and the subsequent victory in Zimbabwe by Mr. Robert
Mugabe—Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), Nigeria was beginning to attain
2. Bola A. Akinterinwa, “Nigeria and Permanent Membership of the United Nations
Security Council: Dynamics and Definienda,” in Nigeria and the Development ofAfrican Union,
ed. Bola A. Akinterinwa (Nigeria: Vantage, 2005), 35- 86.
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its goals. As with any establishment ECOWAS had its challenges especially in the areas
of funds needed to sustain the basic day-to-day/ECOMOG’ s operations. As noted by a
former Nigerian president Babangida, “while appreciating the serious balance of payment
problems facing Member States I implore members who are not up-to-date in their
contributions to intensify effort to liquidate them. . .“~
Adding to the lack of funds, which is a drawback, ECOWAS suffers from the
perceived Anglo-phone/Franco-phone dichotomy a situation which infers that, there
was some level of mistrust between the English speaking states and the French speaking
ones. Another reason though, more speculative, than factual, was the language barrier
between the English speaking group and the French speaking ones.
There were other issues too, such as the often commonly asserted notion by some
political propagandists that, Nigeria’s intent for and effort in the formation of ECOWAS,
stems from an ulterior desire for regional hegemony. The issues discussed above further
retard the achievement of the main idea for the establishment of ECOWAS which was
an economic integration, socio-economic and socio-political relationship among its
member-states.
Some progress though has been made, such as the construction of the coastal
Trans-West African Highway, the execution of INTERCOM, the operation of the Brown
Card Scheme and the implementation of protocols on free movement of persons, right of
residence and establishment. As stated in Nigeria and the ECU WAS since 1985, “The
3. Address by General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, at the 12Th Summit of the
ECOWAS held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, June29 30, 1989, in Nigeria and the ECUWAS
since 1985: Towards A Dynamic Regional Integration by President Ibrahim B. Babangida,
(Nigeria: Fourth Dimension, 1991), 91.
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first major area of activity of the ECOWAS was the dismantling of barriers to trade in the
sub-region as the initial steps towards trade expansion. Agreement on these schemes,
however, was not reached until May 1980 at the Third Summit of the Authority of Heads
of States and government.”4
Subsequent to the summit, there were so many interesting initiatives taken and
planned by ECOWAS community. These initiatives were in the areas of trade
liberation; transport and communication, free movement of persons, defense co
operation, the fund for co-operation, compensation and development (Fund), and
executive secretariat. But implementation of these initiatives had many problems and as
it was stated in Nigeria and the ECO WAS since 1985:
Quotas on industrial products were to be lifted between May 28, 1981 and
May 28, 1989. For the More Developed Countries (MDCs), this took effect from
May 28, 1979 with regards to Community priority goods. Non-tariff barriers were
scheduled to be lifted between May 28, 11981 and May 28, 1985. Rules of origin
were to be applied gradually: industrial enterprises producing goods in the
Community would have 20 per cent of their equity in the hands of nationals of the
Member States by May 28, 1981, 35 per cent by May 1983 and 57 per cent by
May 28, 1989. . . The delay in the adoption of the first phase was partly due to the
failure to employ the requisite personnel at the secretariat from the onset.
Another aspect of the problem was from the perceptions of the West African
Economic Community (CEAO) and the Mano River Union (MRU) with regards
to the first phase. Both believe that Article 20 of the Treaty of Lagos is inimical to
their interest . .
4. “A Decade of Integration in the ECOWAS,” Nigeria and the ECO WAS since
1985: Towards a dynamic regional Integration. Forwarded by President Ibrahim B.




Despite different problems affecting the ECOWAS community initiatives,
including funding, the organization was able to achieve some success with some of the
initiatives. For example, “by 1985, the telecommunication network in the sub-region had
received a face-lift. INTELCOM I, the infrastructural development aspect had proceeded
satisfactorily with active participation of the ECOWAS Fund.”6 ECOWAS also
succeeded in erecting the ECOWAS secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria.
Other problems however, surfaced to set the community’s progress back
especially with the implementation of the free movement of persons. From the onset, the
protocol was not quite clear the ratification was hastily done and equally
misinterpreted, which resulted in massive immigration particularly from the less
developed states to the more developed ones; so that, “by 1982, illegal immigration in
Nigeria from Benin, Ghana, Niger and Togo numbered about 2 million. Many of these
immigrants were employed at wages below the statutory national minimum, thus
exacerbating the unemployment problem which was then at about 15 percent. Their
presence created the need for more social overhead cost in terms of more schools,
hospitals, etc.”7 There were other immigration related problems, apart from social-
economic issues; there were religious issues that somewhat spilled over into socio





The more significant part of the immigration problem was that large segment of
these immigrants, were of diverse religious persuasions and political beliefs, susceptible
to local political manipulations by devious political leaders in Nigeria. These, in fact,
became inevitable in the political and socio-economic crisis that ensued in Nigeria as
from the early 1980s about mid 1988s. In the report of the Aniagolu’s Commission on
the Maitasine (Islamic extremist movement that resulted in the killing of many Muslims
in Northern Nigeria) uprising in 1980, ECOWAS illegal emigrants were said to be
effectively involved. As a result of this pressure and the calculation that the emigrants
could be mobilized into an army of thugs at the October 1983 general elections, the
government in January of that year expelled the illegal emigrants.8 In spite of the above
socioeconomic problems, the ECOWAS community did overcome these setbacks and
obstacles and forged ahead with the integration and arrangements, for further
implementation of various projects. At each summit, treaties were signed and protocols
set for new agendas.
Subsequently, as the conflict in Liberia continued to escalate and in accordance
with the provisions contained in the ECOWAS mutual defense treaty of 1981, signed in
Freetown which authorizes ECOWAS member-states to intervene with force when the
security of a member-state is threatened, ECOWAS members therefore, could not stand
by while the peace and tranquility they so desperately wished and needed for the
realization of regional economic integration evaporate. After all, economic
stability/sustainability and peaceful tranquil environment are not mutually exclusive; one
enhances and reinforces the other.
8. Ibid., 20-21.
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Given the noncommittal attitude of the world community, ECOWAS members
therefore, had to devise a means to attend to the rather pressing Liberian crisis. It is
important to note that before 1990, ECOWAS had no unit within it, nor did it commit or
set aside resources to deal with security issues. However, in the wake of the Liberian
crisis, ECOWAS in desperate need for a necessary cease-fire, moved to set up the
Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), during its 13th summit of May 28-30 1990 held in
Banjul, Gambia. SMC a committee made up of five ECOWAS members-states
Gambia, Ghana, Mali Nigeria and Togo. SMC hence formed, was designated the task of
finding a possible solution to the deplorable attacks on civilian lives in Liberia and the
rising security concern to other neighboring states.
SMC subsequently recommended the creation of a cease-fire group, which will
then cater to regional security. The result of this recommendation was the creation of the
ECOMOG as of August 7th 1990. In support of ECOWAS action, Salim Ahmed Salim,
the Secretary-General of the OAU at the time, stated that, “. . . Africans are one people. It
is hence unacceptable that a part of that people should stand in silence and in seeming
helplessness when another part is suffering.”9
A Case Study of Liberia
Background
Liberia was a created by the United States of America in 1847, by taking those
ex-slaves who had expressed the desire to return to Africa and settling them among three
9. Akinterinwa, Nigeria and the Development ofAfrican Union, ed., Bola A.
kinterinwa (Nigeria: Vantage, 2005), 3.
other ethnic groups the Sapo, Krabn, and Fante (coastal people) who coexisted for
centuries in the today’s Liberia (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Map of Liberia:
Source: http: media.maps.comlmagellanllmages/LIBERI-W 1 .gif
According to Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia:
98
American Colonization Society, organized Dec., 1816 Jan., 1817, at Washington,
DC, to transport free blacks from the United States and settled them in Africa.
The freeing of many slaves, principally by idealists, created a serious problem in
that no sound provisions were made for establishing them in society on an equal
basis with white Americans anywhere in the United States. Robert Finley,
principal founder of the colonization society, found much support among
prominent men, notably Henry çj~y. Money was raised with some indirect help
from the federal government when (1819) Congress appropriated $100,000 for
returning to Africa blacks illegally brought to the United States. In 1821 an agent,
Eli Ayres, and Lt. R. F. Stockton of the U.S. Navy purchased land in Africa,
where subsequently Jehudi Ashmun and Ralph R. Gurley laid the foundations of
0
10. The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th ed., Copyright © 2007, “Columbia
University Press. American Colonization Society,” http: www.infoplease.com/ce6/history
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Like all Western intrusions in Africa, the infusion of the newcomers into the
preexisting groups (the natives) was not without its disruption of the stable native groups.
But unlike the usual European colonizers (who were of a different race), these Americo
Liberians were mostly of the African race or mixture of the white and black race, who
upon arrival began to impose their superiority complex on the natives. Over time, they
began to dominate and marginalize the natives economically and politically. Further in
the same line, Adekeye Adebayo indicated that, the 133-year rule of the Liberian
oligarchy created deep seated resentment and divisions within Liberian society and left
historical scars on the oppressed indigenous population; the reforms enacted by
presidents William Tubman and William Tolbert (1944-1971; 1971-1980) failed to heal
these.’1
As with everything that has a beginning, by the 1 970s, the inequality had reached
its saturation level and the natives escalated their agitation. On April 12, 1980, the
Americo-Liberian monopolized government was overthrown by Samuel Quiwonkpa Doe.
As stated by Britannica:
After the coup Doe assumed the rank of general and established a People’s
Redemption Council (PRC) composed of himself and 14 other low-ranking
officers to rule the country. Doe suspended the nation’s constitution until 1984,
when a new constitution was approved by referendum. In 1985 he won a
presidential election that was denounced as fraudulent by some observers. Doe
faced opposition both at home and abroad, where his regimewas often described
as corrupt and brutal. His term of office was burdened by deteriorating economic
conditions. 12
II. Adekeye Adebayo, “Regional Security in Post War Africa,” in Liberia’s Civil War:
Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, Co., 2002),
12. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic 167633/Samuel-K-Doe (accessed
April 3, 2008).
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Subsequently, Doe, a soldier and a member of the Krahn ethnic group, created
ethnic division within his administration and ultimately, the ethnic division led to
mistrust. As things began to deteriorate, the economy began to crumble. and on
December 24th 1989, Charles Taylor, a rebel leader of the National Patriotic Front of
Liberia, invaded the country through neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, thereby, officially
starting the Liberian crisis. As observed by Time Week in review, “On Christmas Eve,
1989, a small force of about 100 men led by an obscure former Liberian government
official crossed the border from Ivory Coast into Nimba County in northern Liberia.”3
Charles Taylor, graduate of Bentley College, Massachusetts, was a member of
Doe’s government but unlike Doe, had no military background. After falling out with
Samuel Doe’s regime and “allegedly embezzling the sum of $1 million from the
government,”4 fled back to Massachusetts, where according to Time Week in Review,
He was jailed in Massachusetts, but escaped in 1985 by sawing through the bars
of his jail cell. Once back in Africa, he met with Liberian dissidents in Ghana and
then made common cause with revolutionaries in Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and,
most critically, Libya, where Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi was plotting and
supporting a continent-wide revolution. In Libya, he trained in camps that also
trained men who would later play starring roles in the great African tragedies of
the 1 990s; they included Sierra Leone’s Foday Sankoh, whose rebel movement
would become best known for hacking off the arms and legs of civilians, . . ~15
13. Lydia Poigreen, “A Master Plan Drawn in Blood,” www.nytimes.com./2006/O4/O21




In an attempt to quell the situation and to initiate an immediate cease-fire in
Liberia, the newly formed security group (ECOMOG)—made up of military contingents
from the five SMC members, plus Guinea and Sierra Leone, left for Liberia on
August 29, 1990. Support for the mandate though, was not unanimous within the
ECOWAS organization Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire were not in agreement, but it
had the approval of both the OAU and the UN. Also because of fear of wide spread
regional instability, the ECOWAS member-states had to act to contain the crisis and/or
end it. In the same view, Draman and Carment, assert that:
• . . ECOWAS’ decision to intervene transcended primordial and humanitarian
concerns. . First, citizens from several member-states were in Liberia at the
outbreak of the conflict. Some were killed while others were taken hostage
(mainly by Taylor’s [NPFLJ). Second, Member states were concerned that the
Liberian civil war would have a domino effect in the region. . . The movement of
peoples fleeing the conflict across borders combined with the constantly shifting
military alliances could prove too much for these unstable and largely
authoritarian regimes.’6
The ECOMOG intervention was a heavy under-taking for an economic
organization such as ECOWAS which as at five months into the Liberian crises, had no
security division and was pleading with its members to liquidate their respective
outstanding contributions to the organization. Nonetheless, ECOMOG deployed to
Liberia with a diverse contingent of 2,700 troops led by a Ghanaian force commander.
ECOMOG was mandated to monitor ceasefire between the rebel group National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) lead by Charles Taylor, and the Armed Forces of
Liberia (AFL) in support of Samuel Doe, until the environment was conducive for an
16. Rasheed Draman, and David Carment, Managing Chaos in the West African Sub
Region: Assessing the Role ofECOMOG in Liberia, (2001), 3-4, http: http-server.carleton.cal
dcarment/papers/ECOMOG.pdf (accessed April 4, 2007).
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eventual general election. But what ECOMOG met upon arrival at the Liberian capital of
Monrovia, was beyond ceasefire operation “. . . as ECOMOG forces landed in Monrovia,
they were attacked by the NPFL, which then controlled almost all of the country outside
capital city. ‘~‘~ the situation warranted a reinforcement of intense military operation.
According to an eyewitness account, the condition in Liberia was too violent
among the different groups ECOMOG had to deal with and the civilian population was
caught in the crossfire. This situation was much more than ECOWAS! ECOMOG had
anticipated. It should be understood that ECOMOG is a group pulled together in an
instance of emergency, to further compound this position, the group was made of
different military contingents.
Secondly, the force commander did not have complete autonomy in issuing
directives, even though, “SMC stipulated that ‘the commander was to have full command
authority over ECOMOG, which he will derive from the chairman of the ECOWAS
Authority through the Executive Secretary,”8 each contingent however, obtained
directives from its military leader from their home base.’9 Daily operational movements
of the troops however, were enforced by the force commander. The above scenario
invariably could lead to a safety issue for the troops.
In some other interstate conflicts and wars, usually the situation was somewhat
straight forward, in that, there is a rebel group opposing the main government or just two
17. Mohamed Belmakki, African Sub-regional Organizations in Peacekeeping and





opposing groups fighting for the right to govern. The case of Liberia had more than three
warring factions—the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) loyal to Samuel Doe, the National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor, and other divisions such as
United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Johnson faction (ULIMO-J), and
the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy~Kromah faction (ULIMO-K).
According to SMCs report, the situation on the ground in Liberia had deteriorated from
violent to extreme violent. As noted by Gerry Cleaver:
The second fundamental problem that faced ECOMOG forces arriving in August
of 1990 was that they failed to obtain the consent of the belligerent parties to the
mission. Taylor regarded ECOMOG as a Nigerian force sent to deny him his
‘deserved’ triumph over Doe. The later must have mixed feeling about
ECOMOG. Its arrival undoubtedly relieved the pressure on his forces, if only
because the NPFL had another target to aim at. . . The only group to welcome
openly ECOMOG was the newly formed splinter group of the NPFL, led by
Prince Johnson, which was contesting control of Monrovia with Taylor.20
Given the above scenario, ECOMOG’s initial mission of ceasefire/peacekeeping
changed to peace enforcement. Since the group had not trained together as a
peacekeeping unit, the troops lacked cohesion and they were very few troops (2,700),
compared with the enormity of the task of enforcing peace in such a hostile environment
as Liberia was then. Additionally, the two-tier chain of command (the different
contingents, sought directives from their home base) within the ECOMOG contingents,
as well as the lack of funds to sustain the mission, and reported skepticism of some
ECOWAS members. All these stated challenges mentioned above, combined to turn a
difficult case into an almost impossible mission. According to Cleaver, “on
20. Gerry Cleaver, “Liberia: lessons for the future from the experience of ECOMOG,” in
eacekeeping in Africa, ed. Oliver Furley, and Roy May (Vermont: Brookfield, 1998), 225.
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the question of the size of ECOMOG the initial deployment of 3,000 troops was
inadequate to the tasks allotted to them.”2’
Part of the problems found in the Liberian crisis included different acts of
violence, from rapes to torture, and killings committed on the civilians (mostly women
and children), as well as the reported different attacks on the nongovernmental
organization (NGO) aid workers. As these violent attacks continued, ECOMOG’s
initially mandated mission of peacekeeping for the sake of cease-fire, transformed to
peace enforcement. According to the Human Rights Report entitled, Liberia Human
Rights Practices, “Although the Constitution prohibits torture and other degrading
treatment, the factions perpetuated massive abuses. But there were no reports of torture
by the AFL, LNTG-I or LNTG-II police or security forces, nor by ECOMOG.”22
It is also important to point out that SMC’s initial mandate for ECOMOG was for
ECOMOG to keep the two groups (Doe’s and Taylor’s) from fighting, while ECOWAS
members through diplomacy negotiate proper conditions for a cease-fire. But given the
violent treatment of the civilian population, particularly by the NPFL rebels, there was
the urgent need for peace enforcement.
As the conflict continued and not much physical military assistance from the
international community anticipated by ECOWAS, ECOMOG troops strived to maintain
some level of security. There were those within the international community who
criticized ECOMOG’s use of force. For example, “One of the persistent problems that
21. Ibid., 227.
22. http://dosfan.1ib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1 995_hrp_reportl95hrp_report africa!
iberia.html (acessed April 30, 2009).
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have bedeviled ECOMOG is the legitimacy of the force itself and of its mandate for
action.”23 But peace enforcement under the Liberia’s violent and volatile conditions
required some level of force. According to Draman and Carment: It is obvious that the
use of force in efforts to reduce violent interstate conflict constitutes a basic ~‘iolation of
impartiality.. .by contrast, Betts argues that intervention cannot hope to maintain
impartiality if the form of forceful intervention is limited in scope. He maintains that only
in instances where the outside power takes complete command of the situation and
imposes a peace settlement, will the intervention result in stability.24
Perhaps ECOWAS moved too fast in the bid to attain a ceasefire at the very initial
stage of the Liberian crisis. But given the non-urgency of the crisis to the international
community and the precarious position of the organization the fact that members were
concerned that the civil war would have a domino effect in the region, the desire for
regional stability, led ECOWAS to respond in the manner they did. At the end of the
crisis, and in spite of the difficult scenarios, many including the critics of ECOMOG’s
intervention all agreed that the Liberian crisis was an incredible challenge and ECOMOG
did relatively well given what it had to work with.
Furthermore, ECOMOG may not have been able to carry out any peacekeeping
mission, had Nigeria not contributed the majority of the troops as well as the funding and
other military equipments. As Hutchful indicated, “. . . without Nigeria’s massive
23. Gerry Cleaver, “Liberia: lessons for the future from the experience of ECOMOG,”
224.
24. Rasheed Draman, and David Carment, Managing Chaos in the West African Sub
Region: Assessing the Role ofECOMOG in Liberia, (2001), 7-8, http://http-server.carleton.
caJ~dcarmentJpapers/ECOMOG.pdf (accessed April 4, 2007).
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contribution in funding and manpower, the ECOMOG operation could not have been
sustained. ~ Though there are some scholars who asks what Nigeria’s motive for
such massive contributions are and other scholars such as Cleaver, who indicated that,
the Francophone states believed that Nigeria was using ECOMOG as a vehicle for
its own regional hegemonic ambitions. 26 Scholars such as Adebayo, on the other
hand, suggested that perhaps, “It will be important to find ways in future of harnessing
the important military and financial capacity of local hegemons like Nigeria.”27 Or it
could just be as Kuna stated, “Nigeria’s effort at peace building has been predicated
principally on the pursuit of domestic security through the promotion of peaceful
relations between herself and neighbours, and between neighbours themselves.”28
It could just also be that Africans are beginning to take care of Africa. As
Adebayo stated in Regional Security in Post-Cold War Africa. “There is a new urgency
among African policy-makers and scholars in the search for effective mechanisms for
resolving African conflicts.”29 No matter what reasons are attributed to the motivation
25. Eboe Hutchful, “The ECOMOG Experience with Peacekeeping in West Africa,”
Published in Monograph No 36: Whiter Peacekeeping in Africa? (Monograph No 36: April, 999),
6, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs Monographs/No36/ECOMOG.html (accessed January 16, 2008)
26. Cleaver, “Liberia: lessons for the future from the experience of ECOMOG,” 225.
27. Adekeye Adebayo, “ECOMOG: Problems, Progress, and Prospects,”
http://www.ccr.uct.ac.zalfileadminltemplate/ccr/pdf/ecomog_adebaio december2004.pdf
(accessed April 6, 2007), 2.
28. Muhammad Juma Kuna, the Role ofNigeria in Peace Building, Conflict Resolution,
and Peacekeeping since 1960, http://www.ceddert.com/publications/ceddertO06.pdf (accessed
March 12, 2008).
29. Adekeye Adebayo, “Regional Security in Post-Cold War Africa,” in ECOMOG:
Problems, Progress, and Prospects, http://www.ccr.uct.ac.zalfileadmin template cer pdf/
ecomog_ adebajo december2004.pdf (accessed April 6, 2007), 1.
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behind Nigeria’s role/s in the ECOMOG’s peacekeeping mission to Liberia, one thing is
certain, Nigeria played an unparalleled role in putting an end to the crisis in Liberia; crisis
that had the potential to spill over in the neighboring countries. Also as observed by
some members of the Liberian community that were interviewed, “IfNigeria did not
come to the aid of the Liberian, when they did, there may not be more than few of us
Liberians left. At time it looked like every member of the ECOMOG army was a
Nigerian because they all spoke pidgin English.”30
A Case Study of Sierra Leone
Background
Sierra Leone, a former British colony of about 6,440,053 people (2009 est., CIA
Vs orld Facthook), is located in West Africa and occupies a geographical area of about
71,740 Sq. kilometers (29,925 Sq. Miles-see Figure 5). Sierra Leone’s initial contact
with Europeans was through economic sphere with the Portuguese who in 1495
according to Bureau of African Affairs (BAF), “built a fort in Freetown, the country’s
capital city, for trade in gold, spices, ivory and slaves.”3’ Sierra Leone from the time of
her independence in 1961 had a relatively stable civilian government until the military
coup in April 29 1992.
30. “Comments from the members of the Liberian community” who were eye witness to
the Liberian crisis and the arrival of the ECOMOG troops as of September 1990.
31. Bureau of African Affairs (December 2009), http://www.state.gov/ r/paleiIbgn/5475
tm#history (accessed December 20, 2009).
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Figure 5. Map of Sierra Leone
Source: http: www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/africalsierra-leone
After Siaka P. Steven’s 18 year regime, ended in 1985, and Major General Joseph
Saidu Momoh, was elected president in a one-party referendum in October that same
year. The Sierra Leone’s relatively stable government began to experience some
agitation and lack of confidence in Major General Momoh’s government. Across Sierra
Leone, public revolt continued fueled by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by
Foday Sankoh, and the economy of the country further deteriorated, as a result of
mismanaged of natural resources.
Part of the root cause of the Sierra Leone crisis is poor administration of the
country’s economy which according to BAF, included natural resources such as
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diamonds, bauxite, gold, iron ore and many more as well as forests, abundant fresh water,
and rich offshore fishing grounds. Another part of the Sierra Leone crisis was
precipitated by the prevalent unequal distribution of goods and services like many states
in the developing world but especially in West Africa.32
By March 1991, a full-blown revolution ensued against Momoh’s government,
incited by the RUF movement, which was reported to have an established relationship
between its leader Foday Sankoh, and the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL), Charles Taylor. With no credible group in charge of the central government,
things got out of hand and subsequently, Momoh’s government was over thrown by a
military coup. But by 1996, in a general election, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was elected
Sierra Leone’s President.33
On May 25, 1997, after the elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was over
thrown in a coup d’ etat, led by Major Koroma The crisis in Sierra Leone worsened.
Incidentally, Major Johnny Paul Koroma, had aligned himself with the RUF movement,
but his administration could not maintain security in the country.
It is also possible that, given the proximity of Liberia to Sierra Leone, some of the
crisis in Liberia, particularly violence against civilians and smuggling of arms!
ammunitions as well as some diamonds, had earlier spilled over into Sierra Leone.
Further complicating the crisis there was also the fact that, some of the RUF’s movement
32. Bureau of African Affairs, http://www.state.gov/ r/palei/bgnl 5475 .htm#history
ccessed December 20, 2009).
33. History of Sierra Leone, http://www.leoneclub.org!index. php?option=com
ntent&view article&id 93&ltemid=80 (accessed January 14 2010).
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had reportedly been trained by the NPFL group, especially as there were reported
evidences of strengthening of the relationship between Taylor and Sankoh. For example,
“Knowledge of President Charles Taylor’s NPFL led government’s support of rebels in
Sierra Leone is an open secret in Liberia.”34
Additionally, Foday Sankoh was himself very visible in what was known as
Greater Liberia, especially between the periods 1991 to 1 994•~~35 There were several other
eye witness accounts narrating what Charles Taylor’s men did as stated by Masa
Washington:
A Liberian mother of two, who sought refuge in Sierra Leone at the start of the
Liberian war in 1990, returning home in 1997, narrated her ordeal. The outskirts
of Freetown in which I lived along with other Liberian refugees was captured by
‘our boys’ (meaning Liberians). After they captured the area, they hoisted the
Liberian flag and began singing songs in6praises of Charles Taylor. When we saw
this, we became very terrified’ she said.3
Furthermore, Adebayo stated:
• . . ECOMOG’s involvement in Sierra Leone’s civil war was inextricably linked
to its peacekeeping efforts in its neighbouring Liberian’s civil war. The
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) had invaded Sierra Leon from Liberia in
March 1991 with the assistance of Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (NPFL), resulting in several hundred Nigerian and Ghanaian troops being
deployed to assist Sierra Leon a fellow ECOMOG member, to defend it capital,
Freetown.37
34. Masa Washington, “The Crisis in Sierra Leone: The Heart of the Matter”
http://www.theperspective.org/sierraleone.html (accessed March 15, 2007).
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Adekeye Adebayo, “Regional Security in Post-Cold War Africa,” in ECOMOG.
Problems, Progress, and Prospects, http://www.ccr.uct.ac.zaJfileadmin/template/ccr/pdf/
ecomog_adebajo_december2004.pdf (accessed April 6, 2007).
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By 1998, Sierra Leone’s crisis had reached the level where ECOWAS had to once
again, elect for ECOMOG to intervene in the country. This intervention was in spite of
ECOMOG’s challenges in Liberia, which were the non-cohesiveness of the contingents
(having not before the Liberian conflicts, trained or worked together. etc.), and the fact
that, financial and logistical aspects of the group’s mission were seriously lacking. Given
these challenges, coupled with the internal political struggles within the ECOWAS
organization, the Sierra Leonean case was beginning to resemble the ECOMOG’s
experience in Liberia. As Mohamed Belmakki indicted, “The diversity of languages,
equipment, and doctrine denied the ECOMOG force the synchronicity and homogeneity
that a military operation requires to be successful on the ground. There were
communication difficulties between Francophone and Anglophone forces and lack of
overall training in counterinsurgency.”38
Since many ECOWAS members lagged behind in their required financial
obligations (annual dues and other required fees), Nigeria had to bear the burden of
financially sustaining ECOMOG’s operations. In addition Nigeria also contributed about
eighty percent of the troops. According to Belmakki, during the 6 January 1999 rebel
invasion of Freetown, Nigerian jets bombed rebel’s positions in the capital and its
soldiers shelled the outskirts of eastern Freetown. ECOMOG eventually forced the rebels
to withdraw from Freetown after more than six weeks with the loss of 3,000 civilian lives
38. Mohamed Belmakki, African Sub-regional Organizations in Peacekeeping and
Peacemaking: The Economic Community of West African States (ECO WAS), (California:
Monterey, 2005), 18, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/researchJtheses/be1makki05 .pdf (accessed
April 4, 2007).
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and massive destruction of the city by arsonist rebels. About 100 Nigerian soldiers died
in this attack andlOO were missing in action.39
Some observers indicated that, Nigeria, because of her regional hegemonic intent,
has elected to shoulder most of the burden. As Hutchful asserted, “On the Nigerian side,
several personal as well as economic motives, have been cited as principal reasons for the
intervention.”40 There were others who saw Nigeria’s level of participation within the
ECOWAS organization, as activities indicative of a member state, wanting to and doing
everything in its power to prevent political and security destabilization to its region. Yet,
others contend that, since the aid pledged by the UN and the international community
was insufficient (below that which the situation demanded), Nigeria, often criticized for
its hegemonic aspirations, continued to regularly bear the burden of the missions to
prevent what she saw as embarrassment to West Africa. As President Ibrahim Babangida
stated at the 10th session of the Authority held at Abuja, “Nigeria’s interest in establishing
effective and integrated security in the subregion is shared by other states and is designed
to promote the general wellbeing of the region.”41
In various accounts of ECOMOG’s peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, several
different reports indicated that Nigerian soldiers dominate the mission. What this study
39. Ibid.
40. Eboe Hutchful, “The ECOMOG Experience with Peacekeeping in West Africa,”
Whiter Peacekeeping in Africa (Monograph No 36: April 1999), http: /www.iss.co.zalPubs/
Monographs/No36/ECOMOG.html (accessed January 16, 2008).
41. Address by General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, at the 10TI~ Session of the
Authority held in Abuja, June 7 —9, 1987, in Nigeria and the ECUWAS since 1985: Towards A
Dynamic Regional Integration, by President Ibrahim B. Babangida, (Nigeria: Fourth Dimension,
1991), 127.
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found however, is that ECOMOG troops were made up of soldiers from several different
military contingents’ from different ECOWAS member-states but the Nigerian
contingent made up eighty percent of the force. To this end, perhaps the “dominant
force” often attached to Nigeria, fits, but Nigeria equally suffered huge casualties as
evidenced by Omoigui’s account:
For Nigerian troops, the casualty rate was horrific. Although the government has
kept mum about figures. foreign news agencies and some Nigerian newspapers
reported an average figure of 30 deaths on a daily basis for all of January and
early February, 1999. . . But perhaps most provocatively, a Sierra Leonean
Minister announced that the conflict was costing Nigeria 1 million US dollars
daily! This has not been denied by any knowledgeable Nigerian official.. ~42
Though Nigerian force constituted the largest contingent of ECOMOG troops. the
troops still had major problems for example, many of these soldiers spoke different
languages thereby, making communication among them difficult. Also the troops had
issues that should have ordinarily, deterred any group from functioning as a unit but the
ECOMOG troops, reinforced by large military supply by Nigeria, including mi1itar~
planes, and other military ammunitions, carried on in spite of the difficult working
conditions and challenges. Along the same line. Mohamed Belmakki asserted that:...
Nigeria again provided the bulk of the forces. the Force Commander, and the majority of
financial and logistical support, and this lack ot’balance within ECOMOG led to
42. Nowa Omoigui ~‘A Perceptive on Nigeria’s Involvement in the Sierra Leone
Imbroglio,” http://www.waado.org/nigerian scholars archive/debatesiforpolicy/ sierleone.html
~accessed April 13. 2008).
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unilateral manipulation of forces by Nigeria. . . But ECOMOG national contingents did
work together at operational levels. .
As noted earlier, Nigeria, spurred by her experience with colonization and the
urgent need for regional security, pursues regional peace through several peacekeeping
roles. To Nigeria, regional security/stability became even more necessary, particularly as
the attention to African issues by the international community diminished after the Cold
War. As reported by different political observers; for example, “The UN and the
international community played only a passive role in stopping the recurrence of internal
conflict in Africa, and helping to reduce the violence prevalent in many West African
countries. The perceived inadequacy of their combined response, prompted sub-regional
organizations..
Equally, Britain, like the US, lent mostly diplomatic and humanitarian assistance
to ECOMOG’s peacekeeping efforts, and until a brief military intervention in 2000 which
helped to stabilize a collapsing UN mission, desisted from playing a direct military role
in Sierra Leone. Both interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leon illustrated the growing
43. Mohamed Belmakki, African Sub-regional Organizations in Peacekeeping and
Peacemaking: The Economic Community of West African States (ECO WAS), (California:
Monterey, 2005), 19, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/ theses! belmakki05. pdf (accessed
April 4, 2007).
44. Mohamed Belmakki, African Sub-regional Organizations in Peacekeeping and
Peacemaking: The Economic Community of West African States (EGO WAS), (California:
Monterey, 2005), 1, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/researchJtheses/be1makki05 .pdf (accessed April
4, 2007).
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indifference of external actors to African conflicts in the post Cold War era, the rising
influence of regional actors like Nigeria.45
Further noting the passive role played by the international community, especially
at the initial stages of the crisis, the Center for Democracy and Development and IRIN
West Africa Update reported that, Britain’s Royal Air force evacuated about 80 European
citizens from Sierra Leone on Friday following fighting near Freetown. Tow C-130
Hercules transport planes flew the evacuees to the Senegalese capital, Dakar, for an
onward flight to London. They included nationals of Ireland, Finland, France, the
Netherlands, Poland, Italy and Spain. There were also one Canadian and one Mexican,
Reuters reported on Saturday, quoting a British Foreign Ministry official. The US closed
operations at its embassy and ordered all US government personnel to leave. The airlifts
follow hit and run attacks by rebels near Freetown. “. . . Nigeria’s claims to regional
hegemony can be made or unmade by the outcome of the war.”46
In spite of all the difficulties it faced, such as logistical issues, ECOMOG
achieved a respectful success in Sierra Leone, by reinstating Abmed Tejan Kabbah as the
rightfully elected president. Brief as it may be, and regardless of the UN peacekeeping
mission (UNAMSIL), it was ECOMOG, after the killing and hostage taking of the UN
peacekeepers in May of 2000, that finally supervised the eventual Sierra Leonean
45. Adekeye Adebayo, “ECOMOG: Problems, Progress, and Prospects,” 2, http:/l
www.ccr.uct.ac.zalfileadminltemplate/ccr/pdf/ecomog adebajo_december2004.pdf (accessed
April 6, 2007).
46. “Sierra Leone: Insight to Current Developments,” the Center for Democracy
and Development Special Report to USAFrica.com and US Africa, Newspaper
http://www.usafricaonline.com/arinzechido.html http://www.africa.upenn.edu/file:!!
E:irinw368.htm (accessed July 27, 2007).
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transition to peaceful election in 2003, with Nigeria substantially absorbing greater part
of the cost.
As was reported by the Center for Democracy and Development “in the aftermath
of the AFRC-RUF coup of May 1997, diplomatic efforts were made by ECOWAS, OAU
and UN to return the country to the elected government of Tejan Kabbah. However,
faced with the insurgents’ prevarication and the project of long drawn negotiations,
President Kabbah solicited the help of mercenaries to mount a counter-coup that was
largely supported by the international community.47 Nigeria, not about to allow matters
to deteriorate further, reconvened ECOWAS member-states for another ECOMOG
operation.
Subsequently, and regardless of the reported recruitment of the private military
company (Sandline International), Nigeria/ECOMOG forces embarked on the Sierra
Leone peacekeeping mission and together with the Kamajors (a Sierra Leonean based
civil defense force) fought against the RUF rebels to reinstate Kabbah’s government.
Reporting on the same event, Ero contends:
From December of 1998 until the signing of the Lomè peace agreement of 7 July
1999 in Togo, the RUF and the AFRC launched a devastating attack throughout
Sierra Leone. Kabbah and ECOMOG were not alone in relying on mercenaries.
Taylor’s network of mercenaries, mainly from the Ukraine, was effective in
supporting the RUF/ACRF military campaign. The ECOMOG contingent of 15,
000 was unable to respond to the jungle warfare tactics of the RUF and the
AFRC. Instead the Kamajors and other civil defense forces orchestrated much of
the fighting that took place between January and June of 1999.
47. Ibid.
48. Comfort Ero, “ECOMOG: A Model for Africa?” Center For Defense Studies
(London: King’s College, (Monograph No 46: February, 2000), 8, http://www.iss.co.za/PubsI
Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html (accessed July 27, 2007).
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Even though there was the controversy in March of 1998 of President Kabbah,
the British official (Ambassador Penfold), and Nigeria’s involvement in the acquisition of
private company to maintain peace and order in Sierra Leone, what is important here, is
the effort by Nigeria/ECOMOG troops to restore peace to the region and bring order to
an ECOWAS member-state.
Nigeria also advanced the initiative to continue peacekeeping mission in Sierra
Leone particularly after the “RUF rebels attack on UN peacekeepers in May 2000. This
led to the arrest of Foday Sankoh who had been appointed Vice-President in the
transitional government at a peace conference in Lomè in July 1 999•~~49
There were similarities between the Liberian and the Sierra Leonean crises. In
both cases, the ECOMOG troops were dealing with multiple factions in Liberia, they
had to contend with the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (NPFL), the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Johnson
faction (ULIMO-J), and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
Kromah faction (ULIMO-K). It is along this line that Cleaver argues that, “ECOMOG’s
claim to be an effective intervention force has been undermined by numerous failures to
enforce agreements and disarm the factions. . . . Generally speaking the only constant in
what was otherwise a fluid environment of shifting alliances had been the antipathy
between ECOMOG and the NPFL. This has at times led to open warfare with ECOMOG
49. Adekeye Adebayo, “ECOMOG: Problems, Progress, and Prospects,” 2, http://www.
ccr.uct.ac.za/fileadmin/template/ccr/pdf/ecomog_adebajo_december2004.Pdf (accessed April 6,
2007).
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fighting alongside other factions, such as ULIMO and AFL, against the NPFL.”5° While
in Sierra Leone, apart from coping with the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) led by Lieutenant
Colonel Johnson Koroma, ECOMOG had to deal with the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) led by Sankoh and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by Sam
Bockarie. With the above challenges as the (IINAMSIL) later found out, ECOMOG’
troops had to additionally cope with outdated equipments, nonfunctioning
communication system and many other logistical problems already mentioned above.
Adebayo further stated, UNAMSIL eventually recovered its balance, disarming
Sierra Leone’s factions and overseeing the successful election Kabbah in May 2002.
While Taylor and Sankob along with Johnny Paul Koromah, and the head of the Kamajor
(Hinga Norman), were indicted for war crimes by an international Special Court for
Sierra Leone in 2003.~’
It is relevant to point out that the conducive environment for the UNAMSIL to
eventually return to Sierra Leone, particularly after the UN peacekeepers’ killing and
hostage taking by the RUF rebels, was by the efforts of the Nigeria/ECOMOG troops,
which sustained heavy casualties. Finally, there is no knowing for sure what the outcome
in both the Liberian and the Sierra Leonean cases would have been, had ECOMOG not
intervened and had Nigeria not played the roles both diplomatically with the OAU/AU.
and at various UN general assemblies; and resource wise (financial and human), as it did
(as narrated by several eye witness counts). But one thing is certain; ECOMOG’s
50. Cleaver, “Liberia: lessons for the future from the experience of ECOMOG,” 232.
51. Adekeye Adebayo, “ECOMOG: Problems, Progress, and Prospects,” 2,
http://www.ccr.uct.ac.zaJfileadmin/template ccr pdf ecomog adebajo december2004.pdf
(accessed April 6, 2007).
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intervention in both of these crises did minimize violence against the civilian populations
of both countries and provided relative security for the West African region. As noted by
Draman and Carment,
.This fear was based on the fact that the preponderant majority of ECOWAS
member-states were governed by weak regimes. The movement of peoples
fleeing the conflict across borders combined with the constantly shifting military
alliances could prove too much for these unstable and largely authoritarian
regimes.52
Secondly, the various diplomatic endeavor by different organizations such as the
OAU now AU, the UN, and other ECCOWAS member-states such as Ghana, Gambia,
Mali, Nigeria and Togo, has added to bring an end to the crises in both Liberia and Sierra
Leone. In almost all of these diplomatic efforts, Nigeria has participated in one form or
the other. According to Akinterinwa,
As part ofNigeria’s effort to strengthen and sustain sub-regional and regional
cooperation, Nigeria established the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) scheme to assist
needy countries, especially in Africa. . . Nigeria again brokered peace in the
Mono River Union, comprising Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone Nigeria and
Sierra Leone have a bilateral agreement on security protection for the government
of President Tej an Kabbah. It was the basis of the bilateral accord that Nigerians
were in to contain the violent activities of the RUF before the arrival of
ECOMOG II in Sierra Leone.53
The OAU on the other hand has equally been instrumental in seeing that peace
was restored to both Liberia and Sierra Leone. This point has been reiterated by
Akinterinwa who stated that:
In Liberia, the role of the OAU was critical in the mobilisation of international
political, financial and material support for the initiative of the Economic
52. Rasheed Draman, and David Carment, Managing Chaos in the West African Sub
Region: Assessing the Role ofECOMOG in Liberia, (2001), 4, http://http-server.
carleton.cakdcarmentlpaPerS/ECOMOG.Pdf(accessed April 4, 2007).
53. Akinterinwa, Nigeria and the Development ofAfrican Union, 22-26.
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Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The OAU promoted the
evolution of a regional consensus behind the ECOWAS Military Observer Group
(ECOMOG), and contributed to the Abuja Peace Accord and the process that
culminated in the successful elections held in that country during mid-1997. In
Sierra Leone, the OAU worked closely with the UN, and the regional actors in the
negotiations that brought the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to the conference
table, and is still engaged in the search for a political and security solution to the
stalemate brought about by the coup d’etat in the country in June 1997.~~
It is also important to note that the roles played by these five SMC members
especially in the creation of ECOMOG was very instrumental in the minimization of
violence as well as peace enforcement/peacekeeping successes achieved in Sierra Leone.
Data analysis in this study was conducted utilizing the IAFCA and the
contemporary history approach. The primary data detailed descriptively, the responses
from the different informal interviews. A great amount of the theoretical aspect of the
data was also detailed from the viewpoint of contemporary history. Since contemporary
history investigates past and present and future occurrences, it became quite relevant for
the dada analysis of the study. The analysis was used to answer the research questions
and the case study method was used to adequately trace the cause and consequences as
well as the implications of peacekeeping in West Africa.
54. William Nhara, “Conflict Management and Peace Operations: The Role of the
Organization of African Unity and Sub-regional Organizations,” Monograph No 21, (Resolute
Partners, February 1998), http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No2 1 fNhara.html (accessed
April 29, 2008).
CHAPTER V
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
Summary
The preceding chapters evaluated data collected for the analysis ofNigeria’s
peacekeeping roles in West Africa. This chapter starts with brief summary ofNigeria’s
roles in West Africa, what the response of her neighbours have been and for better insight
into the extent and motivation to Nigeria’s commitment to the roles as well as
ECOMOG’s efforts. Then, concludes by summarizing the findings throughout the course
of this study and making necessary recommendations, issues needing reviews, as well as
providing future perspectives.
During the Cold War the East-West rivalry necessitated vying for political allies
by the “Super powers” (mainly the USSR and USA), during this time, many newly
independent nations (mostly African nations), benefited with attention from the more
powerful countries—Russia, the USA, Britain, France and others. By the end of the Cold
War (1989), there was less need for allies from the developing countries and especially
from the West African newly independent nations. For example, before the end of Cold
War in the 1989s, before then, the UN had enjoyed strong support by the big powers to
intervene in Africa. When it was thought necessary, and where it coincided with their
strategic interests. Afterwards, strategic interest faded, and Africa ceased to be stage
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where the East and West could play out their rivalries using surrogate African states in
bids for dominance or influence.’
The findings in this is this study, also showed that the stated policy at the ministry
of external affairs, Nigerian foreign policy has been characterized by a focus on African
and by attachment to several fundamental principles: African Unity and independence;
peaceful settlements of disputes; nonalignment and nonintemational interference in the
internal affairs of other nations; and regional economic cooperation and development. In
carrying out these principles, Nigeria participates in the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) now known as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth, and the United
Nations.2
The above stated policy is in line with several similar statements found in
different literature reviewed, this study also was able to deduce that Nigeria has
attempted to stay true to her independence stance proclamations, “. . .Nigeria would
subscribe to the principles. . . of multilateralism, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and
equality of states. . . “~ Nigeria could have and can still achieve continuity in her foreign
policy, with cautious contribution of funds.
1. Gerry Cleaver and Oliver Furley, “Liberia: lessons for the future from the experience
of ECOMOG,” in Peacekeeping in Africa, ed. Oliver Furley, and Roy May (Vermont: Brookfield,
1998), 6.
2. Foreign relations of Nigeria, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiIFOreigflrelatiflS0fNigeria
(accessed November 14, 2009).
3. Hassan A. Saliu, Nigerian Journal ofInternational Affairs: Reflection ofFour
Decades ofNigeria’s Foreign Policy 25, no.1(1999): 60.
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Many analysts point to Nigeria’s quest for regional hegemony. But many also
point to the enormous cost (in human and other resources) she has had to bear for the
sake of regional hegemony. Similarly, the deductions of this study are that there are
many evidences to support Nigeria’s professed motivation and intent for her
peacekeeping roles in West Africa, which is as a result of her geographical location, and
her experience with colonialism.
The study further revealed that some ofNigeria’s neighbors, particularly her
immediate neighbours, do not think that Nigeria intends to dominate her small neighbors
but rather, they think that Nigeria seeks security coexistence with other countries in the
region both far and immediate neighbours. As Metz states, “Nigeria had cordial relations
with all its neighbors—Benin, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea as well
as with other countries in the West African sub-region. with most of which it had bilateral
agreements.4
The Republic ofNiger (Nigeria’s neighbor to the North), shears a 1500km (450
mile) long border with Northern Nigeria. The people of this area shear common culture,
language, kith and kin as well as other social activities. Nigeria has a cordial relationship
with the republic ofNiger, for example, “Each nation plays active roles in continental
multilateral organizations. . . , the two nations formed the Nigeria-Niger Joint
4. Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Nigeria: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library
Congress, 1991, http://countrystudies.US/fligerial8O.htm (accessed December 4,2009).
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Commission for Cooperation (NNJC), established in March 1971, with its
permanent Secretariat in Niamey, Niger.5
Chad’s view of Nigeria: “the two countries have had some differences but we live
as brothers.”6 Furthermore:
The two nations forged stronger ties during the 1980s. Hoping to benefit
commercially and diplomatically by expanding regional trade relations, Nigeria
replaced France as Chad’s major source of export revenues. Bilateral trade
agreements involved Chadian exports of livestock, dried fish, and chemicals and
imports of Nigerian foodstuffs and manufactured goods. Both governments also
recognized the potential value of the large informal trade sector across their
borders, which neither country regulated. In addition, Nigerian industry and
commerce employed several thousand Chadian workers7
In the past, the relationship between Nigeria and Cameroon had been strained because of
territorial/land (Bakassi peninsula) dispute, but things have settled and many
Cameroonians state that they do not have any ill opinion of Nigeria. Equally, as
indicated by The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission Intentions (see Figure 6), for a
few years, relations between Cameroon and Nigeria have intensified over issues relating
to their 1,600-kilometer land boundary. . . The issues that are involved are rights over the
oil-rich land and the fate of local populations.”8
5. Nigeria Niger Locator.png, Niger Nigeria relations http://en.wikipedia.org/Wiki/
Niger/Nigeria-relations (accessed February 3, 2010).
6. Ibid.
7. Rita M. Byrnes, “Country Study: Relations with Nigeria and Sudan,” Library of
Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/CS/tdtOc.html (accessed November 17, 2009).
8. The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission Intentions, http://en.wikipedia.org/Wiki
Cameroon-Nigeria relations (accessed November 17, 2009).
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A
The disputed Peninsula of Bakassi (green) is mostly a mangrove swamp
Figure 6. Area Showing NigeriaJCameroon Border Dispute
Sources: Based on IJN sources and afrol archives, http://www.afrol.com/News
2002/camO 12 nigbakassi.htm
The Republic of Benin’ s relations and view of Nigeria - many Beninese see
themselves as partially Nigerians. “Many Centuries ago some of our people migrated
from Western Nigeria, and today many of our citizens speak the Yoruba language and
hear the Yoruba culture.”9 Furthermore, “the Republic of Benin enjoys stable relations
with Nigeria, the main regional power.’
9. Christian Kofi, “Comments on Nigeria-Benin Relationship,” (accessed November
2009).
10. Bureau of African Affairs, http://www.state.gov/r/palei/bgfl/676 1 .htm#foreign
ccessed November 2009).
126
Equally, on Ghana’s view ofNigeria, “Ghana has a close relationship with
Nigeria and they collaborate on different issues.” ~ Ghana does not shear border with
Nigeria, but shares several bilateral/multilateral partnership with Nigeria. Ghana also sees
Nigeria as a brother country and also as a “great strength in Africa and African Affairs.”12
In West Africa and around the world, Ghana and Nigeria are seen as “two of the most
important members of ECOWAS and the Commonwealth ofNations.”3 “Nigeria and
Ghana have a close relationship, and they collaborate on various issues.”4
It is important to note here that ECOMOG is not a governing body, nor is it an
established administrative organization; or even an established security entity for that
matter. In 1990 by the end of the Cold War, and at the height of many inter state
conflicts, as the West African region became home to some of the world’s deadliest
conflicts, ECOWAS urgently assembled ECOMOG as a necessary possible means to help
solve these problems and provide the region with relative security. As Mitikishe
indicated:
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) is a non-standing military force consisting of land, sea and air
components that, was set up by member states of the ECOWAS to deal with the
security problem that followed the collapse of the formal state structure in the
ii. Maxwell Owusu, “Nigeria,” A Country Study: Ghana, ed La Verle Berry, Library of
Congress Federal Research Division (accessed November 1994).
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ghana—Nigeria relations: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GhaflareI~~tb01~ (accessed
November 2009).
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Republic of Liberia in 1990. The force successfully restored an atmosphere that
permitted the reinstatement of a functional state structure in Liberia.
When ECOMOG’s was created, ECOWAS had no security unit within it, nor did
it commit or set aside resources to deal with security issues. The violent and lawless
situations in Liberia and the subsequent repeat of same issues in Sierra Leone and few
other states, presented enormous security implications for the West African region.
According to Coetzee:
The apparent aversion of Western nations, especially the United States of
America (USA), to peacekeeping in Africa after the Mogadishu experience of
1993 has placed a big responsibility on the shoulders of African leaders to get
their peacekeeping house in order. In fact, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN
Secretary-General had already made a call for regional security arrangements to
lighten the peacekeeping load of the UN in 1992. African heads of state looked
for mechanisms to manage the conflicts of the continent and found what looked
like a suitable vehicle in the existing regional economic cooperation
arrangements.’6
As a group that was hurriedly gathered together, ECOMOG had several challenges, many
of which were as a result of preexisting problems within ECOWAS. These challenges
included: the lack of funds to sustain the organization’s operations, the perceived
Anglophone/Francophone dichotomy, which sometimes created political struggle/rivalry
among members. Of the many challenges ECOWAS faced, was the lack of funds,
particularly, because many if not all the member-states, with the exception ofNigeria,
15. Maxwell Khobe Mitikishe, “The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG Operations in
West Africa,” in Boundaries ofPeace Support Operations (Monograph No 44: February, 2000),
h~~p://www.iss.co.za/PUbs/Mon0graPhSfN044)’~0MOGJItml (accessed May 10, 2008).
16. R. J. Coetzee, “ECOMOG and Nigeria in West Africa,” in ECOMOG and Nigerian
Military Interventions in West Africa: Success or Failure? http://www.oppaperS.cOm/eS5aY5/
Ecomog-Nigeria-West-Africall 13679 (accessed May 10, 2008).
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genuinely lack the financial means to adequately meet their individual domestic
obligations.
Equally, along the line of challenges encountered by ECOMOG, Hutchful stated
that, “The ECOMOG operation occurred at a difficult time for the states in the region,
when they themselves were involved in painful economic reforms and their own
legitimacy, in most cases, was subject to internal criticism and pressures. The ECOMOG
intervention in Liberia was also complicated by linguistic and geopolitical rivalries and
by cleavages within ECOWAS itself, and undermined by debilitating arguments about its
legitimacy and organization.17
Until ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia, there had never been a sub-regional
organization anywhere in the Africa that took on a peacekeeping mission at the level the
ECOWAS organization did. As Draman and Carment pointed out, “The ECOMOG
initiative, the first of its kind in Africa, was a significant milestone in African politics. It
signified a bold attempt in designing African solution to African problems within the
current environment of international neglect and state failure.”8
ECOMOG, as mentioned earlier, had several challenges including: lacking up-to-
date equipments, lack of cohesiveness among the contingents exacerbated by language
barrier, poor living conditions, and inexperience with peacekeeping/peace enforcement.
The inability to agree on some of the issues among ECOWAS members, the indiscipline
17. Eboe Hutchful, “The ECOMOG Experience with Peacekeeping in West Africa,”
Whiter Peacekeeping in Africa, (Monograph No 36, April 1999), http://www.iss.co.za/Pubsf
Monographs/No36/ECOMOG.htm1 (accessed January 16, 2008).
18. Rasheed Draman and David Carment, Managing Chaos in the West African Sub
Region: Assessing the Role ofECOMOG in Liberia, (2001), 19, http://http-server.carleton.cal
dcarmentlpapers/ECOMOG.pdf (accessed April 4, 2007).
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behaviors of some of the soldiers (in terms of the reported involvement with illegal
acceptance of diamondJmoney), and other similar matters, further compounded the
challenges faced by ECOMOG troops in the peacekeeping missions. But despite all the
enumerated challenges, ECOWAS members, through tenacity and Nigeria’s immense
financial contribution, some of the challenges were much contained.
Given the nature of the recent West African inter-state and intra-state conflicts
(often unexpected and many a time, vicious and volatile) as stated earlier, some of
ECOMOG’s problems such as insufficient fund and lack of consensus by the member-
states, were unavoidable. As Draman and Carment pointed out, “It is an accepted fact
that in international relations, particularly in military interventions, there is the need for a
lead player around which intervention efforts can mobilize. As ECOMOG’s architect,
Nigeria’s leaders chose to put the force together amidst opposition from Francophone
states.”9
ECOWAS, through subsequent summits and accords during and since the initial
peacekeeping mission of 1990, has continued to improve/correct some of
ECOWAS/ECOMOG shortcomings. As Coetzee asserted, “ECOMOG forces, mainly led
and financed by Nigeria, have undertaken three interventions of note since its inception.
These interventions were criticized widely at the time and in subsequent studies. Yet,
19. Ibid.
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some academics have pointed out the positive achievements of these interventions and
have postulated the value of these experiences for all concerned.
The problems encountered by ECOWAS/ECOMOG in the course of attending to
the Liberian and the Sierra Leonean crises, especially with the Liberian crisis,
necessitated immediate attention. ECOWAS took the necessary steps with the various
subsequent accords, for example, The Abuja Accord of August 1995. This accord, made
allowance to bring all warring factions into the transitional government; enlarging the
Council of States to six members and appointed a third civilian, Mr. Wilton Sankawulo,
as the chairman; naming LPC’s George Boley as “coalition” representative on the
council; reasserting the allocation of ministries. The Abuja accord did serve to
temporarily resolve some of the problems, particularly in relation to the Liberian warring
factions.2’
There were other matters that could not be given immediate attention such as the
difficulty of establishing sustaining funding within the ECOWAS organization. There
was the inability of the body to reach a consensus on some of the issues, either as a result
of political struggles, the perceived Anglo-phone/Franco-phone dichotomy, and the issue
of troops training, or combination of all of the above. But there have also been
subsequent Summits that have and addressed and continue to address these matters. For
20. R. J. Coetzee, “ECOMOG and Nigeria in West Africa”, in ECOMOG and Nigerian
Military Interventions in West Africa: Success or Failure? http://www.oppapers.com essays!
comog-Nigeria-West-Africall 13679 (accessed May 10, 2008).
21. Mohamed Belmakki, African Sub-regional Organizations in Peacekeeping and
Peacemaking: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), (California:
Monterey, 2005), 12, http:Hwww.ccc.nps.navy.mil!researchltheSeS!belmakkiOS.pdf (accessed
April 4, 2007).
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example, “Assessing the Liberia and Sierra Leone operations in 1998, ECOWAS
ministers decided that ECOMOG should form the basis of a regional peacekeeping
mechanism.”22
Furthermore, the underdeveloped economy of all ECOWAS member-states, plus
extensive economic hardships, brought on by the various (hardship exacerbating
programs) such as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP), and the devaluation of these
states’ currencies, have all combined to escalate various economic political instability
andJor crises.
In the analysis ofNigeria’s peacekeeping roles in the West African region, the
study revealed that, Nigeria has attempted to stay true to her proclamations at
independence, “...Nigeria would subscribe to the principles.. . of multilateralism, peaceful
resolution of conflicts, and equality of states. ,,23 Nigeria could have achieved and can
still achieve continuity in her foreign policy, with cautious contribution of funds.
Many analysts point to Nigeria’s quest for regional hegemony. But many also
point to the enormous cost (in human and other resources) she has had to bear for the
sake of regional hegemony. Similarly, the findings of this study are that there is much
evidence to support Nigeria’s professed motivation and intent for her peacekeeping roles
in West Africa, which is as a result of her geographical location, and her experience with
colonialism. According to Magbadelo,
22. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africak0Uflt FOfiIes/’2364O29 .stm (accessed May 10,
2009).
23. Hassan A. Saliu, Nigerian Journal ofInternational Affairs: Reflection ofFour
ecades ofNigeria’s Foreign Policy, 25, no.1 (1999): 60.
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The zeal, with which Nigerian nationalists prosecuted the struggle for political
autonomy of the countries of Africa from colonial bondage, has continued to
reproduce itself in the policies and programmes of the successive post-colonial
Governments ofNigeria. Indeed, Nigeria’s consistency in her concern for Africa
is evident in the adoption of Africa as the cornerstone of the country’s foreign
policy. The country’s African diplomacy centers around five broad strands. 24
Whether the ECOWAS decision to intervene in the Liberian crisis and
subsequently, in Sierra Leone, was championed by Nigeria as it has often been said, or
not, one thing many observers seem to agree on is that, ECOWAS, given what it had to
work with (all the enumerated challenges) succeeded, beyond any observer’s expectation.
As Draman and Carment indicated:
ECOMOG initiative, the first of its kind in Africa, was a significant milestone in
African politics. It signified a bold attempt in designing African solution to
African problems within the current environment of international neglect and state
failure. Given the novelty of the initiative for Africa, the complexity of the
Liberian conflict, the intra-regional rivalries, the lack of experience in multilateral
diplomacy on the part of the sub-regional leaders and the difficult financial and
political circumstances within which ECOMOG had to operate Overall, the
ECOMOG initiative is indicative of a number of lessons both for policy and
theory on peacekeeping in Africa.25
It must also be remembered that as at the time ECOWAS was involved with the
crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone, there were many different political crises taking place
in different regions in Africa. Some of these unrests and their seriousness perhaps
induced ECOWAS members to make the decision to intervene in Liberia and Sierra
Leone. For example, in the early to mid 1 990s, there were serious political crisis in
Angola, Burundi, the ethnic conflict in Rwanda that resulted in where at least eight-
hundred thousand people lost their lives as well as the tribal/racial problems in the Sudan.
24. Magbadelo, “Nigeria and Africa’s Development Concerns,” 39.
25. Draman, and Carment, Managing Chaos in the West African Sub-Region: Assessing
the Role ofECOMOG in Liberia.
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All the terrible incidences listed above took place between 1990 and 1994,
dwarfing one of the biggest celebrations all Africa should have had as a result of the
disintegration of the apartheid system in South Africa. These incidences also disrupted
the development process in Africa, as these types of crises take up essential funds. Often
time, it is only the conspicuous participation of peacekeepers and other peacekeeping
attendees that are noticed but the financial implications are often unnoticed. Case in
point, “ECOMOG’s offense in Liberia succeeded in containing the conflict, at least for a
short period, preventing the situation from degenerating into genocidal proportions..
Given all the different political cries listed above (from the political crisis in
Angola, Burundi, to the ethnic conflict in Rwanda) in different regions in Africa, no
wonder the ECOWAS organization felt the need for their peacekeeping initiative in
Liberia/Sierra Leone. Equally, since “her own security is inextricably tied to the security
of West Africa. ~ Hence Nigeria felt compelled to pursue the peacekeeping
initiative.
In spite of the obvious need for security in the region, some political observers
such as Hutchful, Draman, and Carment, Adebayo, Cleaver to name but a few, argue that
Nigeria’s principle motive for championing ECOMOG initial peacekeeping initiatives is
for regional domination. Equally, Cleaver stated that, “. . . The Francophone states
26. Ibid.
27. Akinterinwa, Nigeria and the Development ofAfrican Union, 22-26.
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believed that Nigeria was using ECOMOG as a vehicle for its own regional hegemonic
ambitions ,,28
Nigeria on the other hand, and cognizant of the fact that political observers,
especially western political observers, perpetually insinuate that her main objective for
leading the way in both the Liberian/Sierra Leonean crises or for dominating the
peacekeeping missions as it was often portrayed, was for her eventual regional
hegemony. She nonetheless stepped up to help prevent what could have turned out
perhaps many times worst than they did in both cases.
Through the course of this study, several research outcomes showed that Nigeria
played a significant role as an ECOWAS member-state but more importantly, it showed
that there was a need for a leader. As Draman and Carment point out, “it is an accepted
fact that in international relations, particularly in military interventions, there is the need
for a lead player around which intervention efforts can mobilize. ~ In all, this study
was able to deduce that Nigeria and ECOMOG, both played their parts in the best way
they could, especially with their first peacekeeping mission in Liberia. Against the same
background, Chikwem asserts that, “. . . there is no best approach to peacekeeping
missions because no approach to peace is ideally suited to every situation.”30
28. Cleaver, “Liberia: lessons for the future from the experience of ECOMOG,” 225.
29. Draman and Carment, Managing Chaos in the West African Sub-Region: Assessing
the Role ofECOMOG in Liberia.
30. Roy Chikwem, “Why ECOMOG Is Still the Best? The Success and Failure of




In the course of this study, information gathered from various sources was
analyzed in an effort to establish the scope and extent ofNigeria’s roles in peacekeeping
in West Africa. The study also looked at the relationship between Nigeria and her
neighbors as well as the perception of Nigeria by her neighbors in West Africa; then,
through different theoretical and conceptual approaches, the study delved into scholarly
and empirical analyses of the international/domestic implications ofNigeria’s extensive
involvement in international peace-keeping operations.
A lot of interesting and insightful findings emerged from the vast body of
literature reviewed and the interviews conducted for this study and the findings are
summarized as follows.
Nigeria has been at the forefront of peacekeeping in West Africa, through
enormous contributions of financial assistance, economic aid, diplomatic relations and
partnerships and extensive contribution of other resources, including human resources.
The findings in this study revealed that Nigeria since her independence and even before
then has remained committed to achieving economic and political stability for Africa,
especially for the West African region. The findings also showed that, Nigeria remains
adamant and committed to these causes, because they are necessary for economic
development, political stability, socioeconomic sustainability and regional security.
Nigeria’s intent or rationale for taking the lead role in peacekeeping in West
Africa has been commended by some, but it has also been misconstrued by others as an
attempt to establish political hegemony. What the findings further indicate, is that the
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perceived regional political rivalry, particularly between the Anglophone/Francophone
ECOWAS members, is more speculation than factual and often exacerbated by the Extra-
African countries, for their own ulterior benefits. It was also found that part of the
political rivalry among some of the ECOWAS members, is as a result of the constant
insinuations by some western political observers, ofNigeria’s intent for regional
hegemony. The findings showed that many of these observers were quite critical of
ECOWAS initiative, and even called it Nigeria’s decision, indicating that because of
Nigeria’s need for regional hegemony, she dominated the forces and created problems for
ECOMOG in Liberia as well as in Sierra Leone. Some political observers equally
contend that some of ECOMOG’s decisions were made unilaterally by Nigerian forces.
The perception ofNigeria’s neighbors of her peacekeeping roles in the West
African region as the finding revealed, is that some of her neighbors see Nigeria as a
powerful good neighbor and some see her as rich in resources, helpful but arrogant; while
others view Nigeria as a leader in West Africa. For example, “Today, each of Africa’s
sub regional entities has a natural lead country. South Africa plays that role in the
Southern Africa sub region just as Nigeria plays it in West Africa, and Kenya does same
in East Africa.”3’ As summed up by one of the Liberian refugees interviewed, “many of
us in Liberia and West Africa appreciate what Nigeria does to help in times of crisis. We
are lucky Nigeria is in West Africa.”32
31. http://www.tffcam.OrgIPreSS/20O91iciCem~_1902O9~1~ (accessed April 16, 2009).
32. An informal interview with a Liberian refugee (May 2007).
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The findings also revealed that the ECOMOG troops (trained for conventional
army), were not used to the tactic (guerilla war) used by the warring factions in both the
Liberia and Sierra Leone crises. There were many such challenges, as stated by
Adebayo, “Military maps were not available except the tourist maps of Monrovia which
was what the initial planning was based on.”33 Furthermore, the lack of consensus
among ECOWAS members in addition to the challenges enumerated above resulted in
ECOMOG’s inadequate strategies throughout their peacekeeping missions. It is clear
from the findings, that the recent (1990 to 2005) waves of inter state conflicts prevalent in
various parts of West Africa and indeed, Africa, are more vicious, volatile, and
sophisticated (in terms of the arms and ammunitions) used by the perpetrators.
ECOWAS had many questions regarding its legitimacy in creating ECOMOG,
particularly with reference to its Treaty of non-aggression, signed in 1981, in Freetown,
Sierra Leone. This issue of legitimacy was further addressed by the then President of
Nigeria, Ibrahim Babangida, who during an impromptu briefing stated that:
We have heard of the illegality of the ECOMOG. But those who raise this
preposterous question are equally but indirectly questioning the legality of the
ECOWAS. The answer therefore to this rather ambiguous question lies in asking
the fundamental question, is the ECOWAS legal? Furthermore, people who raise
the issue of legality should promptly look at Article 52 of the Charter of the
United Nations for the appropriate and expected role of the ECOMOG and other
sub-regional organizations world-wide. However, for the benefit of the general
public let me cite this very relevant Chapter of the United Nations Charter: a
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements
or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided
33. Adebayo, “ECOMOG: Problems, Progress, and Prospects,” 2.
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that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the
Purpose and Principles of the United Nations. . .
The findings also showed that ECOWAS members have been financially handicapped
and Nigeria has had to bear the financial burden of maintaining both ECOWAS and
ECOMOG.
The findings summarized above are useful for, or contribute to, scholarly and
policy discourses of peacekeeping in Africa. They also serve a pragmatic purpose as the
basis for the recommendations of this study, which are presented below.
Conclusion
This study concludes from the findings, that NigeriaJECOMOG encountered
many obstacles and challenges in these two peacekeeping missions (Liberia and Sierra
Leone) but in the end, what mattered was that ECOWAS members were able to find an
African solution to an African problem ECOWAS members were able to organize
troops from the organization’s member-states, to prevent the LiberianlSierra Leonean
crises from becoming a regional anarchy. Regardless of the criticisms of Nigeria’s
actions/strategies, she was determined to end both crises. It is, however, important to
note, that the effort of the ECOWAS organization and Nigeria’s determination to bring
about peace to Liberia and Sierra Leone, are what ultimately brought relative peace to
these two countries.
34. President Ibrahim Babangida, “Impromptu Press Briefing: The Imperative Features
Of Nigerian Foreign Policy and the Crisis in Liberia, 1990,” in Nigeria and the ECOWAS since
1985: Towards A Dynamic Regional Integration, by President Ibrahim B. Babangida, (Nigeria:
Fourth Dimension, 1991), 107.
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Furthermore, Nigeria’s insistence on a stable region stems, from her belief that
economic/political stability leads to secure environment, especially in relation to her
contiguous neighbours. Nigeria further believes that Africa can take care of Africa’s
problems. hence her adamant commitment to several peacekeeping roles in the region
and beyond. To further substantiate the above statements, former Nigerian President
Ibrahim Babangida, speaking on the Liberian crisis, stated that:
Our attitude over the years with all these countries (Ring Countries) has
developed a consistent pattern and relentless effort to ensure and encourage
peaceful co-existence. Nigeria may as well be one of the countries in Africa with
less number of border clashes with our immediate neighbours. We believe that
policies that emphasize stability, and above all, we believe that crisis or conflicts
in our region will inevitably have adverse spill-over effects on the peace and
stability of our own country.35
This study set out to analyze Nigeria’s peacekeeping roles in West Africa. It is
obvious that Nigeria/ECOMOG will continue to participate in peacekeeping endeavors in
the West African region and other regions in Africa. This form of regional peacekeeping
arrangement is new and unique. According to the inter-agency framework for conflict
analysis in transition (IAFCA), there are three important elements of peacekeeping:
conflict analysis, analysis of ongoing response, strategic and program planning. When
followed, these elements not only guide peacekeeping principles and process, but also
give structure to an otherwise chaotic situation.
As supported strongly by the reflective history theory and the concept of national
interest, this continuous involvement in international peacekeeping is extensive. The
implication of this extensive peacekeeping role is its cost on the domestic economy. But
Nigeria, given her geographical location in the West African region, has to continue to
35. Ibid., 103-104.
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play the part of a coordinator, by constantly finding ways to maintain political stability in
the region.
Some scholars in Nigeria for example, have also stated that “Nigeria cannot but
thread the path of multilateralism (the coordination of relations among two or more states
based on specific norms and principles.)”36 They however, insist that while Nigeria
continues to cooperate and collaborate with other nations in West Africa, for ways to
maintain peace and political stability, she must also pay attention to principles and
standards guiding the collaboration. A good example of collaborative work is the
establishment of ECOMOG by ECOWAS member-states. Another effective means of
collaborative work is the setting up of treaties (some articles of these are contained in the
appendix) and accords, and the diligent implementation of the agendas set forth in that
treaty andJor accord.
The Abuja accord signed in August of 1995 in Abuja, Nigeria, is an example of
how to set standards or principles of a collaborative endeavor. The Abuja accord had
sixteen articles to it, some of this are the enlarging of the council of states to six members
and appointing Mr. Wilton Sankawulo (a civilian), as chairman; imposing a cease-fire
from August 26, followed by the installation of the council of states immediately after.
The OAU/AU was equally in support ofNigeria’s peacekeeping roles and the
collaborative efforts of ECOWAS member-states, to send ECOMOG in to Liberia in
1990. In spite of criticisms from many international political observers, some political
observers as well as the UN were in support of Nigeria/ECOMOG peacekeeping roles.
36. Istifanus S. Zabadi, “Nigeria’s New Multilateral Diplomacy,” in Nigeria’s New
Foreign Policy Thrust: Essays in Honour ofAmbassador Oluyemi AdenUi, CON. Ed. Bola A.
Akinteriwa (Ibadan: Vintage Publishers LTD.), 347.
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This new bold move by a regional group showed the world what Africans are capable of
achieving when they decide to work together.
Since the Liberia and Sierra Leone crises, Nigeria has adjusted her peacekeeping
policy, though still “Africa-center-piece,” the format of its implementation has some
element of change. With the election of a democratic government in 1999, “the current
thrust ofNigeria’s foreign policy is to regain respectability and relevance in the
international community. . . The grand strategy seeks to the conversion of foreign policy
activities into concrete achievements which are of direct benefit to Nigeria.”37 From
many indications, it is obvious that democracy has a direct bearing on the way Nigeria’s
foreign policy is implemented. Another way of looking at it is that over time, Nigeria’s
foreign policy implementation which by extension, her peacekeeping roles, will adjust to
reflect its format of governance, especially in a democratic environment.
Finally, in this study of an analysis ofNigeria’s roles in the West African region,
it was revealed that Nigeria has taken a leading role in providing funding and military
personnel for conflict resolution in the West African region, in forming organizations and
assembling groups to protect the region’s economic and political stability, and in
encouraging a collaborative partnership among the member states of the region. All these
responsibilities have placed a burden on Nigeria’s ability to take adequate care of her
own domestic (internal) affairs, mainly economic and security. On this issue, the




The recommendations made in this study are by no means exhaustive or even
comprehensive. This is partly because conflict, by nature, takes on new and different
dimensions with time and context. This would mean and require response strategies that
are appropriate and feasible at the time of a conflict and for the parties in the conflict. It
is in this regard that the recommendations made in this study are relevant and
appropriate. They point to specific and useful lessons that ECOWAS member-states
particularly Nigeria, can and should learn from their experiences in peacekeeping, peace
enforcement and peace-making in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
It is recommended therefore that:
1. Nigeria continues to work with ECOWAS members as well as the “Ring
Countries” (countries that surround Nigeria in all her four coordinated (see
Figure 7), through diplomatic and cultural endeavours to minimize and/or
eliminate the perceived Anglo-phone/Franco-phone differences. These
differences are seen as distracting and limiting on the effectiveness of the
organization.
2. Nigeria should streamline her regional multilateral roles and devote more of
the resources going towards regional peacekeeping, to strengthening her
domestic economy.
3. This study, highly recommends that the ECOWAS organization, in the case of
future peacekeeping missions, try to solicit extensive international help (more
than they sought during the Liberian/Sierra Leonean crises). Especially from
the more established organizations such as the United Nations—with
extensive peacekeeping experience and financial backings. The solicitation
should not however, be limited to the UN, the United States of America,
Britain and France, but should be expanded to nations like Japan, China and
any such nations with the capacity and ability to assist in times of extreme
crises. As Adebayo suggested, “It would be important to find a way in the
future of harnessing the important military and financial capacity of local
I S. S
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Figure 7. Map of West Africa:
Source: http://images.google.comlimages?um—l&hl en&tbs isch:1&q map of
+west+africa&saN&start 54&ndsp= 18.
power like Nigeria into more multilateral efforts, preferably, under a UN
umbrella.”38
Along the same line, Draman and Carment also suggested that, “UN support will
not only have the effect of neutralizing the perception that regional powers are at the
forefront of local initiatives, but it could also do much to enhance organization’s
peacekeeping influence, reputation and capabilities.39
38. Adebayo, “ECOMOG: Programs, Progress, and Prospects” Regional Security in
Post- War Africa,” 1.
39 Draman and Carment, Managing Chaos in The West African Sub-Region: Assessing
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4. Finally, this study further recommends that it would be logical and or
necessary for Nigeria to reduce the dichotomy or balance the difference in
policy implementation between her domestic policy and her foreign policy,
while paying attention to the environmental variables, such as regional intra
state and inter-state crises. Attention to these environmental variables is
necessary, given the reduction in the level of peacekeeping involvement by
the international community such as the United Nations.
APPENDIX
Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (COWAS)
Text Of The
Treaty O~ The Economic Community Of
West Af ‘can States (ECOWAS)
Preamble
The President of the Republic, Head ~f State. Head of the Revohitionaiy
Military Government, and President of the National Council of the
Revolution of Dalwmey
ThePresideiitoftheRepiablic of The Gambia
The Head of State and Chairman of the National Redemption Council øf the
Reputdic of Ghana
The Head of Sate and Comrnander-’in~CLiief of the People~s Revulut~onaiy
Armed Forces~ President of (lie Repub~lc of Guinea
The President of the Republic of Guinea Bissau
The President of the Republic of Ivory Coast
The President of the Republic of Libexia
The Chairman of I Military Committee of NaI~onal Uberation, President
of the Republic of Mali
‘The President of the [stamic Republic of M~turitunia
The Head of the Federal Military Go~rnment. Co~nrnander-io-Chicf of the
Armed ~oreas of the Federal Repubhc of Nigeria
The President of the Republic of Senegal
The President of the Republic of Sieira Leone
The President of the RepubLic of Togo
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Conscious of the overriding need to accelerate, foster and encourage tie
economic and social development of their States in order in inlprovc the
ItandatdSof their peojka,
Convinced that the premotion of harmonious economic development of
their States calls for effective economic co-operation largely through a
Recognizing that progreso towards sub-regional economic integration
requires ana~snoenlof occonornic otcntiai andinteresta of each State;
Accepting the need far a fair sod equitable distribution of the benefits of
co-operation among Member States;
Noting that forms of bitatemJ and snuttilaterat economic co-operation
esisting in the nub-region gi~ehope fer wider co-opexpliors;
Recalling the Declasalion of African Co-operation, Development and
Economic Independence adopted by the Tenth Assembly of }lemls of State
and Govenunent of tiscOaganiention of African Unity;
Bearing in mInd that efforts at sub-regional co-operation should not
conflict with or hamper similar effosin being made to foster wider to-
operation in Afric~
Affirming as the ultimate objective of their efforts accelerated and
sustained economic development of their states and the creation of a
lnxnogeneca,s society leading to the unity of the countries of West Afdca,
by the ellsnina&m of all type of obstacles to the tree movement of goods,
cupitsl aidpemons;
Decide for the purpoon of the fezegoing to create an Economic Community
of West African States, and AGREE AS l~)LLOWS:
1~OTE
I. The Republic of CAPE VERDE has adhered to the Treaty of the
Community in avcordanc~ with the jzovisong olpazugntph 2 Article 6
of theTreaty
2. The Treaty of the Community shall he binding on the Republic of
CAPE VERDE as born 1977 (date of submis~on of its ineutbership
document to the Fedeaol Military Govunmoagof Nigeria)
3. The Re~olutionary Military Republic of Dahcmiey became the People’s
Ropublic of BENIN in 1975.
ARTiCLE I
£rrablishmont and Membership qf the Crmrnsnhly
1. By this Treaty the HIGH CONTRACIING PARTIES establish among
themselves an Economic Community of West African States
(BCOWAS), hereinafter referred toes ‘the Communil~.
2. The members of tIre Community, hereinafter refuted to us ‘the Member
States, shall be the States that ratify lids Treaty and such other West
African Stalenos mayxcede Lois.
ARTICLE 2
Mew of the Conunwd~
I. It shall be the aim of the Community to promote co-operation and
development in all fields of economic octivity padicuh~)y is tire Lields
of industry, tronspoat, telecomnsunbtiona, energy, agriculture natural
resowcos, commerce, morm ni~scid questions anti in social and
cnltuml mallen for the purpose of raising the standard of Living of its
peoples, 0 increasing and nrnintaining economic stability, of fostering
closec relations among its niembers end of contributing to the progress
and development of the African cesitineniL
2. ForLbepucSsetcolinh1Ltpreedingpa1agIBphafldaShemi1~1
provided lee itt thin Treaty, the Commiulity shall by stages ensure:
(a) the eLimination us between the Member States of customs duties
and other charges of equivalent effect in respect of the importation
andenpertation c~ goodr
(b) the abolition of quantitative and administraSve restrictions on trade
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(c) the establishment of a common customs tariff and a common
comnieccial policy toimsds thrdccunhies
(r~ the abolition as between the Mmrsber States of the obstacles to the
free rflovntof,anevjcc.saralcijpita):
(e) the hamionisaljcjn of the agricuhussal policies and (he promotion of
common projects in the Member Statc~ notably in tire fields of
iuukcting, re hand agro-induslrial cntarpriscs
(~ the implcmentati~n of schemes for (he joins development of
transport, communications, energy and other infnistructural
facilities as welt as the evolution of a ~nmnon policy is these
if
(~) the lmrmoniniaion of the economic and industrial policIes of the
Member States and the elimination of disparities iii the level of
de eJopmmut of Member Stales;
~r) (lie hamonisahon. required for the proper functioning, of the
Comrnunny. of the mooeby policies of the Member States;
(~ the esUtirlishment of a Fund lot Co~operation, Compesmation and
Developrnent and
(j) such other activities calculated to further the aims of the




The Member States shaH make every effort Io~dan and direct their policies
with a view to creating fatoarable conditions for the achievement of tli~
aims of tire Community; in parliculer, each Member Stale shall take nU
steps to secure the enactment of such legislation as is necessary to give
eff~ctto this Tienty.
CBA1~ER U
InstItutions 01 The Community
ARTICLE 4
in.rfiftUkrns
1. The institutions of the Cominumly shall be~
(a) the Authority of He~dsof Slide and Goycrntneiut;
~ the Council of Minit(ers
(c) die Executive Secretaflat;
~ the Tribunal of he Community; and
(e) the following Technical and ,ecialised Commissions:
— the’l~relc,Customs, Immigualion, Monetary and Payments
Commission;
— the Industry, Agriculture and Natural Reanurces Commission;
— (heTsansport, Thtecoinntunications and Energy Caresniasion;
— the Social and Cultural Allaire Commissicus
and such other Conmisnions or bodies as may be e~abuished by the
Authority of Ifeads of Stat and GmncntorereesbbPr0~
for by this Treaty.
2. The inmiflitions of tire Coisununity shall perform the functions arid act
within tiselinsits of tire powers confeated upon them by or under this





Authority of Heads c~fStare and Gorern.nrnt
Esiabhshmeiii, Composition and Functions
There is hereby e~tabtithed the Authority of Heads of Smtc and
Governmtel of the Member SIat~s minored to in this Treat3 as the
Authority’ which shall be the principal governing institution of the
Community.
2. The Aiithoiity shall be responsible 1~i, and have the general direction
and control of the performance of the csecuth’e functions of the
Community for the progressive development of thsConisnunity sind the
a~iliievemcet of ito aims.
3. The decisions and din~ions of the Authority shall be binding on all
institutions of the Community.
4. The Authority shall meet at least once a year. 11 shall determine its ov~rs
procedure including that for mnvenisg,its mnctingu~ for the conduct of
business thereat and at other Iime~, and for the annual rotation of the
office of Chairman among tim snenibom of tim Authority.
Ai~TlCL~ 6
Council of Ministers
Es1ab1lsh.ne~t, Composition and Functions
I. There is hereby established a Conneil of Ministers which shall consist
01 (we representatives of each Member State,
2. It shall be the i~ponsibillly of the Council of Ministers:
(a) to keep under review the functioning and development of die
Community in nrwthimc with this Tteaty
~) to make recommendations to the Authority on matters of policy
aimed ~lhe efficient and hrsmunious functioning and development
of the Community;
(c) to give directions to all subordinate insinutionsof the Community:
mel
~l) toexcicise such ollierpowers conferiodon it and perfomi seth otter
duties ~signed onthy this Treaty.
Treoiy l4~
The decisions and directions of the Council of Ministers shalt be
binding on all subordinate institutions of the Community unless
othecwi~ determined by (he Authority.
4. The Cmincil of Ministers shall meet twice a year arid one of such
meetings sh~D be held immediately preceding the annual meeting of the
Authority. Bnlraordinary meetings of the Council of Ministers may be
convened en and when seressasy.
5. Subject to any directions that the Authority may give, the Council ci
Ministers shall deteernine its own preircdure including that for con’mniog
itS meetings, lot she conduct of tiusiness thereat mid at other times, and
far the annual rotation of the office ci Chaimiun among the members of
the Council of Ministers.
6. Where an objeclion is recorded on behalf of a Member Stoic to a
proposal submitted for the decision of the Council of Ministers, the
proposal shall, unless stcli objection is withdnswn, be referred to the
Authority for its decisioi~
ARTICLil 7
Decisions of the Authority and the Council ofMinisters
The Auliioxity shall dctennme the procedure for the dissemination of its
decis.ons and directions wid those of tIle Council of Ministus and [or mailers
relating In their coming into effect
ARTICLI? 8
The Erccuflsv Sees etarlas
1. Th~ie shall beeslablished an Enecelivo Secretisiat of the Community.
2. The E~ecu1ive Secretariat shall be headcd by an Enecutwe Secretary,
who shalL be appointed by the Authority to serve in soth office for a
term of four (4) years and be eligible for reappointment for another
temi of foote (4) years oniy.
3. The Uxecutivu Secretary shall only be removed From oftice by the
Authority upon lire recommendation of the Council cii Ministers.
4. The ~recuthe Sececlasy shall be the priocipat eneccitivo officer of Lire
Community. lie shall be assisted by two Deputy Eacculive Sorrettiries
who shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers.
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In addition to the Executive Secietaiv and the Deputy E~ecuiive
Secretaries. there iftea Financial ContnrI~r sad such other officers
as UeExeceslive Secretariat as the Council of Mijaisteis may determine.
6 The terms and conditions of service of the Executive Secretary and
other officers of the Executive Secretariat shall be governed by
regulations that may be made by the Council of Ministers.
7. lii appointing oltkers to aflices in the Executive Secretariat due regard
shall be had, subject to the paramount importance of ~ecnring the
highest standards of efficiency and ccchn.cal competence. to the
skaimbility of snnistninbsgan equitable disinbution of appointments to
such puns arnaxigcitraenu of lIe Member States.
0, The Exccutive Secsels~y and officer of the Executive Secretariat, in the
discharge of their duties, owe their loyalty entirely to the Community.
9. The Executive Secretary shall be responsible for the day-to.day
adininistrulion of the Cwnniunity maid all its institutions.
10. TheE eSecsutaryalndl
(a) us appropriate, service and assist the inntitutions of the
Community us the perfonnance of their functions;
Ib) keep the functioning of the Community under continuous
examination and, where appropriate, repast list results of its
exmiin~x’n to the Council of Miiiistenm
(c) nibmit a report of activities to all sessions of the Council of
Ministers cmii all meetings of the Authodty and
(s~ undertake such wont and studies and pes*xm such services teLiling
to the aims of the Community as may be assigned o turn by the
Council of Mhustrm and am, make such proposals thereto as may
assist in the eflicserg and hasmnsmmouefunclion ing and icvelrçsnenc
of lit Community.
ARtICLE 9
7’echisicai aia~i Sperm fired Commissions
Eziahijshsneul, Cansposldon arid Functions
There shall be established the following Couiunissiom~s:
(a) the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments
Commission;
the Industry, Agriculture and Natinal Resources Cccrniissioa;
(cj the Transport. Telecom munscalioiss wed Energy Qanniission; amid
(s~ the Social and Cultural Affairs Commission
2. The Authority may (mm time o time establish oilier CommissionS as it
deems necessary.
3. Each Commission shall consist of reprvsentalives dcsignatetl one each
by the Member States. Such representatives may be assisted by advisers.
4. Each Commission shalt:
(a) submit froni time to tune reports and recommendations through the
Executive Secretary to the Council of Ministers either on its own
initiative or upon the request of the Council of Ministeni or lime
Executive Secm(ary and
~i) have such other functions as arc imnpored on ii under this Treaty.
5. Subject to any directions which may be given by the Council of
Ministers, each Commission shall meet as often as necessary for the
proper discharge of its functions and shalt determine its own procedure,
including that fax convening its meetings and the conduct of bustiiess
ihererd and at other times.
ARTICLZI 10
External Auditor
1. There shall be an External Auditor of he Community who shall be
appointed and removed 1w the Authority on the recommeodatiolt of the
Council of Ministers,
2. Subject to tIne provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Council of
Ministers shall make regulations governing the ternis and condutiops of
service mind powers of Ike External Auditur.
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Conseious of the overtidiog neesi to accelerate, feeler and eneoumgc the
economic and mcmi ~levelopmeni of their States in order to improve the
Iiiingsofthejrpe~
Convinced that the psumodan of harmonious economic development of
their States caDs for effec~ve economic co-operation largely lluuugh a
dctemrinedandcf~~
Reeogulaisag that progress towanh sub-regional economic integration
requires ana~nent of theceonornjc potential indintatesta of eadi State:
Accepting the need furs fair arid equitable distribuiio~ of the bcne~ts of
Cocperalion among M~mbcr Slates;
Noting that foils of bilateral and multilatend economic co-operation
ecisting in the nob-regima gi~cbope for wider co-operation:
Recoiling the Declaration of African Co-operation, Development and
Economic Independence adopted by the Tenth Assembly of Heists of State
and Govemmentorfiworga,~jertjon ofAfricanUnjiy;
Bearing in mind that efforts at sub-regional cooperation should not
conflict with or hamper similar efforts being made to foster wider Co.
operation in Ahica
AWitoniag as lire ultimate objective of their efforts accelerated and
sustained economic development of their elates and the creation of a
Isornogencous society, leading to the unity of the countries of West Afiica,
by the elimina&oi of all type of obstacles to the free movement of goods,
capinil and person;
Decide for the purpose of Ike foregoing to create an Economic Coniniunity
of West African Slates, and AGREE AS fOLLOWS:
NOTE
1. The Republic of CAPE VERDE has wlhezeal to lire Treaty of the
Community in accordance with the provisons of paragraph 2 Article 6
of the Treaty
2. The Treaty of the Community shall be binding on die Republic of
CAPE VERDE as from 1977 (date of sutmuissiun of its membership
Cocurncnt(o the Federal Military Gvernnm~ofNigerja)
• The Revolutionary Military Republic of Dahorney became (he People’s
Republic of BEN1N in 1975.
ART!CLIf 1
E,rrablichment and Membership r~’rhe Cvunrnunlly
1. By this Treaty (tie NJGI{CONIRACrING PARTIES estoblish alnond
themselves an Economic Community of West African Slates
~COWAS), herciurafter referred teas the Community’.
2. The members of the Community, hereinafter referred to a~ ~1ie Member
States, shall be the States that ratify this Treaty and suds other West
African Slates as may zcedc to ii.
ARTICLEd 2
Aimr of the Conmwriity
I. U shall be the ainu of (he Community to peamote co-operation arid
development in alt fielda of economic activity particularly in the fields
of industry, flreispont, Ielecommuniartions, cotorgy, agriculture, natural
resources, commerce, mcoietirey red financial questions and in sodal and
coitwal mallen for the purpose of raising the standard of Living of its
peoples, of increasing and maintaining ecanomi~ stability, of fostering
closer relationa among its members and of contributing to the progrem
mid development of U~ Ahicencerutineril
2. For the purposes ml out in the preceding paragraph and as herein- after
provided (orbs this Treaty, theCommimity shall by stages cuisine:
the elimination as between the Member States of customs dirties
and other charges of equivalent effect in respect of the importation
and capertation r~ goods:
(b) the abolition of quantitative and whninistranve restrictions on trade
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ARTICLIf fl
Trjbiis.st of 1k Cuiroaviy
I, Them shall be established a Tribunal of the Ceunmunily which shall
ensure the observance of law and justice in die interpretation of the
provisions of this Treaty. 1~urtbermoeu. it shall be charged with ~ Chapttr[fl
aespoasibility of settling such disputcs as may be referred to it in
orcontance with Article Sdof title Treaty.
~~ StatUtoS 5flj O~ha1 nen~ re1~ng to the Tdbu~~l Cu~oms And Trade Matters
shall be lxescsihed by the Authority.
~0RT1CLE 12
LbrruJizailoii~fThsde
Ibere shall beprogresalvely established in the courso of a tr.insiuurml period
of fifteen (15) years frost the definitive entry into fmeco[tlusTroilY, asides
preseribed in this chapter. a Cuslnms Union among the Member States.
Within this Union, customs duties or other charges with equivalent effect on
imports slmuti be eliminated. Quota, quantitative or like restrictions or
prohibitions and adjninistrative otmlacle.s to trade wnong ihe Member States
shall also be iemoved. Furthermore, a common customs tariff in reapeet of




1. Member States shall reduce and ultimately eliminate customs duties ned
any other rlmarpes with equivalent effect except duties notified in
accordance with Article 17 and c(hcr charges which fall within that
Article, imposed on or in connection with the iiiipomtation of goods
which are eligible for Community tariff treatment in accordance wim
Article IS 0f this Treaty Any such duties or oliicc charges are
liofterrefeared toar’bnpon duties’.
2. Within a period of two (2) years from 11w definitive entry into forte of
this Treaty. a Member State may not be required to reduce or eliminate
impOrt dubes. During this two~year period, Member Slates shall not
impose any new duties and taxes cc increase existing ones usa) shalt
transmit to the Executive Secretariat nil information on import duties
for study by the relevant insmitutio~s of the Community.
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3. tp~oft1wo(2)ye~rofedloingor~jgr~2
of the Article and during the neat saceeeding right(S) years, Member
Stales shall progresswely reduce end ultimately eliminate irnpon duties
in accordance with a schedule to ho recommended to the Council of
Ministers by the Trade, Customs. Immigration, Mr*ietary and Payments
Commissicn. Such a schedule shall take into account, Inter cilia, the
effects of the redi~tion and ebminatiun of impoit duties on the revenue
of Member States and the need to avoid die distupiion of the income
ttrry derive from mqvrt duties,
4. ‘The Authority may at any time~ on the necumaseirdution of the Cow~ii
olMintoers, decide that any import duties shall in reduced more rapidly
or eliminated earlier than is reconimetided by the Trade, Customs
Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission. However, the
Council of Miuister~ shalt, not later than one calendar year preremling
the dale in which such reductions or etuninations cane into effect,
vsamine whether such reductions or eliminations shall aHily to some or
atl goods and in respect of mane or alt the Member States and shall
report the result of such examination for the decision of the Authority,
4RTICLE 14
Crrnamm Cerrnrnr Tariff
I. The Member Staten agree to the g,adanl estabtishment ot a cmnnton
customs tariff in respect of all goods imported into the Member States
flum thirdcountnm,
2 Atthecndofthcpanedofeig~t(g) yearare(cemd loin patagraph3of
Article 13 of ibis Treaty and during the neat succeeding five(S) years,
Member Stares shalt gradually, in accordance with a uct~edute to be
recommended b) the Trade, Customs, Immigration. Monetary and
Paanents Commission, abolish existing differences in their external
wstoais tariffs.
3 lii the course of the urine period, the abovc.mcntioned Commission
shall ensure the enfabtishmeut rifacomiaca customs nomenclature and
rastoms statistical nomenclature for all the Member States,
ARTICLE 15
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of the importing Member State laura the territory of anolhcr Member
State and originate anthe Member States,
2. The definition of products originating &onr Member States ihall be die
subject ala protocol lobe annexed to this Thaty.
3. The Trade, Customs, Inimigracion, Monetary and Payments
Commission shalt from Lime to time exssrine whether the mules referred
to in paragraph 2 of this Article can be amended to make them simplex
and more liberal. In order to ensure their smooth and orlmtabtc u~ratiOn,
the Council of Ministers may from time to time unread them.
ARTICLE 16
Defleclfmvn ojlradt
1. Farthepurpoocs of ihisAntirle, imde is said to tedellectedif,
(a) imports of any particular pruduct by a Member State from
ancthcr Meanbet State increase,
(i) an a result of the redmictiomi ox elimination cml duties and
drargeson that psudueL and,
(ii) ~cc~~~se duties and charges Levied by umeexpostitig Member
Shee on imports of raw materials used for manufacture of
11w product iii question are 1owe~ than the CoTteOpomidiOg
duties and chamges levied by the hnpcoting Member State;
(ii) this increase in inmports causes or would cause serious injury to
production which is cnr~icd on in the territory of the iniportuig
Member State.
2. TIme Council of Ministers shall keep under review the question of
deflection of trade and its causes. IL shall take such decisions, as are
nccecsary,inoi’derlodeal with thecausrsofthisdeflecl on.
3. Ia case of deflection of trade to the detrinment of a Member State
resulting from the abusive reduction oretimimiation of duties and charges
levied by another Member State, the Council of Ministers shall straly’
time question iii order to arrive at ajust solution.
Community Tar(~Treatmeni
I. For the purposes of this Treaty, goods almail be accepted as eligible for
Community tarilTtrea~nenm if they have ken consigned to the tenilomy
Appendix (continued)





I. Member elates shall not a~i]y direcije or indirectly to iniporled goods
frcua any Mmnber~je Coral charges in caceus of those applied to like
dornesti~ goods or otherwise impose such charges for the effective
protection of donrealic goods.
2. Member Stales shalt eliminate all effective internal taxes or other
intotnal charges that are marie fcc ih~ protection of domestic goods vol
later than one (1) year after the period .of two (2) yems referred to in
paragraph 2of Article 13 of thic Treaty. Where by virtue ct obligations
under an existing contract entered into by a Member State and ouch a
Membte State is unable to comply with (he provisions of (his Article,
the Member State shall duly notify the C~undil of Murciter& of this fart
and shall not extent) or renew cecIl contract at its expijy.
3. Member States abalt eliminate progressively alt revenue duties designed
to protect dotncstrc goods not later lhrii the end of the period of eight(S)
YciTodWinparagraph 3 of Article 13 of thinTreaty.
4, Each Memlj~ Statesbaji, nut later than ibeendsifthepenodof two (2)
yearn referred to in pui~rapb 2 of Article 13 of this Treaty, notify die
Council of Ministers of any dul.y it wishes to apply under the
previsions of parugiaph 3 of the a[oremceliurnid Article.
ARTICLE iS
Qu’rurftarjvc Rarttrjj~ij~~d Ciinunu.qiiv Goo,ls
I. Except as stay be provided for orpennitted by this Treaty, each of the
Member Stales undortuke to relax goatlually and to remove ultimately in
accordance with a sebednletij berecommeruleel by the Trade, Customs,
Immigration, Monetary and Payments C~mmis~ion and not later than
Lea (l~ years frcun the defulidve entry into forec of this Treaty, all the
then existing quota, quantitative or like restrictions or prohibitions
which apply to the import into that State of goods originating in the
other Member states and diereartcr refrain train imposing any further
restrictian~ or probibitio~0.
2. The Authority isa> at any time, on the recommendation of the Council
of Miniscern decale that any quota, quantitative or like testrictians or
prohibition shall be relaxed more rapiill> or removed earlier than is
recommended by the Trade Custorno, Immigration Monetary and
Payments Curnini~alon.
3. A Member State may. after having given notice to the other member
States of its intention to do so, introduce or continue or execute
reshirtlans ix prdibitions affecting:
(a) the application of security laws and regulation;
(N tire control of arnie, ammunition antI other war equipment and
military items;
(c) the protection of human, animal cc plant health or life, or the
jrotection of ptrbtic morality;
(~ the transfer of gold, silver and preciour and ocmi.prccious stones;
(at the protection of national treasisen; provided that a Member Slate
shall not so exercise the right to introduce or continue to execute
tire restrictioran or pioliibitior~ conferred by this paragnipli as to
stultify the Ime rnovemeu~o1 goods envisaged in thus Aiticl~
ARTICLE 19
Dwnptng
I. !vleinber States undertake to prohibit the practue of dumping goods
within the Community.
2 For (lie purposes of this Article, ‘dumping means ttic transfer of goods
otiginating in a Member Stale tO another Member State for sale:
(a) at a price lower than the comparable price charger! for similar
goads in the Member States where such goods originate (due
allowance being marIe for the differences in lire conditions of sale
or in taxation or for any other factors affecting tire comparability
of prices); and
(N under circumataices likely io prejudice ilic proiloetia” of similar
goods in that Member Stat~
ARTiCLE 20
Most .Fcr,owcd’NaIioo Treatment
I. Member Staten shall accord to one another in relation to (ride between
them the naostiavoured-naliort toentoitnt and in no case shall tariff
i.oncessions granted to a shard coinitry tinder air agreement with a
154
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Member State be more tavuurable than tho~ applicable under th
Treaty.
2 Copies of norh agreements referred to in paragraph 1 of this Ailicte shot]
be transmitted by (lie Member States which ire pasties to them to the
Eseculive Srxretanr~ of the Community.
3. Any agreement b aaMe,nber State mnda third counlmy under which
tariff concessions ate granted, shall not derogate fmrn (be obligations of
that Member Slate under this Treaty,
ARTICU≤ 21
Iraernal LegWolion
Member States shall refr~n trout enacting legislation which directly or
uo.Iirecliy discrirrinnies agaitns] the sumac or libe products of another Member
4RTICL1~S 22
Re-exporiartomi ofGoodso.ndTrcuisirFaciliikx.
1. Where castoms duty has been charged and collected on arty goods
imported from a third wuSUy into a Member State suclt goods shall not
he re-eaported into another Member Stale eseept as may be permitted
under a prolorol to this (realy entered into by the Member States.
2. Where goods are re-exported under mat a protooo~ die Member Stiles
front whose territory such goods are re~esportcd shall refund to the
MeinI~ State into wlx~e territory such goods are imported the customs
duties charged and collected on such goode, The duties so refunded shall
not exceed thase applicable on such goods in the territory el the
Member Slate imito which mdi goods are imported.
3. each Member State, in accordance with intennational regula~ons, shall
grant full and wuestricted freedom of transit through ito territory of
goods proceeding to or front a third country indirecihy through that
territory to or from Member Slates; and such termsit shall 1101 be subject
to any discrimination, quaihtative restrictions, duties or other clnmrgos
levied on (outsit.
4. Notwithslaiidingpanigrapii 3 of this Article,
T~i,~t (57
(by goods in transit shall be Liable to (he charges usualLy mode br
carriage aral Fre wry services which winy be rendered provuhed sorb
charges are iioldiscnrninatorY.
S. Wbese goods are irnporterh from a third country into one Member State,
each ot the other Member States shalt be free to mesirict the transfer to it
of such goods whether by a system of licensing and c~trolling
importers or by other means.
6. The provisions of paragraph 5 of Ibis Micte shall apply to goods
which, under Ihe provismorts of Article 15 of (his Treaty, fail to be
accepted as originating in aMembet’ State.
ARTICLIf 23
Customs AdinlnhsIralion
Member States shall, u;roa the advice of the Trade Cuslonis, ImmigrOliOlt.
Monetary and Paynseilts CoannissiOn. take appropriate measures U)
harmonize and sbuldardi7.C their customs regulations mid pccwedufes. to etarure
the effective application of the provisions of this chapter and to facilitate the
niovenimit of goods and services across their frontiers
ARTICLE 24
Drcrwbatk
1. Member States may. at or before the end of the period of eigh (8) years
referred to in pamgsapli 3 of Article 13 of this Treaty. refuse to accept as
eligible for Conhmnunity tariff treatment, goods in relation to which
drawback is claimed or made ~se of is connection with their caportaliort
front the Member states in the territory of which (be goods have
undergone the last gaorcss of~sdudiOm
2. For the purprers of this ArticLe:
(a) ‘drawback’ means any arrangement, including temnpo[city duty free
admissiOn for the refund of all or 1cut of the dirties applicable lii
ijnpoutesi raw rnaIeriah~5. provided that the anangemeflL cxpresslytw
in effect, such refund or rcniission if goods a.~ exported bul Liot if
they are retained for borne taw;
(b) remission includes exemptiOn (corn duties br goods imported into
free zones or oilier places vdiich have similar customs privileges
ports. and;(~ goods in tran~l shall be subject to the customs law: and
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(c) ‘duties means customs duties and any other charges WIth
eqllivateawe imposed on imnpoiled goods. except the onn-prteecliv~




Compensation for Loss c/Revenue
I. lime Council of Ministers shall, on tie report of the Executsyt Secretory
and recommendation by the appropriate Commission or Commissions,
determine the compensation to be paid to a Member State which has
suffelc4! loss of import duties as a result of the application of (his
2. A piolocot lobe nnntxenjto this Treaty shall state precisely the iocthods
of assessment of the toss of revelmtte suffered by Member States as a
result of the applicath)nuftisisclwpler
ARTJCLB 26
&~fegiwrdaause
1, to the event of serious disturbances occurring in the economy of a
Member Slate following the application of the provisions of this
chapter, the Member state concem~1 shalt after immfonrdng the Eaccutive
Secretary and the other Member States lake the necessasy safeguard
mmISuses pending the approval of lIme Council of Ministers.
2. These niecisajes Shall remain in foase for amaximum period of one year.
They many nor tie eatended beyond that period encept with the approval
of the Council of Minislers.
3. The Comindil of Ministers shall examine the m~hod of application of
these measures while they remam in force.
Freedom Of Moveaneol And Residence
A~RTICLim~ 27
Visa wmdReskknre
1. Citiannu of Member Stales shall be regarded ~sCenimnuiity cilii~nt and
accordingly Member States undertake to abolish sit obsixles to their
freedom of movenient and residence wilhm tIme Community.
2. Member Stalts shall by agreements with earh other exempt Conununhly
cithc~ from haldhig visitors’ visas amid residence pennils sad allow
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1c~ ‘dutics means customs duties and my other Charges with
equivalence hnpo,ed an imported goo’k eaceptthr omi-rcesctive
in sueti duties or charges.
ARTICLES 25
TrEdq’ 159
Conq,eizsatitm far Loss of~
I. The Council of Minintens shall, on the rej~ of (he Egmjtiye Secretary
and recommendation by the appropriate Comnetusion or Commiaaions,
delesmine the compenualion to be paid to a Member State which has
~uffero4 loss of impost duties as a result of Ilie application of this
clnj~er.
A protocol to be anncaed to this Tiouty shall slate precisely the methods
of lIsseOssneal of the hem of sevensp~ miffered by Member States us a
result of the apphe ~nefU~s chapter.
ARTICLE 26
SnfegaardCluuse
I. in the event of se~ioue disturbances oncuning in the economy of a
Member Slate following the application of die provisions of this
chapter the Member st~e concerned shall after iafceinieg the ~necutive
Secretary and the other Member States Lake die accemasy aifegnaish
a~asurespendjjig the approval of lie Council of Ministera,
2. ‘These aaige~ntj remain in forte f mamunlpeuiod of one year,
hl~y nny notbe Cnlcsldedbeyond that pealed encept with the approval
of d~ Council of Ministers.
3. The Council of Ministers stiahi examine she m~tlotJ of apphicahon of
the~ niancurra while they remain in force.
ARTICLE 27
VIm andRcskiejwc
1. Citianas of Member Slates shalt be regarded as Coinniunky cithcns and
accordingly Member States undeitake to abolish alt obsixtes ~o their
freedom olmovesuent and residence within the Community,
2, Member States shall by agreements with exh orhefcnemptCOmflluhihy
cilirersi from holding visitors’ visas and residence permits and allow
them to work wid undertake commercial and industsi~il activities within
ttieirtesritorie~
Chapter IV
Freedom Of Movement And Residence
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raw niaterials coreinon in some or all of 11w hirnibo Slates and on
~eririr induslriat prthtein~
ARTICLE 30
Chapter V isge 11 Hm,dzalionfliUlrial1flc~.ll(iYerd1id
Irldastrtal Devehpmenl I’Iaur
Industrial Development And Harmonization Member States imderlaketo:
(a) hamimnze their industrial policies so as to ensore a similarity of
ijiduulnal climate and to ovoid disruption of their industrial
activities resulting froni dissimilar policies in the ficl4~ of
ARTICLE 28 inchislrial incentives, company taxation and Africw iliun: and
Geriatfrbzc4tes (b) co.openalion with one anot]~r by exchanging their industrial plans
For die purposes of this chapter, Member States shall achieve their industrial as a~id n and waste of resourtes,
development and hajnwjnizaljon iii the Ilisee stages as set oat in Aflielni 29. nc 31
3lland3l. Singe 1ff: Personnel liccbange, TrarnJirg eznd Joint Ye,ilurej
ARTICLE 29 Member Slates otralll
Stage!: cIrange~1~forqia~i~, or’ Mqur (r’r&grlot Proj~cls (~ endiange, us may tie necensany, skilled, pro[rssioiiat and managerial
~‘er States undertake ~ personnel in the operation of projeins within the Commuiuty:
(a~ furnish rise aiioonis with iflajur feasibility studies and rcpcr*; ~ (bi provide pisces for training in tlw.ir educational technical instilulions
projeots within the rterrilnrios: for Community cilizerm; and
(Is) furnish one another, on request, repwos on the performance of (c) engage. where appropriate, in joint devetcrpmeull of prujCClS
prospective technical partners who have l~veloped similar projects those wiiic.li enlail the ceecution of compleinealiny pants
in their tenüorieg; of such projects in diffe tMembes Staler.
(eJ furnish oneanother, on inquest ~~ fo~J~ ARTICLE 32
operation in their tmtitthes;
(~ furnish onoanother, on request, with rcportson tlrejr ~pop~p~ ~ I. The Council of M,n~lers shall keep under ~oirst5nt re~ixw hi the
industrial projects md to exchange industrial research information iinplententation of tiLe provisions of this t,hnpter. the disparity in
aenporL~ the Levels of industrial development of the Member States and may
(e) commission, whtre appropriate, joint st~iei f~ç the jdenrtjf~alea direct the appropriate Commission of tIre Community 10
of viable industrial projects f~r development within the routed measures to remedy such disparity.
Community; and 2. In the iinpleinentalicn of the aims of the Cesnmunity. the Cauncil
(~ Finance, WILCIC appropriate, joint research on the transfer of of Ministers 5111111 recommend measures designed to promote the
technology and the development of new products through the use of industrial development of Member Slates xml shall lake Steps to
reduce gradually the Community’s economic dependence on the
outside world and strengthen economic relations among themselves,
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3. The Counril of MiniMcrs shall furthe recommend measures
gnedoucrclcrarc (be indwllrial integr~Uion of the economics of
ChuplerVl
Co-operation In Agriculture And Nalural Resources
ARTICLE 33
Cooperation amongMemberStale$
Member States shah co-operate as net ouf hi this chaj(a in the develof4liea(
of their natural resources pw1irut~ly agriculture, fOresiry, animal husbandry
mid h1sbcnie~
ARTICLE 34
SMgC 1: !~armonianIhrn ofAgricultl4roJPPliciCS
I. Member Slates undertake to work towards the harmoniraliUn of their
internal and cxtes,ial ogrmcultural policies in their relahioos with one
another
2. Member States shall exchange regolaly infomiation on enperimeida mmd
results of research being caned out mtheirfesptcbvelwito1ies mmd (imi
minting nmahdevetopmnentproglanhones and
3. Mesober States shall formable, as appropriate, joint programmes (air
b~thm basic and mn-acavice training in enisthig institutions.
ARTICLE 35
Stage II: Evolution of a Common .4grlnmltural Policy
Member States undertake to lake all necasumes necessary fur the creatIon ole
common policy especially in the fields of research, training, pradurtioti,
processing and’niarketing of the products of agricuilure, forestry. animal
husbandry an4~fLshe1ien. For this pwpnse, the Industry, Agrecuiture and
Nalural Resources Commission shalL as soon as possible, after its
establishment meet to make meconimeralations to the C~indl of Ministers
for the hurrnoriizaliOs and exploitation of natural resourceS of lime MemI~
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